IMPACT Radiological Mummy Database

The IMPACT (Internet-based Mummy Picture Archive and Communication Technology) Radiological Mummy Database Project is designed to provide mummy and medical researchers with a large-scale comparative database of medical imaging of mummified human remains. This departure from a case-study model for mummy studies will drive the field towards a large-scale comparative and epidemiological paradigm. The Canadian team will be investigating the evisceration and excerebration components of the Egyptian mummification tradition, and the US teams will apply the database to a greatly expanded study of atherosclerosis in ancient Egyptian mummies, as part of the IMPACT Ancient Health Research Group, and to the refinement of a novel system of diagnosis by consensus for mummified remains

The problem of church finance as it relates to Christian education

https://place.asburyseminary.edu/ecommonsatsdissertations/2218/thumbnail.jp

An Investigation of Student Perspectives on Classroom Resource Usefulness

Central to the post-secondary education is the textbook, and central to complaints regarding post-secondary education is also the textbook. Textbook use and price are a serious issue at Minnesota State University, Mankato, and at other colleges and universities around the country. Concern regarding textbooks inspires students to become very vocal, filing complaint after complaint regarding the price, the quality, and the utilization of textbooks in the status quo. This is an issue that inflames the hearts (and empties the wallets) of many students, and therefore should be an issue of concern with the university. In two separate studies surveying students at MSU, it has come to our attention that textbooks are overpriced and underutilized, and something ought to be done to help remedy this problem

Vertical structure of anthropogenic zonal-mean atmospheric circulation change

The atmospheric circulation changes predicted by climate models are often described using sea level pressure, which generally shows a strengthening of the mid-latitude westerlies. Recent observed variability is dominated by the Northern Annular Mode (NAM) which is equivalent barotropic, so that wind variations of the same sign are seen at all levels. However, in model predictions of the response to anthropogenic forcing, there is a well-known enhanced warming at low levels over the northern polar cap in winter. This means that there is a strong baroclinic component to the response. The projection of the response onto a NAM-like zonal index varies with height. While at the surface most models project positively onto the zonal index, throughout most of the depth of the troposphere many of the models give negative projections. The response to anthropogenic forcing therefore has a distinctive baroclinic signature which is very different to the NA

A Theory of Representative Shareholder Suits and its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation

We develop a theory to explain the uses and abuses of representative shareholder litigation based on its two most important underlying characteristics: the multiple sources of the legal rights being redressed (creating dynamic opportunities for arbitrage) and the ability of multiple shareholders to seek to represent the collective group in such litigation (creating increased risk of litigation agency costs by those representatives and their attorneys). Placed against the backdrop of controlling managerial agency costs, our theory predicts that: (1) the relative strength of the different forms of shareholder litigation will shift over time; (2) these shifts can result in new avenues for the expression of shareholder litigation power; (3) new agents will emerge to act on shareholders’ behalf when these shifts occur (or old agents will put on new hats); and (4) a new set of principal-agent costs resulting from litigation will arise out of these new relationships, leading to recurrent questions about how these costs should best be controlled in particular contexts. Applying our theory to recent academic and practitioner claims of abusive multi-jurisdictional forum shopping in representative corporate litigation, we conclude that these claims are both overstated and misdirected. Instead, we find a significant amount of what we call fee distribution litigation. In these cases, multi-jurisdictional suits are filed by plaintiffs’ law firms largely to obtain a slice of the total pool of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees that are paid in a global settlement in one of these cases. We show that fee distribution litigation is quite different than traditional forum shopping and requires a different policy response. We then consider various approaches and conclude that, while no one of them is perfect, judicial comity is the best and least costly option

The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions

Shareholder litigation is the most frequently maligned legal check on managerial misconduct within corporations. Derivative lawsuits and federal securities class actions are portrayed as slackers in debates over how best to control the managerial agency costs created by the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation. In each instance, early hopes these suits would effectively monitor managerial misconduct have been replaced with concerns about the size of the litigation agency costs of such representative litigation, which can arise when a self-selected plaintiff\u27s attorney and her client that are appointed to pursue the claims of an entire class of shareholders have interests that may differ from those of the class. Now, however, a new form of shareholder litigation has emerged that is distinct from derivative or securities fraud claims: class action lawsuits filed under state law challenging director conduct in mergers and acquisitions. The empirical data reported in this article show that these acquisition-oriented suits are now the dominant form of corporate litigation, outnumbering derivative suits by a wide margin. Are these acquisition-oriented class actions just another deadbeat in the corporate governance debate? Should policymakers take action to cut back on the development of this new form of shareholder litigation? In this paper, we argue that, just as with derivative suits and securities fraud class actions, good policy must balance the positive management agency cost reducing effects of these acquisition-oriented shareholder suits against their litigation agency costs. This new breed of suits has positive management agency cost reducing effects that may offset the litigation agency costs that accompany them. Our data set of all 1000 corporate fiduciary duty cases filed in Delaware in 1999 and 2000 is the largest empirical study of shareholder litigation. We find that more than 80% of these cases are class actions against public companies challenging one type of director decision - whether or not to participate in a corporate acquisition. By contrast, derivative suits, the traditional shareholder litigation that is the staple of corporate law casebooks, make up only about 14% of all fiduciary duty suits. The acquisition-oriented class actions are a new, previously unstudied category of representative litigation, an area long dominated by studies of state derivative suits and federal securities fraud class actions. We find these suits do provide some management agency costs reductions, but these are concentrated in only one subset of the suits that are brought. Settlements leading to relief in an acquisition setting are not spread across all acquisitions complaints (including hostile, second bidder acquisitions, etc.), but rather concentrated where there is a majority shareholder who is attempting to cash-out the minority interest held by public shareholders on terms that have been picked by the majority. On the opposite side of the equation - whether these suits possess high litigation agency costs - we find conflicting evidence. The acquisition-oriented class action suits have many characteristics that have been identified in other contexts as indicators of agency costs (e.g., suits filed quickly, many suits per transaction). Yet, these litigation agency costs are below the level of perceived costs that spurred securities fraud legislation. Placing our findings in the historical context of the debate over the value of representative shareholder litigation, we believe that the positive management agency cost reducing effects of acquisition-oriented class actions are substantial, while the litigation agency costs they create do not appear excessive. For these suits, we therefore disagree with earlier studies that have claimed that all representative shareholder litigation has little, if any, effect in reducing management agency costs and should be evaluated solely in terms of its litigation agency costs

Acreage, Residency and Excess-Land Sale: Striking a Balance between Modern Agriculture and Historic Water Policy

This comment examines acreage and residency limitations on federally subsidized water. The first issue addressed by the author is whether the present 160-acre irrigation entitlement should be raised to conform with modern agriculture. The second issue addressed by the author is the requirement that any purchaser of excess land would be required to reside within fifty miles of the land. The author concludes by examining current proposals for sale of excess land owned by persons not meeting the acreage limitation and by non-residents as well as legislation recommending government purchase of excess land, sale to would-be buyers lacking money and financing, and federally guaranteed loans to buyers

The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits

Derivative suits, long the principal vehicle for discussions about representative litigation in corporate and securities law, now share the stage with younger cousins - securities fraud class actions and state law fiduciary duty class actions. At the same time alternative governance vehicles - independent directors, auditors and other reforms that have followed in the wake of Enron - potentially diminish the relative place of litigation such as derivative suits. This article presents data from all derivative suits filed in Delaware over a two-year period. We find a relatively small number, certainly as compared to fiduciary class action and securities fraud class actions. Unlike these other representative suits, derivative suits are used for both public and close corporations. They arise usually in a duty of loyalty context. Contrary to earlier studies, we do not find evidence that these cases are strike suits yielding little benefit. Instead, roughly 30% of the derivative suits provide relief to the corporation or the shareholders, while the others are usually dismissed quickly with little apparent litigation activity. In cases producing a recovery to shareholders, those amounts typically exceed the amount of attorneys\u27 fees awarded by a significant margin. They do demonstrate some indicia of litigation agency costs (for example suits being filed quickly, multiple suits per controversy, and repeat plaintiffs\u27 law firms), but each of these is much less pronounced for derivative suits than for other forms of representative litigations. Overall, the claim that derivative suits are strike suits is much weaker than in earlier periods. The Delaware judiciary, which hears most public company corporate litigation in America, has effectively monitored these cases. There is room to open the door for larger shareholders to utilize these suits to police corporate misconduct. Institutional shareholders, while not willing to take on as large a role in governance as many have suggested in terms of naming directors and the like, may be willing to take a larger role in derivative litigation. Thus we see potential for derivative litigation to play a more important role in the future. We therefore suggest that suits brought by a one percent or larger shareholder should be excused from the demand requirement currently applied in derivative suits

The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions

Now, however, a new form of shareholder litigation has emerged that is distinct from derivative or securities fraud claims: class action lawsuits filed under state law challenging director conduct in mergers and acquisitions. The empirical data reported in this article show that these acquisition-oriented suits are now the dominant form of corporate litigation and outnumber derivative suits by a wide margin. Are these acquisition-oriented class actions just another deadbeat in the corporate governance debate? Should policymakers take action to cut back on the development of this new form of shareholder litigation? In this paper, we argue that, just as with derivative suits and securities fraud class actions, good policy must balance the positive managerial agency cost reducing effects of these acquisition-oriented shareholder suits against their litigation agency costs. To frame our analysis of acquisition-oriented class actions, we begin with a look back at the history of this debate over representative litigation in corporate and securities law. For six decades, there have been efforts to limit shareholder derivative suits. These suits, in which one shareholder sues in the name of and on behalf of the corporation, are. usually brought to enforce various fiduciary duties that officers and directors owe corporations and their shareholders. They thus can be contrasted to normal corporate litigation in which directors determine what actions to take for the corporation. Derivative suits were once said to have promise as a means to limit managerial agency costs

Dissolved nitrogen in the sea water of the Northeast Pacific with notes on the total carbon dioxide and the dissolved oxygen

This paper deals with a study and discussion of the distribution of dissolved nitrogen in sea water and its relation to the dissolved oxygen and the total carbon dioxide. Previous studies have been made by Buch (1), Knudsen (8, 9), Petterson (11), Jacobsen (7), Hamburg (6), Dittmar (3) and recently by Rakestraw and Emmel (13., 14). Fox (4) published data showing the variation in the concentration of dissolved nitrogen in equilibrium with the nitrogen of the atmosphere at standard pressure for different temperatures and for different concentrations of sea water. Using these data it is possible to calculate the percent of saturation of the dissolved nitrogen in sea water at a given temperature and chlorinity, the pressure of the gaseous nitrogen being equivalent to that of the gas in air at standard pressur