Outwitting the Gestapo? German Communist Resistance between Loyalty and Betrayal

This article discusses ambiguous tactics of German Communist resisters in the Third Reich. The official historiography of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) portrayed Communist resisters as unfaltering heroes. By contrast, revisionist studies published after 1990 presented Communists as traitors and renegades. This study transcends these approaches that revolve around legitimation or de-legitimation of the dictatorship, and examines the dubious manoeuvring of three German Communists who strategically collaborated with the Nazis, namely Theodor Bottländer, Friedrich Schlotterbeck and Wilhelm Knöchel. While Knöchel’s attempts to outwit the Gestapo failed and could not prevent his execution, Schlotterbeck and Bottl€ander found ways to survive - largely without betraying their comrades. Even so, the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD), as well as its successor in the GDR, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), reprimanded venturesome, inventive and obstinate Communists, excluded them from the party and brought them to court. The harsh reactions are indicative of the inability of Communist historiography to acknowledge ‘Eigen-Sinn’, and highlight a central shortcoming of the antifascist doctrine. Likewise, more recent revisionist approaches have failed to recognise various attempts of Communists to minimise harm and survive in the grey zone between betrayal and loyalty

Verrat im Kommunistischen Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus 1933–1945

Im Zuge der Habilitation sollen Dimensionen, Ursachen und Folgen von „Verrat“ innerhalb der kommunistischen Widerstandsnetzwerke während der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft untersucht werden, womit eine dunkle Seite des „antifaschistischen Mythos“ der DDR beleuchtet wird

Legitimation, Repression und Kooptation in der DDR

"The communist party in the German Democratic Republic claimed governmental legitimacy for being the builder of an antifascist state on the way to communism. The simulation of parliamentarism also played a role and, for a short period of time in the 1960s, the cooptation of technocrats as well. In the 1970s and 1980s the most important part of legitimacy was derived from the welfare policy under Erich Honecker. At no time was the political system stable without a considerable amount of repression. In the Soviet Occupation Zone and the early GDR repression was characterized by Stalinist terror: internment camps, military courts, and harsh punishment. Rigorous repression in 1952/53 and 1960/61 was connected to the attempts to accelerate the socialist revolution (normative legitimacy ). From 1949 to 1989 a gradual mitigation of repression took place, but not steadily. Relaxation in the watersheds such as in 1956, 1963, and 1971 came to a halt in 1960, 1965, and 1976 ff. Nevertheless, more lenient times of repression brought irreversible mitigations. Especially in the 1970s and 1980s open terror was replaced by less visible forms of repression. Cooptation of non - communists played a marginal role in the history of the GDR. In the early phase it was nothing but a phase - out model. Later on cooptation was by and large a recruitment process under the control of the SED, which generated a rather homogenous elite selected by its fidelity to the socialist state." (author's abstract

Verrat und Verräter im kommunistischen Widerstand gegen das NS-Regime 1933 bis 1945. Habilitationsprojekt

University of Leipzi

Outwitting the Gestapo? German Communist Resistance between Loyalty and Betrayal

This article discusses ambiguous tactics of German Communist resisters in the Third Reich. The official historiography of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) portrayed Communist resisters as unfaltering heroes. By contrast, revisionist studies published after 1990 presented Communists as traitors and renegades. This study transcends these approaches that revolve around legitimation or de-legitimation of the dictatorship, and examines the dubious manoeuvring of three German Communists who strategically collaborated with the Nazis, namely Theodor Bottländer, Friedrich Schlotterbeck and Wilhelm Knöchel. While Knöchel’s attempts to outwit the Gestapo failed and could not prevent his execution, Schlotterbeck and Bottl€ander found ways to survive - largely without betraying their comrades. Even so, the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD), as well as its successor in the GDR, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), reprimanded venturesome, inventive and obstinate Communists, excluded them from the party and brought them to court. The harsh reactions are indicative of the inability of Communist historiography to acknowledge ‘Eigen-Sinn’, and highlight a central shortcoming of the antifascist doctrine. Likewise, more recent revisionist approaches have failed to recognise various attempts of Communists to minimise harm and survive in the grey zone between betrayal and loyalty

Outwitting the Gestapo? German Communist Resistance between Loyalty and Betrayal

This article discusses ambiguous tactics of German Communist resisters in the Third Reich. The official historiography of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) portrayed Communist resisters as unfaltering heroes. By contrast, revisionist studies published after 1990 presented Communists as traitors and renegades. This study transcends these approaches that revolve around legitimation or de-legitimation of the dictatorship, and examines the dubious manoeuvring of three German Communists who strategically collaborated with the Nazis, namely Theodor Bottländer, Friedrich Schlotterbeck and Wilhelm Knöchel. While Knöchel’s attempts to outwit the Gestapo failed and could not prevent his execution, Schlotterbeck and Bottl€ander found ways to survive - largely without betraying their comrades. Even so, the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD), as well as its successor in the GDR, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), reprimanded venturesome, inventive and obstinate Communists, excluded them from the party and brought them to court. The harsh reactions are indicative of the inability of Communist historiography to acknowledge ‘Eigen-Sinn’, and highlight a central shortcoming of the antifascist doctrine. Likewise, more recent revisionist approaches have failed to recognise various attempts of Communists to minimise harm and survive in the grey zone between betrayal and loyalty