Demographic projections by religion and education in India

Studying religion jointly with education allows one to produce more precise projections of the size and structure of religious communities. India’s religious groups are characterized by large differences in their education and fertility levels. Among those with secondary or more education, there tends to be low variation in fertility, while for those without any education, fertility is high and varies substantially. For India, if fertility differentials were constant and there was no increase in educational enrolment, the Indian population would grow from 846 million in 2000 to more than 2.3 billion in 2050, while the Hindu population would change from 80.2% to 76.4% and the proportion of Muslims would rise from 13.4% to 19%. If fertility converges and education levels increases, the population would increase to 1.7 billion by 2050, with 78.2% Hindus and 16.5% Muslims

Young Adults Failure to Thrive Syndrome

Many young working age adults in developed countries are failing to thrive in economic, demographic and social terms. Their failure to thrive is a relatively new phenomenon that has not been widely recognized, but it affects young adults in virtually all the more developed countries for which we have relevant data. Young adults nowadays are more often in poverty. They are leaving their parental homes at ever later ages and in some countries the frequency of psychological problems increased. The seriousness of failure to thrive syndrome is reflected in the relationship between relative economic conditions and increased suicide rates. The syndrome is important because young adults are at the prime ages for finding employment, establishing long-run career paths and building an economic basis for founding a family. Developing strategies to arrest the spread of failure to thrive syndrome among young adults, in order to keep them vibrant contributors to our societies, should be a priority for policy makers

Podstawy statystyki

Ze wstępu: "Studenci, podejmując studia na wybranym kierunku i zapoznając się z ich programem, często zastanawiają się, w jakich sytuacjach będzie im przydatna wiedza z zakresu dyscyplin naukowych występujących w planie studiów. Przemyślenia te odnoszą się również do statystyki. W podręczniku przedstawimy wzorcowe przykłady odnoszące się do sytuacji, w których posiadanie wiadomości z tego zakresu może okazać się użyteczne."(...

Investigating neighbourhood concentration of immigrants in Poland: explorative evidence from Kraków

Aim. This study contributes to research on new immigrant destinations in CEE by investigating the neighbourhood concentration of immigrants in Poland. We focus on Kraków – the second largest city – for which we have built a unique register-based dataset containing geocoded individual level data. To our knowledge, it is the first high-quality dataset of this type, prepared and used for research purposes in Poland. We use it to describe immigrants’ spatial allocation at a relatively early stage of immigration using the kNN approach. Results and conclusions. We find that whereas foreigners compose around 4.2% of city population, 50% of the city inhabitants live in the 200 kNNs with a share of foreigners below 2.2%. The DI for the immigrants is 0.45. Yet, a relatively high concentration could be seen among foreigners from Asia and America. However, immigrants from Ukraine and other Eastern European, non-EU countries are much more evenly spread around the city

Demographic and Human Capital Scenarios for the 21st Century: 2018 assessment for 201 countries

This volume presents different scenarios of future population and human capital trends in 201 countries of the world to the end of this century to inform the assessment of possible future migration patterns into the EU, as currently carried out by the Centre of Expertise on Population and Migration (CEPAM) Project (collaboration between JRC and IIASA). The study also goes beyond the conventional population projections, which only consider age and sex structures, by taking a multi-dimensional approach through adding educational attainment for all countries and also labour force participation for EU member states. The definition of scenarios in this study follows the narratives of the SSPs (Shared Socioeconomic Pathways) which are widely used in the global change research community

Demographic and Human Capital Scenarios for the 21st Century: 2018 assessment for 201 countries

This volume presents different scenarios of future population and human capital trends in 201 countries of the world to the end of this century to inform the assessment of possible future migration patterns into the EU as currently carried out by the Centre of Expertise on Population and Migration (CEPAM) Project (collaboration between JRC and IIASA). The study also goes beyond the conventional population projections which only consider the age and sex structures by taking a multi-dimensional approach through adding educational attainment for all countries and also labor force participation for EU member states. The definition of scenarios in this study follows the narratives of the SSPs (Shared Socioeconomic Pathways) which are widely used in the global change research community. The Medium scenario (SSP2) foresees that fertility and mortality follow a medium pathway that can be seen as most likely from today’s perspective. The scenario of Rapid Development (SSP1) assumes rapid increases in life expectancy, a faster fertility decline in high fertility countries and an education expansion path that follows the education goals as given by the SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals). The Stalled Development scenario (SSP3) presents divided world foreseeing a stall in educational expansion in developing countries as well as continued high fertility and high mortality. Moreover, these scenarios also serve policy considerations in many other fields ranging from the economic consequences of population ageing to development priorities in Africa, global population and environment interactions. This volume also serves as an update of the scenarios presented in the 2014 Oxford University Press book entitled “World Population and Human Capital in the 21st Century” (Lutz et al 2014), which includes the most comprehensive summary of different possible scientific arguments underlying the assumptions of future fertility, mortality, migration and education trends in different parts of the world with input from over 550 population experts. This new 2018 assessment also has a new 2015 baseline and adjusts the near term (up to 2030) fertility and mortality assumptions accordingly while maintaining the long term assumptions as justified in the 2014 book. In terms of migration, it combines three rough migration assumptions – zero migration, constant rates as observed over the past 60 years and double those rates – with medium fertility and mortality trends to illustrate the sensitivity of longer term population trends to alternative migration intensities. In terms of global level results, in the Medium scenario, world population would continue to increase until around 2070-80 when it would reach a maximum level of around 9.8 billion before starting a slow decline, reaching about 9.5 billion by the end of the century. This projected increase is lower than the recent United Nations projections based on a different model and higher than in the above mentioned 2014 book which uses the same long term assumptions. An important reason for increase in the outlook lies in the fact that child mortality, particularly in Africa, declined more rapidly than was previously assumed by all international projections. In demographic terms, a decline in child mortality has the same effect on the number of surviving children as an increase in fertility. Hence, already the population baseline of 2015 was markedly higher than had been projected on the basis of the 2010 baseline, which was used in the previous assessment. However, in the long run demography is not destiny and alternative scenarios show a broad range of possible futures. Assuming rapid social development (SSP1), in particular a rapid expansion of education following the Sustainable Development Goals, world population would after a further increase start to decrease, showing a peak population of around 8.9 billion in 2055-60 and a decline to 7.8 billion by the end of the century. Assuming on the other hand stalled social development (SSP3) and thus lower female education and higher fertility rates for each education group, world population already reaches the 10 billion mark around 2045 and then continues to grow over the rest of the century reaching 13.4 billion in 2100. This scenario is also likely to be associated with wide-spread poverty and weak resilience to already unavoidable environmental change. As to the European Union, projected population size under the Medium scenario of EU28 in 2060 is very close to the current baseline of 2015, namely around 507 million inhabitants. However, the trajectory of change would have a convex shape reaching a maximum 512 million people around the year 2035. While the initial increase is mostly a consequence of assumed immigration to the EU the following decline results from persistent sub-replacement fertility levels which will have developed a negative growth momentum through an age structure with fewer young people. Under the scenario of Zero Migration the population of the EU-28 would decline to around 460 million by 2060, while under the Double Migration scenario it would increase to 550 million. Under all scenarios the population of the EU28 shows significant ageing, which is more pronounced under low fertility and low immigration assumptions. However, the scenarios that explicitly consider education and labor force participation also show that the total labor force in Europe does not necessarily shrink, if labor force participation around the EU would approach that of Sweden today and that the future labor force could also be more productive. The population of Sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, is likely to more than double by 2060 from currently around 1 billion to 2.2 billion under the Medium scenario and even 2.7 billion under the stalled development SSP3 scenario. Hence, with the demographic transition in Asia well advanced, the future of world population growth will largely be decided in Africa with the future education of women as a main determinant of fertility playing a key role. There has been recent moderate progress in education expansion but continued progress is not guaranteed, despite the fact that today in virtually all countries the young generations are better educated than the older ones. But as shown by the stalled development (SSP3) scenario the combination of high population growth with no further schooling expansion can actually result in an increase of the proportion without any formal education even at the global level from 10 to 22 percent by the end of the century. This possible stall in education will not only accelerate population growth but also likely be associated with widespread poverty and high vulnerability to already unavoidable climate change. The combined trends of decreasing fertility and increasing life expectancy would lead to continued population ageing in the world in the future. The world will be significantly older. In all scenarios presented in the report, as well as those used by United Nations, the share of older people increases over time. For example, in our Medium scenario the percentage of those aged 65 and more increases from around 8% in 2015 to 20% by 2060. In the European Union, the share of older people will grow from around 20% in 2015 to 32% in 2060 according to medium scenario. In 2060 half of the population in this region will be at an age of at least 50 years. A particularly dynamic process would be observed in Eastern European member states where lower fertility and high life expectancy is accompanied with high volume of emigration accelerating ageing if the current trends continue. These structural changes would lead to significant socio-economic challenges for societies in the future.JRC.A.5-Scientific Developmen

Społeczno-ekonomiczne uwarunkowania procesów ludnościowych i kształtowania się potrzeb

Ze wstępu: "Pierwszy numer naszego rocznika składa się z artykułów naukowych, które łączy zastosowanie metod ilościowych w badaniach zjawisk społeczno-ekonomicznych. Materiały te są efektem zadań badawczych wykonanych w ramach badań własnych Krakowskiej Szkoły Wyższej im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego w 2007 roku. Problematyka badawcza obejmuje dwa obszary a mianowicie: • kształtowanie się wydatków gospodarstw domowych z uwzględnieniem społeczno- ekonomicznych uwarunkowań rozważanych zjawisk; • specyfikę rynku pracy w kontekście problemu starzenia się społeczeństwa. W pracy łączy się warstwa poznawcza z warstwą metodologiczną. Pozwala to ukazać możliwości i zakres zastosowania metod ilościowych w analizie różnorodnych prawidłowości występujących w zjawiskach masowych. Warstwa poznawcza ma dwa wymiary: • dydaktyczny, skierowany do studentów i osób zainteresowanych zastosowaniem metod ilościowych do badań procesów, których masowy charakter i ujęcie liczbowe pozwala na wykorzystanie prezentowanych w pracy metod; • objaśniający rozpatrywane obszary rzeczywistości."(...

Adolescence and the next generation

Adolescent growth and social development shape the early development of offspring from preconception through to the post-partum period through distinct processes in males and females. At a time of great change in the forces shaping adolescence, including the timing of parenthood, investments in today\u27s adolescents, the largest cohort in human history, will yield great dividends for future generations

Demographic Scenarios for the EU

Over the recent decades, the EU has been shaped by population growth, but now its population is ageing. Together with North America and East Asia, the EU is moving towards longer-living, lower-fertility, and higher-educated societies. Facing this new demographic frontier naturally prompts the questions: Who will live and work in Europe in the coming decades? How many, and with what skills? To answer these, this report examines the key factors that will shape European demographics over the coming decades. By examining not only the role of migration, fertility and mortality, but also education levels and labour force participation rates, a more comprehensive view of possible futures can be outlined than the conventional demographic projections allow for. The first five sections of this report focus on demographic challenges inside the EU, such as population ageing, a shrinking labour force, more non-working people being dependent on working people, and showing the impact of high levels of emigration in some EU Member States. With these challenges in mind and with a view towards 2060, the report builds scenarios to understand the long-term effects of changes in key trends, and whether undesirable consequences can be limited or counteracted. As the EU and its demographics do not exist in isolation, the following sections explore the relevant trends for world demographics and for migration flows.JRC.A.5-Scientific Developmen

Adolescence and the next generation.

Adolescent growth and social development shape the early development of offspring from preconception through to the post-partum period through distinct processes in males and females. At a time of great change in the forces shaping adolescence, including the timing of parenthood, investments in today's adolescents, the largest cohort in human history, will yield great dividends for future generations