Latin American Developments in the "Age of Migration"

Latin American Studie

Constraints on lepton number violating short-range interactions from ∣ΔL∣=2|\Delta L|=2 processes

In this work we study the short-range contributions that induce effective lepton number violating (LNV) interactions. We obtain a full set of constraints on the effective short-range couplings from a large variety of low-energy $|\Delta L|= 2$ processes of pseudoscalar mesons $K, D, D_s, B$, and $\tau$-lepton. These constraints provide complementary and additional information to the one obtained from the neutrinoless double-$\beta$ ($0\nu\beta\beta$) decay. As expected, the bounds on electron-electron short-range couplings are the only ones that are strongly constrained by the $0\nu\beta\beta$ decay. Although weaker, LNV effective couplings with different flavours are not accessible to $0\nu\beta\beta$ decay and these can be probe by the $|\Delta L|= 2$ processes in consideration.Comment: 8 pages, 1 figure. v3: references added, discussion extended, section IV included, conclusions unchanged, matches with version published in Phys. Lett.

Problem of Equality in Takings, The

The Supreme Court is finally beginning to bring clarity to the law of regulatory takings and in the process is bringing to the fore a previously submerged theme in the jurisprudence: regulatory takings as a question of distributional justice and horizontal equity. This Article argues that this equality dimension is fundamentally problematic. On a theoretical level, privileging norms of equality engrafts political process rationales for heightened scrutiny onto groups defined solely by the differential burden of a regulation, an exercise in circularity. Equally troubling is the inverted political economy of regulatory takings claims that is likely to result: the greatest judicial protection is provided to those most able to navigate the political system. And from a doctrinal perspective, an overly robust equality inquiry housed in the Takings Clause is inherently indeterminate, warping not only the fabric of takings but also of equal protection jurisprudence. Accordingly, this Article argues that concerns about the uneven distribution of regulatory burdens should sound not under the Takings Clause but rather under the Equal Protection Clause, with its deferential standards for the review of ordinary economic and social regulation. Excising the equality dimension of regulatory takings would properly leave the Takings Clause as a guard against those rare regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the direct exercise of eminent domain. The result would be a simpler, clearer, and ultimately more egalitarian law of takings