Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990

This paper examines fertility and family policies in 15 Central and East European (CEE) countries to establish firstly, likely directions of cohort fertility trends for the coming decade; and secondly, to provide an overview and analysis of family policies in CEE countries, and to assess their impact on cohort fertility trends. Demographic analysis suggests that the cohort fertility decline of the 1960s cohorts is likely to continue at least among the 1970s birth cohorts; stagnation cannot be ruled out. Births that were postponed by women born in the 1970s were not being replaced in sufficient numbers for cohort fertility to increase in the foreseeable future, and shares of low parity women (childless and one child) were larger than shares of high parity women among the late 1960s cohorts than in older cohorts. Also, childbearing postponement which started in the 1990s is reflected in dramatic changes of childbearing age patterns. As period fertility rates have been increasing in the late 2000s throughout the region an impression of a fertility recovery has been created, however the findings of this project indicate that no such widespread childbearing recovery is underway.For the first time ever an overview and analysis of CEE family policies is conceptualized in this paper. It demonstrates that fertility trends and family policies are a matter of serious concern throughout the region. The following family policy types have been identified: comprehensive family policy model; pro-natalist policies model; temporary male bread-winner model; and conventional family policies model. The majority of family policies in CEE countries suffer from a variety of shortcomings that impede them from generating enhanced family welfare and from providing conditions for cohort fertility to increase. The likely further decline of cohort fertility, or its stagnation, may entail long-term demographic as well as other societal consequences, such as continuous declines in total population numbers, changes in age structures, as well as implications for health and social security costs.This paper examines fertility and family policies in 15 Central and East European (CEE) countries to establish firstly, likely directions of cohort fertility trends for the coming decade; and secondly, to provide an overview and analysis of family policies in CEE countries, and to assess their impact on cohort fertility trends. Demographic analysis suggests that the cohort fertility decline of the 1960s cohorts is likely to continue at least among the 1970s birth cohorts; stagnation cannot be ruled out. Births that were postponed by women born in the 1970s were not being replaced in sufficient numbers for cohort fertility to increase in the foreseeable future, and shares of low parity women (childless and one child) were larger than shares of high parity women among the late 1960s cohorts than in older cohorts. Also, childbearing postponement which started in the 1990s is reflected in dramatic changes of childbearing age patterns. As period fertility rates have been increasing in the late 2000s throughout the region an impression of a fertility recovery has been created, however the findings of this project indicate that no such widespread childbearing recovery is underway.For the first time ever an overview and analysis of CEE family policies is conceptualized in this paper. It demonstrates that fertility trends and family policies are a matter of serious concern throughout the region. The following family policy types have been identified: comprehensive family policy model; pro-natalist policies model; temporary male bread-winner model; and conventional family policies model. The majority of family policies in CEE countries suffer from a variety of shortcomings that impede them from generating enhanced family welfare and from providing conditions for cohort fertility to increase. The likely further decline of cohort fertility, or its stagnation, may entail long-term demographic as well as other societal consequences, such as continuous declines in total population numbers, changes in age structures, as well as implications for health and social security costs

: o caso da China

It is well known that populations around the world - and in Pacific Asia in particular - are ageing, and ageing rapidly. China is no exception to this. While it has been widely agreed that gender is an important lens through which to define and develop appropriate policies for both adaptation and mitigation of the challenges of ageing, gender is rarely explicitly taken into consideration as a vector of consideration. In this paper, we demonstrate for the case of China how when viewing this intersection through a regional lens, the extent to which old age is ‘feminised’ differs sharply across the country. Taken together, this shows the importance of considering gender both in old-age, as well as inequalities across the life course, in the formulation and development of policies relating to ageing at both the national and the regional level. This is especially important in a country such as China, where provinces and other local governments yield important policymaking powers in certain key areas relevant to ageing.É bem conhecido que as populações em todo o mundo - e na Ásia do Pacífico em particular - estão envelhecendo e envelhecendo rapidamente. A China não é exceção para isso. Embora tenha sido amplamente aceito que o gênero é uma lente importante para definir e desenvolver políticas apropriadas tanto para a adaptação quanto para a mitigação dos desafios do envelhecimento, o gênero raramente é explicitamente considerado como um vetor de consideração. Neste artigo, demonstramos, para o caso da China, como, ao visualizar essa interseção por meio de uma lente regional, a extensão em que a velhice é "feminizada" difere acentuadamente em todo o país. Em conjunto, isso mostra a importância de se considerar o gênero tanto na velhice quanto nas desigualdades ao longo da vida, na formulação e no desenvolvimento de políticas relativas ao envelhecimento, tanto no nível nacional quanto no regional. Isso é especialmente importante em um país como a China, onde as províncias e outros governos locais geram importantes poderes de formulação de políticas em certas áreas-chave relevantes para o envelhecimento

‘I couldn't hold the whole thing’: the role of gender, individualisation and risk in shaping fertility preferences in Taiwan

Taiwan has one of the lowest fertility rates in Asia. High direct and indirect costs of childbearing have been identified as key drivers behind this at the macro-level, but little is known about the mechanism of these influences at the individual-level. In 32 qualitative interviews with parents in Taipei, we sought to explore the salient factors for couples in their decisions about having further children. We identified a tension between gendered expectations of childcare responsibilities and women's desire to ‘build a life of one's own’ – a life with options and the freedom to pursue career and social aspirations. Based on our grounded analysis, we reflect on the high relevance of individualisation, risk society and incomplete gender revolution theories for understanding why many couples – and women in particular – choose to cease childbearing at parity one

Fertility and family policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990

This paper examines fertility and family policies in 15 Central and East European (CEE) countries to establish firstly, likely directions of cohort fertility trends for the coming decade; and secondly, to provide an overview and analysis of family policies in CEE countries, and to assess their impact on cohort fertility trends. Demographic analysis suggests that the cohort fertility decline of the 1960s cohorts is likely to continue at least among the 1970s birth cohorts; stagnation cannot be ruled out. Births that were postponed by women born in the 1970s were not being replaced in sufficient numbers for cohort fertility to increase in the foreseeable future, and shares of low parity women (childless and one child) were larger than shares of high parity women among the late 1960s cohorts than in older cohorts. Also, childbearing postponement which started in the 1990s is reflected in dramatic changes of childbearing age patterns. As period fertility rates have been increasing in the late 2000s throughout the region an impression of a fertility recovery has been created, however the findings of this project indicate that no such widespread childbearing recovery is underway. For the first time ever an overview and analysis of CEE family policies is conceptualized in this paper. It demonstrates that fertility trends and family policies are a matter of serious concern throughout the region. The following family policy types have been identified: comprehensive family policy model; pro-natalist policies model; temporary male bread-winner model; and conventional family policies model. The majority of family policies in CEE countries suffer from a variety of shortcomings that impede them from generating enhanced family welfare and from providing conditions for cohort fertility to increase. The likely further decline of cohort fertility, or its stagnation, may entail long-term demographic as well as other societal consequences, such as continuous declines in total population numbers, changes in age structures, as well as implications for health and social security costs.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe

Depopulation or population decline? Demographic nightmares and imaginaries

Scientists are well aware of the major social, economic and cultural challenges brought about by population decline. However, we can often underestimate the more extreme interpretations of both the causes and the consequences of population decline in the popular discourse. In this commentary, I explore some of these toxic narratives, and speculate about how they may be linked to what appears to be a prevailing populist/ethno-nationalist view of population grounded in political tropes, rather than in scientific reality. Using Armitage’s (2021) concept of “demographic imaginaries”, I argue that much of this public discourse serves several vital purposes: to try to simplify a complex issue; to try to “unify”; to try to blame and scapegoat; and, ultimately, to try to negate the obligation to make tough, complex political and policy decisions. I also argue that scientists working in the field of population decline need to be more aware of these tropes, and should make more active efforts to ground the discourse of population decline in science and reality. I conclude that a bottom-up approach to responding to population decline may be the most fruitful avenue for progress in the future

Measuring inequalities of development at the sub-national level: From the human development index to the human life indicator.

Despite being one of the most common measures of development, the Human Development Index [HDI] has been much criticized for its consistency, data requirements, difficulty of interpretation and trade-offs between indicators. The 'Human Life Indicator' [HLI] has been proposed as a 'simple effective means' of measuring development and, more specifically, as a viable alternative to the HDI. Reducing inequalities within countries is a core component of the Sustainable Development Goals; yet sub-national HDIs are subject to the same criticisms as national level indices (potentially more so). Our goal in this paper is to demonstrate 'proof of concept' in terms of the systematic application of the HLI to measure development at the subnational level. Using life tables for the United States of America, we calculate, for the first time, HLIs for each state for the period 1959-2016. This country was chosen for the comparatively long run of available sub-national life tables. We also calculate the extent to which mortality is distributed across the life course-a further measure of inequality and the role of the social determinants of health. The HLI clearly shows how striking regional inequalities exist across the United States. We find that HLI and HDI for the most recent time period are strongly correlated. The analysis demonstrates that HLI represents an effective means of measuring development at the sub-national level. Compared to HDI, HLIs are characterized by simpler calculation and interpretation; fewer data requirements; less measurement error; more consistency over time; and no trade-offs between components. A current challenge of producing sub-national HLIs is the lack of comprehensive civil registration and vital statistics systems in many parts of the Global South from which sub-national life tables can be generated. However, as more and more countries develop these systems the potential to produce HLIs will inevitably increase

The changing relationship between marriage and childbearing in Hong Kong.

Births outside marriage (BoM) account for around 15% of all births globally. However, the distribution around the world is very uneven, as are cultural and political attitudes towards them. Studies from East Asia have shown that the percentage of such births is very low, with only modest increases in recent years. The orthodox demographic view holds that the maintenance of conservative views around the relationship between marriage and childbearing can play a role in keeping fertility low. Prenuptial pregnancies (PNP) (where births occur within eight months of marriage) have been identified as a growing phenomenon in Japan, possibly being an 'alternative' Asian pathway to family formation. As yet, no comprehensive statistical analysis of the trends of BoM or PNP has been performed for Hong Kong. Using a comprehensive microdata set of birth registration in Hong Kong from 1984-2015 (N = 1,680,831) we provide evidence of recent trends in such 'alternative pathways' to family formation and examine predictors through regression analysis. Our results indicate, in common with elsewhere in East Asia, low overall period rates of either BoM or PNP (although the latter has risen notably in recent years). While more recent birth cohorts exhibit higher prevalence of such births, their incomplete nature and higher expected propensity suggests that the figures are exaggerated. In our regression analysis, we find that lower educational attainment is a strong predictor of both BoM and PNP, suggesting that a bifurcation of experience may be occurring. This adds further evidence to the theory that the maintenance of traditional family formation systems in the context of revolutionised educational and work opportunities for women mean that the opportunity costs of the 'marriage package' become too high. Current disparities in rights and privileges between married and unmarried parents-and especially their children-means that targeted family planning services and support for vulnerable families are policy priorities

From protests into pandemic: demographic change in Hong Kong, 2019–2021

Compared to other settings, COVID-19 infection and death rates in Hong Kong were very low until 2022, due to top-down interventions (e.g. quarantines, ‘mask mandates’) and community activation. However, in addition to these epidemiological circumstances, Hong Kong has also undergone significant social and political change stemming from the social movement beginning in 2019 through the enacting, and aftermath, of the National Security Law. We draw on registered birth and marriage data from 2015 through 2021 to explore how fertility and nuptiality changed after the social movement followed by the first four waves of the COVID pandemic. We describe how fertility and marriage rates have changed in Hong Kong and to what extent the changes are associated with the social movement and the COVID pandemic. We further disaggregate the fertility and nuptiality trends by Hong Kong-born and non-Hong Kong-born population, with a specific focus on migrants from the Mainland

Why demography matters (excerpt)

Demography is not destiny. As Giacomo Casanova explained over two centuries ago: 'There is no such thing as destiny. We ourselves shape our own lives.' Today we are shaping them and our societies more than ever before. Globally, we have never had fewer children per adult: our population is about to stabilize, though we do not know when or at what number, or what will happen after that. It will be the result of billions of very private decisions influenced in turn by multiple events and policies, some more unpredictable than others. More people are moving further around the world than ever before: we too often see that as frightening, rather than as indicating greater freedom. Similarly, we too often lament greater ageing, rather than recognizing it as a tremendous human achievement with numerous benefits to which we must adapt. The Journal of Economic Sociology publishes the chapter eight “Population and Politics,” where the authors discuss the political demography. Here they address eugenics, in both its historical and contemporary manifestations, and then look again at migration and past fertility patterns that may influence it. Демография — не судьба. Как больше двух веков назад говорил Джакомо Казанова, «судьбы не существует, мы сами определяем свои жизни». Сегодня мы определяем свои жизни и жизнь общества больше, чем когда бы то ни было прежде. Ещё никогда в мировом масштабе у нас не было так мало детей в пересчёте на одного взрослого: численность нашего населения близка к стабилизации, хотя мы и не знаем, когда и на отметке какой численности это произойдёт и что будет потом. Эта стабилизация будет результатом миллиардов частных решений, принятых под влиянием множества событий и политических мер, и некоторые из них будут менее предсказуемы, чем другие. Сегодня по миру передвигаются больше людей, чем когда-либо прежде, но мы слишком часто воспринимаем их как угрозу, а не как знак возросшей свободы. И точно так же мы слишком часто сокрушаемся по поводу старения населения вместо того, чтобы признать его потрясающим и полезным достижением человечества, к которому мы должны адаптироваться