Słowo od autora „Znaczenia i rozumienia w historii idei”

wstę

Motivos, intenciones e interpretación

Desde hace ya algunas décadas se han multiplicado las voces, sobre todo entre filósofos y teóricos de la literatura, que consideran estéril y absurdo seguir planteándose las tradicionales cuestiones hermenéuticas relacionadas con la autoría o el sentido válido de los textos. Cabe preguntarse, no obstante, hasta qué punto el desprestigio de la intencionalidad del autor o del sentido primario del texto no tendrá que ver con una cierta confusión en el uso de nociones claves, tales como significado, motivos o intenciones. Sólo partiendo de la clarificación de estos conceptos puede acaso plantearse si merece la pena y sigue existiendo la posibilidad de distinguir entre interpretaciones más o menos aceptables o descabelladas de los textos literarios y filosóficos

Significado e interpretação na História das Ideias

Tradução do Capítulo 4 da obra:SKINNER, Quentin. Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas. In: SKINNER, Quentin. Visions of Politics. Londres: Cambridge University Press, 2001, vol. I, cap. 4, p. 57-89. Tradutor:Marcus Vinícius BarbosaMestre em História pela Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos. Atualmente é estudante de doutorado em Espanhol na University of [email protected]

Learning to laugh : children and being human in early modern thought

This essay explores the construction of the human in early modern English thought, and uses discussions of the nature and use of laughter as a distinguishing feature of humanity from classical arguments as well as early modern ones. Using these classical, reformed English discussions of education and of the nature of children reveals an anxiety about the status of the child. Laughing appropriately - using tile mind and not merely the body - is a key feature of being human, and as such, the child's lack of "true' laughter reveals that child's status to be never always-already human. "Human' is a created rather than merely a natural status

Independence and property in Kant's Rechtslehre

I argue that the freedom which is to coexist with the freedom of choice of others in accordance with a universal law mentioned in Kant's Rechtslehre is not itself freedom of choice. Rather, it is the independence which is a condition of being able to exercise genuine free choice by not having to act in accordance with the choices of others. Kant's distinction between active and passive citizenship appears, however, to undermine this idea of independence, because the possession of a certain type of property right on the part of some citizens makes it possible for them to dominate others. Kant's account of property in this way turns out to be central to the question as to whether his Rechtslehre represents an internally consistent account of how freedom can be guaranteed within a legal and political community. I go on to argue that Kant's attempt to justify a pre-political right of property cannot be viewed as a successful justification of private property, and that he should have abandoned the notion of such a right together with any presumption in favour of private property

Introduction: approaching space in intellectual history

This article serves as an introduction to the special issue on Conceptions of Space in Intellectual History. It opens with a brief inquiry into the place of ‘space’, both as a topic and as an analytical lens, in the field of intellectual history. The remainder of the introduction suggests a pathway through the special issue. Under three broad headings – ‘territory,’ ‘oceans and empire’, and ‘geopolitics’ – the volume’s articles are presented, brought into dialogue, and situated within a wider trajectory of recent research on conceptions of ‘space’ in intellectual history.Arts and Humanities Research Council; Cambridge Commonwealth, European & International Trust; Levy-Plumb Fund for the Humanities at Christ's College, Cambridge