15 research outputs found
Framing Visual Perception in Terms of Sensorimotor Mapping
Two contrasting theories, or variants of them, are predominant in the current debate on visual cognition. The standard inferential theory sees perception as a process involving the role of memory, past experiences and semantic abilities, whereas the direct theory sees perception as a connection between the perceiver and the environment that does not recruit internal information processing. In particular, the direct theory has recently been invoked because it would be able to explain the sensorimotor coupling of perception and action in humans and animals without relying on controversial notions such as those of conceptualization and propositional information. This paper aims to show that even an inferential theory of perception has enough resources to account for sensorimotor processes without necessarily involving high level cognitive functions. My claim is that there are genuine instances of sensorimotor inferential processing that do not rely on conceptual structures and propositional knowledge. Several theoretical and empirical arguments are provided to support this statement
The ecological meaning of embodiment
Today embodiment is a critical theme in several branches of the contemporary philosophical debate. The term embodiment refers to the role of an agent’s own body in his situated life, suggesting the existence of a bodily root for several experiential and cognitive abilities. A metaphor, that of the root, which aims at establishing a constitutive participation of the body in what we usually consider the domain of the mind. As other philosophical concepts, the notion of embodiment, as well as the idea of embodied mind, lacks of an explicit and shared definition, therefore, is possible to find many different uses of it. Works concerning “embodiment” cover many fields of research such as those concerning the nature of abstract thought (Lakoff & Núñez 2000), artificial intelligence (Clark 1998) and social cognition (Sinigaglia 2009). The aim of this paper is to define a path linking considerations from the phenomenological tradition with recent theoretical developments and experimental evidence. This will make it possible to show that the identification of the bodily roots of experience has the consequence to involve a series of theoretical and experimental consequences leading towards an enactive and ecological approach to perception
Il realismo scientifico è veramente la miglior spiegazione?
My work is an epistemological analysis that concern some philosophical questions about scientific realism. Central in these pages is the defence of a distinction between methaphisical and empirical approach to the notion of reality. In this direction I have considered some aspects of contemporary debate, specially the so called “Inference to the Best Explanation”, and a constitutive theory of empirical objectivity
Lo Statuto Metodologico dei Contenuti Intenzionali
Riassunto: Il dibattito in filosofia della mente è caratterizzato dal crescente interesse per nuove forme di eliminativismo, note con il nome di teorie enattiviste radicali della mente. Secondo la concezione enattivista radicale, il contenuto intenzionale di uno stato mentale è empiricamente sottodeterminato, pertanto non può essere utilizzato quale elemento di una spiegazione naturalistica del comportamento. Tuttavia, sebbene il riferimento ai contenuti intenzionali non sia conciliabile con il naturalismo ontologico, esso è invece compatibile con una forma di naturalismo metodologico. Seguendo l’analisi semantica proposta da Carnap per i termini teorici, è possibile concepire uno stato mentale come un veicolo simbolico il cui significato è stabilito per mezzo di osservazioni e scelte convenzionali. Attraverso un caso di studio riguardante le funzioni cognitive della corteccia somatosensoriale, l’articolo fornisce le indicazioni programmatiche per un’interpretazione delle spiegazioni intenzionali del comportamento in accordo con la metodologia delle scienze naturali.Parole chiave: Contenuto mentale; Enattivismo radicale; Intenzionalità ; Naturalismo; Teleosemantica; Teoria della spiegazione The Methodological Status of Intentional ContentsAbstract: The philosophy of mind debate is characterized by increasing consensus regarding a new type of eliminativism, also known as the radical enactivist theory of mind. According to the radical enactivist view, the intentional content of a mental state is empirically undetermined, therefore it cannot figure as part of a naturalistic explanation of behavior. However, although the notion of intentional content is not compatible with any form of ontological naturalism, it is compatible with a form of methodological naturalism. Following Carnap’s semantic analysis of theoretical concepts, it is possible to conceive of intentional mental states as a symbolic vehicles whose meaning can be conventionally established on the basis of empirical observation. In order to support this claim, I refer to a case study on the cognitive functions of somatosensory cortex. This article provides arguments for building an intentional explanation of behavior based on methodological approaches in the natural sciences.Keywords: Mental Content; Radical Enactivism; Intentionality; Naturalism; Teleosemantics; Theory of Explanatio
Out of our skull, in our skin: the Microbiota-Gut-Brain axis and the Extended Cognition Thesis
AbstractAccording to a shared functionalist view in philosophy of mind, a cognitive system, and cognitive function thereof, is based on the components of the organism it is realized by which, indeed, play a causal role in regulating our cognitive processes. This led philosophers to suggest also that, thus, cognition could be seen as an extended process, whose vehicle can extend not only outside the brain but also beyond bodily boundaries, on different kinds of devices. This is what we call the 'Externally Extended Cognition Thesis.' This notion has generated a lively debate. Here, we offer a novel notion of extended cognition, according to which cognition can be seen as being realized (and expanded) outside the brain, but still inside the body. This is what we call the 'Internally Extended Cognition Thesis'. Not only our thesis but also our approach while defending it is innovative. The argument we offer is supported by recent empirical findings in the life sciences and biomedicine, which suggest that the gut microbiota's activity has a functional role in regulating our cognitive processes and behaviors. In doing so, we embrace theholobiont-perspective, according to which it is possible to claim that what we call biological individuals are not autonomous entities with clear boundaries, but should rather be seen as networks of multiple interactions among species. Thus, by analyzing different sets of evidence in light of theholobiont-perspective, we argue that the gut microbiota could be seen as a component of our organism. On the basis of the philosophical interpretation of this evidence, however, we also suggest that there are no impediments standing the way of considering the gut microbiota also as a functional extension of our cognitive system. If so, this amounts to extending cognition out of 'our skull', though still confining it within 'our body': to 'our gut'. This is an instance of the 'Internally Extended Cognition Thesis,' whose benefits for an original (biologically informed) theory ofextended cognitionare discussed
The Ecological meaning of embodiment
Today embodiment is a critical theme in several branches of the contemporary philosophical debate. The term embodiment refers to the role of an agent’s own body in his situated life,suggesting the existence of a bodily root for several experiential and cognitive abilities. A metaphor, that of the root, which aims at establishing a constitutive participation of the body in what we usually consider the domain of the mind. As other philosophical concepts, the notion of embodiment, as well as the idea of embodied mind, lacks of an explicit and shared definition,therefore, is possible to find many different uses of it. Works concerning “embodiment” cover many fields of research such as those concerning the nature of abstract thought (Lakoff &
Núñez 2000), artificial intelligence (Clark 1998) and social cognition (Sinigaglia 2009). The aim of this paper is to define a path linking considerations from the phenomenological tradition with recent theoretical developments and experimental evidence. This will make it possible to show that the identification of the bodily roots of experience has the consequence to involve a series of theoretical and experimental consequences leading towards an enactive and ecological approach to perception
Through the Flat Canvas: The Motor Meaning of Realistic Paintings
It is well known that common objects in the environment can evoke possibilities of action, but what about their bi-dimensional representation? Do pictures or paintings that represent action-related objects evoke the same possibilities of actions of the objects that they represent? In contemporary cognitive science, there are two contrasting views on this issue. On the one hand, the ecological-dispositional approach to perception supports the idea that viewing depicted objects as endowed with the potential for action is nothing but an illusion. On the other hand, recent findings show that our motor system is activated by the perception of both real and depicted action-related objects, and this activation plays a functional role in planning motor acts. A broad analysis reveals that the activation of the motor system during perceptual tasks plays a crucial rule in processing the practical meaning of the concrete objects and of the abstract representations of them. This evidence has consequences to our understanding of the way we experience pictures and paintings
Cognizione incorporata
Over the last decades, a symbolic, a modal approach has dominated the cognitive sciences. Today, a large part of the scientific and philosophical community states that this view is only an approximation, and that bodily structures play a critical role in cognition. This paper aims at introducing the debate about the embodied approach to cognition.L’idea che la cognizione sia una forma di elaborazione simbolica, indipendente rispetto alle proprietà del supporto materiale che la implementa, ha dominato lo sviluppo iniziale delle scienze cognitive. Oggi una parte della comunità scientifica e filosofica ritiene che questa prospettiva sia insufficiente o sbagliata, e che le caratteristiche morfologiche e dinamiche del corpo svolgano un ruolo peculiare nella genesi e nello sviluppo dei processi cognitivi. Da qui prendono le mosse una serie di proposte teoriche raccolte sotto la generale etichetta di Embodied Cognition. Scopo di questo contributo è delinearne un panorama
Carla Bagnoli, Teoria della ResponsabilitĂ , Il Mulino, Bologna, 2019, pp. 424
Responsibility plays a key role in the social life of all of us. But what is responsibility and what are the criteria that make it possible to attribute responsibility to someone? Carla Bagnoli's book offers valuable answers to these fundamental questions, identifying the "sensitivity to norms" as an explanatory condition of responsibility.La responsabilitĂ riveste un ruolo chiave nella vita sociale di tutti noi. Ma che cos’è la responsabilitĂ e quali sono i criteri che rendono possibile attribuire responsabilitĂ a qualcuno? Il libro di Carla Bagnoli offre le risposte a queste fondamentali domande, individuando nella “sensibilitĂ alle norme” una condizione esplicativa della responsabilitĂ