Existence and Warr Neutrality for Matching Equilibria in a Public Good Economy: An Aggregative Game Approach

Using the aggregative game approach as developed by Cornes and Hartley (2003, 2007) this paper analyzes the conditions under which matching mechanisms in a public good economy lead to interior matching equilibria in which all agents make strictly positive flat contributions to the public good. In particular we show that the distribution of income among the agents is a crucial determinant for the existence of interior matching equilibria. In addition, we explore which matching mechanisms show Warr neutrality and how the size of the economy affects the possibility of implementing a certain type of Pareto optimal solutions through matching.

Equity as a Prerequisite for Stability of Cooperation on Global Public Good Provision

Analysing cooperative provision of a global public good such as climate protection, we explore the relationship between equitable burden sharing on the one hand and core stability on the other. To assess the size of the burden which a public good contribution entails for a country, we make use of a specific measure based on Moulin (Econometrica 55:963-977, 1987). In particular, we show that a Pareto optimal allocation which is not in the core can always be blocked by a group of countries with the highest Moulin sacrifices. In this sense, it is the 'overburdening' and thus 'unfair' treatment of some countries that provides the reason for core instability. By contrast, a Pareto optimal allocation is in the core if the public good contributions are fairly equally distributed according to their Moulin sacrifices. The potential implications of our theoretical analysis for global climate policy are also discussed

How large are projected 21st century storm track changes?

Projected changes in the extra-tropical wintertime storm tracks are investigated using the multi-model ensembles from both the third and fifth phases of the World Climate Research Programme's Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP3 and CMIP5). The aim is to characterize the magnitude of the storm track responses relative to their present-day year-to-year variability. For the experiments considered, the ‘middle-of-the-road’ scenarios in each CMIP, there are regions of the Northern Hemisphere where the responses of up to 40% of the models exceed half of the inter-annual variability, and for the Southern Hemisphere there are regions where up to 60% of the model responses exceed half of the inter-annual variability

Strategically Equivalent Contests

Using a two-player Tullock-type contest, we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs. We propose a simple two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent contests. Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests. Finally, we discuss possible contest design applications and avenues for future theoretical and empirical research