Does illegal immigration empower rightist parties?

The main goal of this paper is to analyze the political outcome in countries where the relevant issue in elections is the control of immigration. In particular we explore the consequences on the political outcome of the fact that parties are either ideological or opportunistic with respect to this issue. In order to do that we use a simple two-party political competition model in which the issues over which parties take positions are the level of border enforcement and the way it has to be financed. We show that an ideological rather than a pure opportunistic behavior gives parties an advantage to win the election. This result may help us to understand the recent success of anti-immigrant and rightist parties in several countries.Illegal immigration, ideological parties, unskilled and skilled.

Immigration policy with partisan parties

This paper analyzes the political economy of immigration when the salient electoral issue is the level of immigrants and the relevant immigration policy is the expenditure in immigration control. We consider that immigration affects voters’ welfare through economic and non economic factors. We model political competition `a la Wittman with the ideology of parties endogenously determined at equilibrium. At equilibrium, parties propose different levels of immigration, located to the left and to the right of the median voter’s ideal point, and combine skilled and unskilled workers among their constituencies. Numerical simulations provide the levels of immigration proposed by the two parties and the composition of parties’ constituencies as we vary the efficacy of immigration control and the intensity of immigration aversion.Immigration, ideological parties, unskilled and skilled labor

Income inequality, voters’ support for public spending and the size of the welfare state. A simple political model

Supporting information S1 Appendix. Conservative majority. (PDF) http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchSingleRepresentation.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0277256.s001This paper studies the effect of income inequality and voters’ support for public spending on the choice of size of the welfare state. Based on new empirical findings showing that preferences for taxation depend on the nature of the policies financed with tax revenues (Barnes 2015, Ballard-Rosa 2016, Roosma 2016, and Berens 2019) I build a Downsian two-party political competition framework in which voters differ in both income (rich or poor) and ideology (liberal or conservative). Government provides two types of public services: one that increase the size of the welfare state and other that does not. Liberal (conservative) voters only care about the public service that increase (do not increase) the size of the welfare state. I find that the decisive voter and the size of the welfare state depends on both the level of income inequality and voters’ support for public spending. In particular, and different from the traditional models on redistributive politics (Romer 1975, Roberts 1977, and Meltzer 1981), I obtain that an increase in pre tax income inequality may reduce the size of the welfare state chosen by majority voting.FEDER/Junta de Andalucía-Consejería de Transformación Económica, Industria, Conocimiento y Universidades/Grant B-SEJ-10-UGR2

Tax compliance and income redistribution: a political competition model

This paper analyzes the political economy of income redistribution when voters are concerned about tax compliance. We consider a two stagemodel where there is a two party competition over the tax rate in the first stage and voters decide about their level of tax compliance in the second stage. We model political competition à la Wittman with the ideology of parties endogenously determined at equilibrium. We calibrate the model for an average of EU-27 countries. Numerical simulations provide the tax rates proposed by the two parties and the level of tax compliance. We find that a decrease in confidence in tax morale, and an increase in parties’ uncertainty about the preferences of the median voter increase the probability that the party offering the lowest income tax will win and decrease tax compliance

Does illegal immigration empower rightist parties?

The main goal of this paper is to analyze the political outcome in countries where the relevant issue in elections is the control of immigration. In particular we explore the consequences on the political outcome of the fact that parties are either ideological or opportunistic with respect to this issue. In order to do that we use a simple two-party political competition model in which the issues over which parties take positions are the level of border enforcement and the way it has to be financed. We show that an ideological rather than a pure opportunistic behavior gives parties an advantage to win the election. This result may help us to understand the recent success of anti-immigrant and rightist parties in several countries

A Heuristic Procedure with Guided Reproduction for Constructing Cocyclic Hadamard Matrices

A genetic algorithm for constructing cocyclic Hadamard matrices over a given group is described. The novelty of this algorithm is the guided heuristic procedure for reproduction, instead of the classical crossover and mutation operators. We include some runs of the algorithm for dihedral groups, which are known to give rise to a large amount of cocyclic Hadamard matrices.Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación MTM2008-06578Junta de Andalucía FQM–296Junta de Andalucía P07-FQM-0298

Error correcting codes from quasi-Hadamard matrices

Levenshtein described in [5] a method for constructing error correcting codes which meet the Plotkin bounds, provided suitable Ha- damard matrices exist. Uncertainty about the existence of Hadamard matrices on all orders multiple of 4 is a source of difficulties for the prac- tical application of this method. Here we extend the method to the case of quasi-Hadamard matrices. Since efficient algorithms for constructing quasi-Hadamard matrices are potentially available from the literature (e.g. [7]), good error correcting codes may be constructed in practise. We illustrate the method with some examples.Junta de Andalucía FQM–29

Microwave Photon Detector in Circuit QED

Quantum optical photodetection has occupied a central role in understanding radiation-matter interactions. It has also contributed to the development of atomic physics and quantum optics, including applications to metrology, spectroscopy, and quantum information processing. The quantum microwave regime, originally explored using cavities and atoms, is seeing a novel boost with the generation of nonclassical propagating fields in circuit quantum electrodynamics (QED). This promising field, involving potential developments in quantum information with microwave photons, suffers from the absence of photodetectors. Here, we design a metamaterial composed of discrete superconducting elements that implements a high-efficiency microwave photon detector. Our design consists of a microwave guide coupled to an array of metastable quantum circuits, whose internal states are irreversibly changed due to the absorption of photons. This proposal can be widely applied to different physical systems and can be generalized to implement a microwave photon counter.Comment: accepted in Phys. Rev. Let

How do market imperfections affect working capital management?

This paper examines whether Working Capital Management (WCM) is sensitive to market imperfections such as asymmetric information, agency conflicts or financial distress. We find that firms have a target investment in working capital and that they take decisions in order to achieve this. In addition, the results appear to support the hypothesis that the working capital competes with investment in fixed assets for the funds of the firms when they have financial constraints. Finally, we also find that WCM depends on bargaining power and other financial factors such as the availability of internal finance, cost of financing and access to capital markets. Este artículo analiza si la gestión del capital circulante está afectada por las imperfecciones de mercado tales como la asimetría informativa, los conflictos de agencia o las dificultades financieras. Los resultados muestran que las empresas tienen un nivel de inversión en capital circulante objetivo y toman decisiones con el fin de alcanzarlo. Además, los resultados parecen apoyar la hipótesis de que el capital circulante compite con los activos fijos por los fondos de las empresas cuando éstas tienen restricciones financieras. Finalmente, la gestión del capital circulante depende del poder de negociación y otros factores financieros tales como la disponibilidad de financiación interna, el coste de financiación y el acceso a los mercados de capitales.ciclo de efectivo, gestión del capital circulante, imperfecciones de mercado, datos de panel net trade cycle, working capital management, market imperfections, panel data