Lines of Descent: Kuhn and Beyond

yesThomas S. Kuhn is famous both for his work on the Copernican Revolution and his ‘paradigm’ view of scientific revolutions. But Kuhn later abandoned the notion of paradigm (and related notions) in favour of a more ‘evolutionary’ view of the history of science. Kuhn’s position therefore moved closer to ‘continuity’ models of scientific progress, for instance ‘chain-of-reasoning’ models, originally championed by D. Shapere. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate around Kuhn’s new ‘developmental’ view and to evaluate these competing models with reference to some major innovations in the history of cosmology, from Copernicanism to modern cosmology. This evaluation is made possible through some unexpected overlap between Kuhn’s earlier discontinuity model and various versions of the later continuity models. It is the thesis of this paper that the ‘chain-of-reasoning’ model accounts better for the cosmological evidence than both Kuhn’s early paradigm model and his later developmental view of the history of science

Metacognition and Abstract Concepts

The problem of how concepts can refer to or be about the non‐mental world is particularly puzzling for abstract concepts. There is growing evidence that many characteristics beyond the perceptual are involved in grounding different kinds of abstract concept. A resource that has been suggested, but little explored, is introspection. This paper develops that suggestion by focusing specifically on metacognition—on the thoughts and feelings that thinkers have about a concept. One example of metacognition about concepts is the judgement that we should defer to others in how a given concept is used. Another example is our internal assessment of which concepts are dependable and useful, and which less so. Metacognition of this kind may be especially important for grounding abstract concepts

Reductions in global biodiversity loss predicted from conservation spending

Halting global biodiversity loss is central to both the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)1,2, but success to date has been very limited3–5. A critical determinant of overall strategic success (or failure) is the financing committed to biodiversity6–9; however, financing decisions are still hindered by considerable uncertainty over what any investment is likely to achieve6–9.. For greater effectiveness, we need an evidence-based model (EBM)10–12 showing how conservation spending quantitatively reduces the rate of loss. Here, we empirically quantify how i$14.4 billion of conservation investment reduced biodiversity loss across 109 signatory countries between 1996 and 2008, by an average 29% per country. We also show that biodiversity change in signatory countries can be predicted with high accuracy, using a dual model that combines the positive impact of conservation investment with the negative impact of economic, agricultural and population growth (i.e. human development pressures)13–18. Decision-makers can use this dual model to forecast the improvement that any proposed biodiversity budget would achieve under various scenarios of human development pressure, comparing those forecasts to any chosen policy target (including the CBD and SDGs). Importantly, we further find that spending impacts shrink as human development pressures grow, implying that funding may need to increase over time. The model therefore offers a flexible tool for balancing the SDGs of human development and biodiversity, by predicting the dynamic changes needed in conservation finance as human development proceeds

Mind before matter: reversing the arrow of fundamentality

In this contribution to FQXi's essay contest 2018, I suggest that it is sometimes a step forward to reverse our intuition on "what is fundamental", a move that is somewhat reminiscent of the idea of noncommutative geometry. I argue that some foundational conceptual problems in physics and related fields motivate us to attempt such a reversal of perspective, and to take seriously the idea that an information-theoretic notion of observer ("mind") could in some sense be more fundamental than our intuitive idea of a physical world ("matter"). I sketch what such an approach could look like, and why it would complement but not contradict the view that the material world is the cause of our experience.Comment: Contribution to the 2018 FQXi essay contest "What is fundamental?

Emergence d’une spécialité scientifique dans l’espace - La réparation de l’ADN

International audienceIn the study of science, the specialty is seen as the ideal level of analysis to understand the genesis and development of scientific communities. This article uses bibliometric data to analyze the emergence of DNA repair by testing a hybrid method to identify the specialty’s appearance in geographical space by focusing on the geographical trajectories of the pioneers in this field. We try to identify the professional mobility of researchers using these bibliometric data, and if possible to highlight the structural networks of places during the emergence stage of the specialty. These networks determine places as much as they are built by individual trajectories. In this way, we try to make a place for the geography of science in the field of social studies of science.Dans l’étude des sciences, la spécialité est perçue comme le niveau d’analyse idéal pour comprendre la genèse et le développement des collectifs scientifiques. Cet article utilise des données bibliométriques pour analyser l’émergence de la Réparation de l’ADN en expérimentant une méthode mixte pour repérer son apparition dans l’espace géographique. En nous concentrant sur les trajectoires géographiques de pionniers dans cedomaine, nous tâchons de repérer leur mobilité professionnelle à l’aide de données bibliométriques dans la perspective de mettre en évidence les réseaux de lieux structurants dans la phase d’émergence de la spécialité. Ces réseaux de lieux déterminent autant qu’ils sont construits par les trajectoires individuelles. Nous essayons ainsi de faire une place à la géographie des sciences dans le domaine des études sociales des sciences

We favor formal models of heuristics rather than lists of loose dichotomies: a reply to Evans and Over

In their comment on Marewski et al. (good judgments do not require complex cognition, 2009) Evans and Over (heuristic thinking and human intelligence: a commentary on Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer, 2009) conjectured that heuristics can often lead to biases and are not error free. This is a most surprising critique. The computational models of heuristics we have tested allow for quantitative predictions of how many errors a given heuristic will make, and we and others have measured the amount of error by analysis, computer simulation, and experiment. This is clear progress over simply giving heuristics labels, such as availability, that do not allow for quantitative comparisons of errors. Evans and Over argue that the reason people rely on heuristics is the accuracy-effort trade-off. However, the comparison between heuristics and more effortful strategies, such as multiple regression, has shown that there are many situations in which a heuristic is more accurate with less effort. Finally, we do not see how the fast and frugal heuristics program could benefit from a dual-process framework unless the dual-process framework is made more precise. Instead, the dual-process framework could benefit if its two “black boxes” (Type 1 and Type 2 processes) were substituted by computational models of both heuristics and other processes