How Hard is Bribery in Elections with Randomly Selected Voters

Many research works in computational social choice assume a fixed set of voters in an election and study the resistance of different voting rules against electoral manipulation. In recent years, however, a new technique known as random sample voting has been adopted in many multi-agent systems. One of the most prominent examples is blockchain. Many proof-of-stake based blockchain systems like Algorand will randomly select a subset of participants of the system to form a committee, and only the committee members will be involved in the decision of some important system parameters. This can be viewed as running an election where the voter committee (i.e., the voters whose votes will be counted) is randomly selected. It is generally expected that the introduction of such randomness should make the election more resistant to electoral manipulation, despite the lack of theoretical analysis. In this paper, we present a systematic study on the resistance of an election with a randomly selected voter committee against bribery. Since the committee is randomly generated, by bribing any fixed subset of voters, the designated candidate may or may not win. Consequently, we consider the problem of finding a feasible solution that maximizes the winning probability of the designated candidate. We show that for most voting rules, this problem becomes extremely difficult for the briber as even finding any non-trivial solution with non-zero objective value becomes NP-hard. However, for plurality and veto, there exists a polynomial time approximation scheme that computes a near-optimal solution efficiently. The algorithm builds upon a novel integer programming formulation together with techniques from n-fold integer programming, which may be of a separate interest

Scheduling Stochastic Jobs - Complexity and Approximation Algorithms

Uncertainty is an omnipresent issue in real-world optimization problems. This paper studies a fundamental problem concerning uncertainty, known as the beta-robust scheduling problem. Given a set of identical machines and a set of jobs whose processing times follow a normal distribution, the goal is to assign jobs to machines such that the probability that all the jobs are completed by a given common due date is maximized. We give the first systematic study on the complexity and algorithms for this problem. A strong negative result is shown by ruling out the existence of any polynomial-time algorithm with a constant approximation ratio for the general problem unless P=NP. On the positive side, we provide the first FPT-AS (fixed parameter tractable approximation scheme) parameterized by the number of different kinds of jobs, which is a common parameter in scheduling problems. It returns a solution arbitrarily close to the optimal solution, provided that the job processing times follow a few different types of distributions. We further complement the theoretical results by implementing our algorithm. The experiments demonstrate that by choosing an appropriate approximation ratio, the algorithm can efficiently compute a near-optimal solution

Local Differential Privacy Meets Computational Social Choice -- Resilience under Voter Deletion

The resilience of a voting system has been a central topic in computational social choice. Many voting rules, like plurality, are shown to be vulnerable as the attacker can target specific voters to manipulate the result. What if a local differential privacy (LDP) mechanism is adopted such that the true preference of a voter is never revealed in pre-election polls? In this case, the attacker can only infer stochastic information about a voter's true preference, and this may cause the manipulation of the electoral result significantly harder. The goal of this paper is to provide a quantitative study on the effect of adopting LDP mechanisms on a voting system. We introduce the metric PoLDP (power of LDP) that quantitatively measures the difference between the attacker's manipulation cost under LDP mechanisms and that without LDP mechanisms. The larger PoLDP is, the more robustness LDP mechanisms can add to a voting system. We give a full characterization of PoLDP for the voting system with plurality rule and provide general guidance towards the application of LDP mechanisms

Hardness and Algorithms for Electoral Manipulation Under Media Influence

In this paper, we study a generalization of the classic bribery problem known as electoral manipulation under media influence (EMMI). This model is motivated by modern political campaigns where candidates try to convince voters through advertising in media (TV, newspaper, Internet). When compared with the classical bribery problem, the attacker in this setting cannot directly change opinions of individual voters, but instead can execute influences via a set of manipulation strategies (e.g., advertising on a TV channel). Different manipulation strategies incur different costs and influence different subsets of voters. Once receiving a significant amount of influence, a voter will change opinion. To characterize the opinion change of each voter, we adopt the well-accepted threshold model. We prove the NP-hardness of the EMMI problem and give a dynamic programming algorithm that runs in polynomial time for a restricted case of the EMMI problem