Diagnosing Sorites arguments

This is a discussion of Delia Fara’s theory of vagueness, and of its solution to the Sorites paradox, criticizing some of the details of the account, but agreeing that its central insight will be a part of any solution to the problem. I also consider a wider range of philosophical puzzles that involve arguments that are structurally similar to the argument of the Sorites paradox, and argue that the main ideas of her account of vagueness helps to respond to some of those puzzles. ; Esta es una discusión sobre la teoría de la vaguedad de Delia Fara, y de su solución a la paradoja de Sorites, criticando alguno de los detalles de su aproximación, pero de acuerdo en que la intuición central es parte de cualquier solución al problema. También considero un rango más amplio de puzles filosóficos que incluyen argumentos estructuralmente similares al argumento de la paradoja de Sorites, y defiendo que las ideas principales de su aproximación a la vaguedad ayudan a responder algunos de esos puzles

Los nombres y la referencia: semantica y metasemantica

Kripke, in "Naming and Necessity", defended answers to two kinds of questions about names and reference: a Millian semantics that answers a question of descriptive semantics and a causal account of reference that answers a metasemantic question--a question about what makes a descriptive semantic theory correct. It is argued that the main philosophical work in Kripke's defense of his account of names and reference is done by distinguishing the questions of clarifying the alternative possible answers to them in a way that provides a rebuttal to philosophical arguments that a Millian semantics is impossible

On the Representation of Context

No abstract

Diagnosing Sorites arguments

This is a discussion of Delia Fara’s theory of vagueness, and of its solution to the Sorites paradox, criticizing some of the details of the account, but agreeing that its central insight will be a part of any solution to the problem. I also consider a wider range of philosophical puzzles that involve arguments that are structurally similar to the argument of the Sorites paradox, and argue that the main ideas of her account of vagueness helps to respond to some of those puzzles

Sens et contexte

François Recanati, directeur d’études Séminaire doctoral Ce séminaire, destiné en priorité aux doctorants de François Récanati et aux doctorants étrangers en stage avec lui, prend tantôt la forme d’un groupe de lecture et tantôt la forme d’un séminaire classique avec exposés suivis de discussions. Le séminaire doctoral a accueilli des exposés, parmi lesquels : François Recanati, « Pragmatic modulation » (18 novembre 2009) ; Dan Zeman (doctorant, Université de Barcelone) ; « Binding predicates..

Affective Experience, Desire, and Reasons for Action

What is the role of affective experience in explaining how our desires provide us with reasons for action? When we desire that p, we are thereby disposed to feel attracted to the prospect that p, or to feel averse to the prospect that not-p. In this paper, we argue that affective experiences – including feelings of attraction and aversion – provide us with reasons for action in virtue of their phenomenal character. Moreover, we argue that desires provide us with reasons for action only insofar as they are dispositions to have affective experiences. On this account, affective experience has a central role to play in explaining how desires provide reasons for action