Eliding in New York

In January 2006, this Journal published an article that set forth the social institutional argument for man/woman marriage, demonstrated how that argument is a sufficient response to all constitutional attacks leveled at the laws sustaining that social institution, and detailed how the courts mandating genderless marriage (and the dissenting judges favoring that result) had elided the argument (“the Judicial Elision article”). Since the Judicial Elision article’s early December 2005 cut-off date, two more instances of judicial elision of social institutional realities have cropped up in New York. Both are dissenting opinions, one in the Appellate Division and one in the Court of Appeals. Because those dissenting opinions are interesting, and engagement with them intellectually productive, this article critically examines both. In preparation for doing so, and as an aid to the reader, this article also summarizes central aspects of the social institutional argument as set forth in the Judicial Elision article

Genderless Marriage, Institutional Realities, and Judicial Elision

The stuff of the marriage debate is not static. That is particularly true in the courts, where the legal definition of marriage is debated most thoroughly and most consequentially. This article addresses one of the new arguments advanced in support of man/woman marriage now drawing judicial attention, the argument from social institutional studies. The social institutional argument is a sufficient answer to the variety of constitutional challenges leveled against man/woman marriage. Yet to date, the courts holding for genderless marriage have chosen (consciously it appears) to elude rather than engage argument

Genderless Marriage, Institutional Realities, and Judicial Elision

The stuff of the marriage debate is not static. That is particularly true in the courts, where the legal definition of marriage is debated most thoroughly and most consequentially. This article addresses one of the new arguments advanced in support of man/woman marriage now drawing judicial attention, the argument from social institutional studies. The social institutional argument is a sufficient answer to the variety of constitutional challenges leveled against man/woman marriage. Yet to date, the courts holding for genderless marriage have chosen (consciously it appears) to elude rather than engage argument

Marriage, Fundamental Premises, and the California, Connecticut, and Iowa Supreme Courts

The highest courts in California, Connecticut, and Iowa recently held that the constitutional norm of equality requires the redefinition of marriage from “the union of a man and a woman” to “the union of any two persons.” The argument leading to that holding, like all arguments, proceeds from premises that the argument does not prove but that serve as the starting point for reasoning. Those premises range from the nature of contemporary American marriage to the equivalence of the pre- and post-redefinition marriage institutions, to the social costs, if any, resulting from redefinition, and to marriage’s relationship with other social institutions such as law and religion. This Article critically examines the common fundamental premises underlying the California, Connecticut, and Iowa opinions. That critical examination leads to serious questions regarding those premises’ validity. Indeed, that examination demonstrates their falsity. At the same time, it clarifies their materiality; that is, it shows that, but for the cases’ fundamental premises, no line of judicial reasoning can lead to their holdin

Marriage, Fundamental Premises, and the California, Connecticut, and Iowa Supreme Courts

The highest courts in California, Connecticut, and Iowa recently held that the constitutional norm of equality requires the redefinition of marriage from “the union of a man and a woman” to “the union of any two persons.” The argument leading to that holding, like all arguments, proceeds from premises that the argument does not prove but that serve as the starting point for reasoning. Those premises range from the nature of contemporary American marriage to the equivalence of the pre- and post-redefinition marriage institutions, to the social costs, if any, resulting from redefinition, and to marriage’s relationship with other social institutions such as law and religion. This Article critically examines the common fundamental premises underlying the California, Connecticut, and Iowa opinions. That critical examination leads to serious questions regarding those premises’ validity. Indeed, that examination demonstrates their falsity. At the same time, it clarifies their materiality; that is, it shows that, but for the cases’ fundamental premises, no line of judicial reasoning can lead to their holdin

DNA repair in trinucleotide repeat ataxias

The inherited cerebellar ataxias comprise of a genetic heterogeneous group of disorders. Pathogenic expansions of cytosine-adenine-guanine (CAG) encoding polyglutamine tracts account for the largest proportion of autosomal dominant cerebellar ataxias, while GAA expansion in the first introns of frataxin gene is the commonest cause of autosomal recessive cerebellar ataxias. Currently, there is no available treatment to alter the disease trajectory, with devastating consequences for affected individuals. Inter- and Intrafamily phenotypic variability suggest the existence of genetic modifiers, which may become targets amendable to treatment. Recent studies have demonstrated the importance of DNA repair pathways in modifying spinocerebellar ataxia with CAG repeat expansions. In this review, we discuss the mechanisms in which DNA repair pathways, epigenetics and other genetic factors may act as modifiers in cerebellar ataxias due to trinucleotide repeat expansions