Vitalism and the Resistance to Experimentation on Life in the Eighteenth Century

There is a familiar opposition between a ‘Scientific Revolution’ ethos and practice of experimentation, including experimentation on life, and a ‘vitalist’ reaction to this outlook. The former is often allied with different forms of mechanism – if all of Nature obeys mechanical laws, including living bodies, ‘iatromechanism’ should encounter no obstructions in investigating the particularities of animal-machines – or with more chimiatric theories of life and matter, as in the ‘Oxford Physiologists’. The latter reaction also comes in different, perhaps irreducibly heterogeneous forms, ranging from metaphysical and ethical objections to the destruction of life, as in Margaret Cavendish, to more epistemological objections against the usage of instruments, the ‘anatomical’ outlook and experimentation, e.g. in Locke and Sydenham. But I will mainly focus on a third anti-interventionist argument, which I call ‘vitalist’ since it is often articulated in the writings of the so-called Montpellier Vitalists, including their medical articles for the Encyclopédie. The vitalist argument against experimentation on life is subtly different from the metaphysical, ethical and epistemological arguments, although at times it may borrow from any of them. It expresses a Hippocratic sensibility – understood as an artifact of early modernity, not as some atemporal trait of medical thought – in which Life resists the experimenter, or conversely, for the experimenter to grasp something about Life, it will have to be without torturing or radically intervening in it. I suggest that this view does not have to imply that Nature is something mysterious or sacred; nor does the vitalist have to attack experimentation on life in the name of some ‘vital force’ – which makes it less surprising to find a vivisectionist like Claude Bernard sounding so close to the vitalists

Vitalism in Early Modern Medical and Philosophical Thought

Vitalism is a notoriously deceptive term. It is very often defined as the view, in biology, in early modern medicine and differently, in early modern philosophy, that living beings differ from the rest of the physical universe due to their possessing an additional ‘life-force’, ‘vital principle’, ‘entelechy’, enormon or élan vital. Such definitions most often have an explicit pejorative dimension: vitalism is a primitive or archaic view, that has somehow survived the emergence of modern science (the latter being defined in many different ways, from demystified Cartesian reductionism to experimental medicine, biochemistry or genetics: Cimino and Duchesneau eds. 1997, Normandin and Wolfe eds. 2013). Such dismissive definitions of vitalism are meant to dispense with argument or analysis. Curiously, the term has gained some popularity in English-language scholarship on early modern philosophy in the past few decades, where it is used without any pejorative dimension, to refer to a kind of ‘active matter’ view, in which matter is not reducible to the (mechanistic) properties of size, shape and motion, possessing instead some internal dynamism or activity (see e.g. James 1999, Boyle 2018, Borcherding forthcoming). The latter meaning is close to what the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth termed ‘hylozoism’, namely the attribution of life, agency or mind to matter, and he implicitly targeted several figures I shall mention here, notably Margaret Cavendish and Francis Glisson, for holding this view. However, one point I shall make in this entry is that when vitalism first appears by name, and as a self-designation, in the Montpellier School (associated with the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Montpellier, in the second half of the eighteenth century; thus vitalisme appears first, followed shortly thereafter by Vitalismus in German, with ‘vitalism’ appearing in English publications only in the early nineteenth century: Toepfer 2011), it is quite different from both the more ‘supernatural’ view described above – chiefly espoused by its rather obsessive opponents – and from the more neutral, but also de-biologized philosophical view (that of e.g. Cavendish or Conway who are, broadly speaking naturalists). Rather than appealing to a metaphysics of vital force, or of self-organizing matter, this version of vitalism, which I shall refer to as ‘medical vitalism’, seems to be more of a ‘systemic’ theory: an attempt to grasp and describe top-level (‘organizational’, ‘organismic’, ‘holistic’) features of living systems (Wolfe 2017, 2019). In this entry I seek to introduce some periodization in our thinking about early modern (and Enlightenment) vitalism, emphasizing the difference between the seventeenth-century context and that of the following generations – culminating in the ideas of the Montpellier School. This periodization should also function as a kind of taxonomy or at least distinction between some basic types of vitalism. As I discuss in closing, these distinctions can cut across the texts and figures we are dealing with, differently: metaphysical vs. non-metaphysical vitalism, philosophical vs. medical vitalism, medical vs. ‘embryological’ vitalism, and so on. A difference I can only mention but not explore in detail is that the more medically grounded, ‘organismic’ vitalism is significantly post-Cartesian while the more biological/embryological vitalism is, inasmuch as it is a dynamic, self-organizing matter theory, an extension of Renaissance ideas (chymiatry, Galenism and in general theories of medical spirits). I examine successively vitalism’s Renaissance prehistory, its proliferation as ‘vital matter theory’ in seventeenth-century England (in authors such as Cavendish, Conway and Glisson, with brief considerations on Harvey and van Helmont), and its mature expression in eighteenth-century Montpellier (notably with Bordeu and Ménuret de Chambaud)

Chile's export diversification since 1960: A free market miracle or mirage?

Conventional wisdom has proclaimed Chile's recent economic development a 'free market miracle'. In an examination of Chile's export diversification experience, this article departs from that view. By analysing the dynamics underlying the emergence of the salmon, fruit, forestry and wine sectors in Chile's export basket since the 1960s, the study sheds light on the crucial role of industrial policy in the process of capability accumulation that shapes new industries. The article undertakes a qualitative historical analysis of the scope and nature of policy interventions in each of the four sectors and conducts a quantitative policy evaluation using the difference-in-difference method. It finds that public institutions are essential in overcoming market failures inhibiting the emergence of new industries. Specifically, it shows that the government has a key role to play as a catalyst of human capital accumulation, as a venture capitalist, in trade promotion, and in ensuring 'national' sector reputation through a strong regulatory and quality control role. By elaborating on the dynamic process of structural transformation and capability accumulation, this article contributes to theoretical debates on the role of vertical policies in the emergence of new competitive sectors, and debates relating to static versus dynamic approaches to comparative advantage

Investigating trophic ecology and dietary niche overlap among morphs of Lake Trout in Lake Superior

Four morphs of Lake Trout (Salvelinus namaycush, Walbaum 1792) have been identified in Lake Superior: leans, siscowets, humpers, and redfins. In this comprehensive study, the trophic ecology of Lake Trout morphs were characterized using stomach content, fatty acid, and stable isotope data. Stomach content results indicated a predominately piscivorous diet for leans, siscowets, and redfins, whereas humper diets were comprised of 50% fish and 50% Mysis by mass. Humper and siscowets were most similar in their dietary fatty acid profiles, whereas redfins had the most distinct dietary fatty acid profile. Results from stable isotope analysis revealed some among-morph differences along a pelagic-profundal consumption gradient (34S), but there were no significant differences in trophic position (15N) or basal carbon sources among morphs (13C). Using the recently developed nicheROVER software package, 4-dimensional trophic niches for each morph were quantified using stable isotope ratios (δ13C, δ15N, and δ34S) and fatty acid profiles (30 dietary fatty acids, condensed to one axis). Humpers had the largest 4-dimensional niche regions of all four morphs, and redfins had the smallest. Pairwise probability of overlap among morphs in these four-dimensional niche regions was determined to be < 50% in most cases. Overall, stomach content results indicate that humpers diets were more planktivorous than the other morphs, consistent with previous research. Results of the niche overlap analysis suggests some degree of generalist feeding for all morphs. Better characterization of seasonal variation in diet using tracers that reflect more recent feeding (e.g., fatty acids, stomach contents, and/or stable isotope analyses performed on tissues that turnover more quickly than muscle) are needed to further elucidate among-morph differences and similarities in diet and trophic ecology

Regulation of ERK basal and pulsatile activity control proliferation and exit from the stem cell compartment in mammalian epidermis.

Fluctuation in signal transduction pathways is frequently observed during mammalian development. However, its role in regulating stem cells has not been explored. Here we tracked spatiotemporal ERK MAPK dynamics in human epidermal stem cells. While stem cells and differentiated cells were distinguished by high and low stable basal ERK activity, respectively, we also found cells with pulsatile ERK activity. Transitions from Basalhi-Pulselo (stem) to Basalhi-Pulsehi, Basalmid-Pulsehi, and Basallo-Pulselo (differentiated) cells occurred in expanding keratinocyte colonies and in response to differentiation stimuli. Pharmacological inhibition of ERK induced differentiation only when cells were in the Basalmid-Pulsehi state. Basal ERK activity and pulses were differentially regulated by DUSP10 and DUSP6, leading us to speculate that DUSP6-mediated ERK pulse down-regulation promotes initiation of differentiation, whereas DUSP10-mediated down-regulation of mean ERK activity promotes and stabilizes postcommitment differentiation. Levels of MAPK1/MAPK3 transcripts correlated with DUSP6 and DUSP10 transcripts in individual cells, suggesting that ERK activity is negatively regulated by transcriptional and posttranslational mechanisms. When cells were cultured on a topography that mimics the epidermal-dermal interface, spatial segregation of mean ERK activity and pulses was observed. In vivo imaging of mouse epidermis revealed a patterned distribution of basal cells with pulsatile ERK activity, and down-regulation was linked to the onset of differentiation. Our findings demonstrate that ERK MAPK signal fluctuations link kinase activity to stem cell dynamics

The organism as ontological go-between. Hybridity, boundaries and degrees of reality in its conceptual history

The organism is neither a discovery like the circulation of the blood or the glycogenic function of the liver, nor a particular biological theory like epigenesis or preformationism. It is rather a concept which plays a series of roles – sometimes overt, sometimes masked – throughout the history of biology, and frequently in very normative ways, also shifting between the biological and the social. Indeed, it has often been presented as a key-concept in life science and the ‘theorization’ of Life, but conversely has also been the target of influential rejections: as just an instrument of transmission for the selfish gene, but also, historiographically, as part of an outdated ‘vitalism’. Indeed, the organism, perhaps because it is experientially closer to the ‘body’ than to the ‘molecule’, is often the object of quasi-affective theoretical investments presenting it as essential, sometimes even as the pivot of a science or a particular approach to nature, while other approaches reject or attack it with equal force, assimilating it to a mysterious ‘vitalist’ ontology of extra-causal forces, or other pseudo-scientific doctrines. This paper does not seek to adjudicate between these debates, either in terms of scientific validity or historical coherence; nor does it return to the well-studied issue of the organism-mechanism tension in biology. Recent scholarship has begun to focus on the emergence and transformation of the concept of organism, but has not emphasized so much the way in which organism is a shifting, ‘go-between’ concept – invoked as ‘natural’ by some thinkers to justify their metaphysics, but then presented as value-laden by others, over and against the natural world. The organism as go-between concept is also a hybrid, a boundary concept or an epistemic limit case, all of which partly overlap with the idea of ‘nomadic concepts’. Thereby the concept of organism continues to function in different contexts – as a heuristic, an explanatory challenge, a model of order, of regulation, etc. – despite having frequently been pronounced irrelevant and reduced to molecules or genes. Yet this perpetuation is far removed from any ‘metaphysics of organism’, or organismic biology