Do individuals recognize cascade behavior of others? An Experimental Study

In an information cascade experiment participants are confronted with artificial predecessors predicting in line with the BHW model (Bikchandani et al., 1992). Using the BDM (Becker et al., 1964) mechanism we study participants' probability perceptions based on maximum prices for participating in the prediction game. We find increasing maximum prices the more coinciding predictions of predecessors are observed, regardless of whether additional information is revealed by these predictions. Individual price patterns of more than two thirds of the participants indicate that cascade behavior of predecessors is not recognized

Do individuals recognize cascade behavior of others? An Experimental Study

In an information cascade experiment participants are confronted with artificial predecessors predicting in line with the BHW model (Bikchandani et al., 1992). Using the BDM (Becker et al., 1964) mechanism we study participants' probability perceptions based on maximum prices for participating in the prediction game. We find increasing maximum prices the more coinciding predictions of predecessors are observed, regardless of whether additional information is revealed by these predictions. Individual price patterns of more than two thirds of the participants indicate that cascade behavior of predecessors is not recognized.information cascades; Bayes' Rule; decision under risk and uncertainty; experimental economics

Do Individuals Recognize Cascade Behavior of Others? - An Experimental Study -

In an information cascade experiment participants are confronted with artificial predecessors predicting in line with the BHW model (Bikchandani et al., 1992). Using the BDM (Becker et al., 1964) mechanism we study participants' probability perceptions based on maximum prices for participating in the prediction game. We find increasing maximum prices the more coinciding predictions of predecessors are observed, regardless of whether additional information is revealed by these predictions. Individual price patterns of more than two thirds of the participants indicate that cascade behavior of predecessors is not recognized.Information Cascades, Bayes' Rule, Decision Under Risk and Uncertainty, Experimental Economics.

I want YOU! An experiment studying the selection effect when assigning distributive power

We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two others empty-handed and allowing one of the other two players to distribute a pie. Treatments differ in the procedure by which distributive power is assigned: to a randomly determined or to a knowingly selected partner. Before making her decision the selecting player could consult the personality questionnaire of the other two players. Results show that knowingly selected players keep less for themselves than randomly selected ones and reward the selecting player more generously.

A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games - An Experimental Study

In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishmentrule in a public good setting. We show that under all punishment rules cooperationis stronger and more sustainable than reported from settings without punishment.Moreover, we present evidence and explanations for differences between the rulesconcerning punishment intensity, contribution and profit levels, as well as justice.Finally, we investigate influences crucial to participants’ support for a collective rulewhen the individual rule is the status quo. We show that beside profit differences thedegree of consent required by the collective rule is essential for the degree of supportby the participants.mathematical economics and econometrics ;

I want you! An experiment studying the selection effect when assigning distributive power

We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two others empty-handed and allowing one of the other two players to distribute a pie. Treatments differ in the procedure by which distributive power is assigned: to a randomly determined or to a knowingly selected partner. Before making her decision the selecting player could consult the personality questionnaire of the other two players. Results show that knowingly selected players keep less for themselves than randomly selected ones and reward the selecting player more generously

Produktivität IT-basierter Dienstleistungen : wie kann man sie messen und steuern?

Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien haben die Produktion in Unternehmen grundlegend verändert. IT-basierte Dienstleistungen stellen ein zentrales Bindeglied zwischen vielen anderen Unternehmensprozessen dar und leisten einen wichtigen Beitrag zur betrieblichen und gesamtwirtschaftlichen Produktivität. Welche Konzepte gibt es zur Messung und Steuerung dieser Produktivität und wie werden sie in der Praxis eingesetzt? Wie können sie weiterentwickelt werden? Diese Fragen standen im Mittelpunkt des Forschungsprojektes „Produktivität IT-basierter Dienstleistungen“, das das Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Pierre Audoin Consultants GmbH (PAC) und die Universität Mannheim gemeinsam in den Jahren 2010 bis 2014 durchgeführt haben. Das Projekt wurde vom Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF) im Rahmen des Programms „Innovationen mit Dienstleistungen“ gefördert. Ziel des Projektes war es, die Messung, die Bestimmungsfaktoren und die Steuerung der Produktivität IT-basierter Dienstleistungen aus verschiedenen Blickwinkeln zu untersuchen. Diese Blickwinkel lassen sich anhand der Frage erläutern, welche gesellschaftlichen Akteure ein Interesse haben, Produktivität IT-basierter Dienstleistungen zu messen

Sequestration of Defenses against Predators Drives Specialized Host Plant Associations in Preadapted Milkweed Bugs (Heteroptera: Lygaeinae)

AbstractHost plant specialization across herbivorous insects varies dramatically, but while the molecular mechanisms of host plant adaptations are increasingly known, we often lack a comprehensive understanding of the selective forces that favor specialization. The milkweed bugs (Heteroptera: Lygaeinae) are ancestrally associated with plants of the Apocynaceae from which they commonly sequester cardiac glycosides for defense, facilitated by resistant NaNa+/K+-ATPases and adaptations for transport, storage, and discharge of toxins. Here, we show that three Lygaeinae species independently colonized four novel nonapocynaceous hosts that convergently produce cardiac glycosides. A fourth species shifted to a new source of toxins by tolerating and sequestering alkaloids from meadow saffron (Colchicum autumnale, Colchicaceae). Across three milkweed bug species tested, feeding on seeds containing toxins did not improve growth or speed of development and even impaired growth and development in two species, but sequestration mediated protection of milkweed bugs against two natural predators: lacewing larvae and passerine birds. We conclude that physiological preadaptations and convergent phytochemistry facilitated novel specialized host associations. Since toxic seeds did not improve growth but either impaired growth or, at most, had neutral effects, selection by predators on sequestration of defenses, rather than the exploitation of additional profitable dietary resources, can lead to obligatory specialized host associations in otherwise generalist insects

Does Cascade Behavior in Information Cascades Reflect Bayesian Updating?

Updating behavior in cascade experiments is usually investigated on the basis of urn prediction. But urn predictions alone can only provide a very rough information on individual updating behavior. Therefore, we implement a BDM mechanism. Subjects have to submit maximum prices that they are willing to pay to participate in the prediction game. This enables us to study subjects’ probabilty formation less crudely. The results show that in many situations herding occurs in accordance with the standard BHW model but cannot be explained neither by rational Bayesian updating nor by heuristics identi…ed in former cascade experiments