Thermal and Structual Properties of Candidate Moldable Glass Types

This thesis contains results of our efforts to develop a method for defining key glass material properties that must be known and modeled for the design and experimental validation of a precision glass molding (PGM) process for optical glasses. Viscosity, calorimetric, and thermal expansion properties of two commercial glass types N-BK7 and P-SK57 of SCHOTT were characterized to establish a proof-of-concept protocol for the experimental determination of meaningful material properties. Experimental results were determined in order to be incorporated into a computational model predicting final glass size and shape following a molding cycle. Experimental methods were confirmed on the two \u27known\u27 glass types and extended to a moldable, OHARA (L-BAL35), which had never-before been characterized using this protocol, for molding applications. Beam-bending and parallel-plate techniques were employed to measure the glass viscosity, and the well-known VFT equation was used to interpolate viscosity data through the molding region. Expansion behavior below and above the glass transition temperature, Tg and transition region was quantified using rate-heating and isothermal expansion measurements, respectively. Differential Scanning Calorimetry measurements were performed and curve-fitted using the Tool-Narayanaswamy-Moynihan (TNM) model for structural relaxation, and from these calculations kinetic glass property response in the transition region was determined. Finally, a model for predicting the thermal expansion behavior of the glass optical lens upon cooling from the molding temperature was compiled using experimentally determined variables derived within this effort. The results show that a simple, linear thermal expansion model cannot be used and that structural relaxation must be implemented in order to precisely define the glass expansion properties upon rapid cooling through the glass transition region

“Kill the Sea Turtles” and Other Things You Can’t Make the Government Say

In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, the Supreme Court confirmed that there is no heckler’s veto under the government speech doctrine. When speaking, the government has the right to speak for itself and to select the views that it wants to express. But the Court acknowledged that sometimes it is difficult to determine whether the government is actually speaking. Specialty license plates have proven to be one of those difficult situations, raising novel and important First Amendment issues. Six circuits have reached four separate conclusions regarding the status of messages on specialty license plates. Three circuits have held that specialty plates are private speech, one has held that specialty plates are government speech, and another has held that specialty plates are hybrid speech. Yet another circuit has held that the issue is nonjusticiable under the Tax Injunction Act. And the uncertainty continues as North Carolina, Texas, and Oklahoma currently confront litigation over their license plates—litigation that will determine whether states or third parties have the right to select the messages on specialty license plates. This Article explores the Court’s “recently minted” government speech doctrine in the context of specialty plates. In particular, it analyzes the circumstances under which a state can adopt one message (“Save the Sea Turtles”) while refusing to authorize opposing viewpoints (“Kill the Sea Turtles”). To date, the majority of circuits have applied a literal speaker test, which looks to see if a reasonable observer would view specialty plates as government or private speech. Under that test, specialty plates are private speech, and any restrictions on the content of such plates must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral, even if a state disagrees with that message. This Article contends that a careful review of Summum, which was decided after all but one of the circuit court decisions, shows that the majority interpretation is wrong. The literal speaker test is inconsistent with the “control” test set out in Summum and Johanns. Under the Court’s new test for government speech, many specialty license plate programs are government speech, and third parties cannot force states to promulgate messages with which they disagree. If a state has a “Save the Sea Turtles” plate to promote conservation and the protection of its wildlife, it cannot be forced to offer a “Kill the Sea Turtles” plate. And the same holds true for more controversial messages such as “Choose Life” in North Carolina as well as Texas’s ban on plates containing divisive images such as a Confederate flag. Thus, this Article concludes that Summum marks a significant development in the Court’s free speech jurisprudence, one that affirms the states’ ability to control the messages on their specialty license plates as well as their other expressive activity

For-Profit Corporations, Free Exercise, and the HHS Mandate

Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, most employers must provide their employees with health insurance that covers all FDA-approved contraceptive methods and sterilization procedures (the “HHS mandate”). Across the country, individuals, religious schools, and corporations have sued to enjoin the mandate, arguing, among other things, that it violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). These cases require the federal courts to sort out the complex relationship between the Free Exercise Clause and laws that are alleged to be neutral and generally applicable, such as the HHS mandate. But they also raise a novel threshold question: whether corporations can exercise religion under the First Amendment and RFRA. As several federal courts have noted, whether secular corporations can exercise religion is an open question. To date, this question has confounded the courts, resulting in a split between the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits as well as the numerous district courts that have ruled on challenges to the HHS mandate. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in two of these cases, Hobby Lobby (Tenth Circuit) and Conestoga Wood Specialties (Third Circuit). This Article analyzes this novel and unresolved issue, arguing that the Supreme Court should follow its reasoning in Bellotti and Citizens United and hold that, just as corporations can engage in free speech, for-profit corporations can exercise religion under the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA. Although never having addressed this specific issue, I argue that the Supreme Court has established rules for determining whether corporations can invoke particular constitutional rights and that, under these rules, corporations can invoke the protection of the Free Exercise Clause. The Third and Sixth Circuits, along with several district courts have reached the opposite conclusion, while several others have avoided the issue altogether. Relying primarily on a single footnote in Bellotti, the courts denying free exercise protection to for-profit corporations maintain that the free exercise of religion is a “purely personal” right that is limited to individuals and religious non-profit organizations. This Article contends, however, that a more detailed review of Bellotti, Citizens United, and the Court’s other decisions regarding the constitutional rights of corporations reveals that free exercise, like the freedom of speech, is not a “purely personal” right. Consequently, corporations—whether for-profit or non-profit—can claim its protection. Moreover, in the wake of Bellotti and Citizens United, neither the “profit motive” of a for-profit corporation nor the “religious nature” of religious organizations (e.g., churches) justifies limiting the Free Exercise Clause only to individuals and non-profit religious organizations. Although many (perhaps most) corporations may choose not to engage in religious activities, there is no constitutional basis for precluding a priori all for-profit businesses from raising free exercise claims

RFRA Rights Revisited: Substantial Burdens, Judicial Competence, and the Religious Nonprofit Cases

This Article contends that on remand, the circuit majority should join the Eighth Circuit and uphold the right of religious nonprofits to forego the notice required under the Accommodation. Contrary to the majority’s claim, Hobby Lobby and Holt v. Hobbs preclude courts from deciding whether the ACA (or any other statute) actually burdens a religious adherent’s sincerely held beliefs. Although, as Chief Justice Marshall famously declared, “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to declare what the law is,” courts lack the authority and competence to declare what the religious commitments of a faith are and when those commitments are violated. Under the Court’s free exercise precedents, courts can determine only whether the government puts a religious practitioner to the choice of engaging in conduct that violates her beliefs or disobeying the government’s policy and facing “serious” consequences. Religious and philosophical questions regarding moral complicity are left to religious adherents, not the courts. As the Founders recognized, religious and moral questions transcend the legal, imposing a different – and higher – obligation on religious believers. For religious adherents, only God (through a religious authority determined in accordance with their sincere religious beliefs) can determine whether an action makes them complicit in sin. Consequently, as the Court explained in Hobby Lobby, “question[s]” about moral complicity are ones “that the federal courts have no business addressing.

Future Orientation as a Protective Factor for African American Adolescents Exposed to Community Violence

For African American youth disproportionately exposed to community violence and the associated risk of externalizing behaviors, developmental assets that reduce the risk for externalizing behaviors and enhance adaptive coping should be explored. In a sample of 572 African American adolescents (Mage = 15.85; SD = 1.42), the current study explored whether future orientation or gender buffered the impact of community violence exposure on externalizing behaviors. The current study also examined the interaction between future orientation, gender, and violence-specific coping strategies to determine their association with externalizing behaviors. Future orientation moderated the relationship between violence exposure and delinquent, but not aggressive, behaviors. Future orientation interacted differently with coping for males and females to predict externalizing behaviors. Research and clinical implications are discussed