The Discursive Evolution of State Official Immunity in the International Law Commission

The House of Lords’ landmark case Pinochet triggered an extraordinary political and academic interest in the issue of immunities of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction. Do domestic law enforcement mechanisms have jurisdiction to investigate and adjudicate purported crimes committed by foreign officials, including the (former) holders of the highest offices in the State? Among contrasting calls to “end impunity” while safeguarding the stability of international relations, the United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) put the topic on its agenda, with the aim of codifying and progressively developing the rules of customary international law in this field. 15 years later, the Commission approaches a contentious conclusions of its efforts: in a highly unusual non-unanimous decision, the ILC adopted a set of draft articles, containing most prominently an explicit exception to the protections granted by immunity if the most severe international crimes are at stake. This study approaches the ILC’s struggle over State official immunity through a discourse-analytical lens. The theoretical perspective on the identification and progressive development of rules of customary international law as a performative linguistic practice embedded in the dynamics of the “invisible college of international lawyers” is sketched in Part 1. Part 2 investigates the actors performing the discursive practices looked at, the legal experts elected to serve on the ILC since 2006. The profiles of these individuals are analysed through a set of personal features emerging from their CVs, such as nationality, length of tenure, professional background, expertise, education, age, sex and language skills. On this basis, the shifting characteristics of the ILC’s composition and correlations between specific features and successful election to the Commission are highlighted. Part 3 and 4 elaborate in detail on the salient issues of State official immunities as they emerge from the records of the Commission’s discursive practices, first and foremost the special rapporteurs’ reports and the minutes of the ILC’s controversial plenary debates on the topic. One main goal consists in identifying evolving positions and in tracing argumentative patterns and strategies, as the ILC members struggled over authoritative interpretations of the “accurate” meaning of terms, rules and concepts over the years. Part 5 finally analyses the discursive interaction between the ILC and its principal allies and institutional counterparts, the ICJ and the States represented in the General Assembly’s 6th Committee. Besides an analysis of these institutions’ respective views on each others’ prerogatives, a special focus is put on the patterns of positions and argumentations expressed by specific States on the topic over time. The conclusions summarise the main achievements and obstacles emerging from the analysis of the ILC’s efforts, and give an outlook on the Commission’s crucial future challenges and opportunities both within and beyond the boundaries of the topic of State official immunities

‘Muhajirun’ from Austria. Why they left to join ISIS and why they don’t return.

After the proclamation of the so-called Islamic State in June 2014 thousands of Europeans, including hundreds of Austrian residents, went to fight and live with ISIS or other extremist groups in Syria or Iraq. Austria is one of the European countries with the highest per-capita share of foreign fighters. The article gives a broad overview of the situation in Austria: Who are the different groups relevant in this field? How did young people who grew up in Austria become radicalised, and what is their current status? The data from two Austrian commissioned research projects and one EU-funded project are supplemented by the findings of recent research in northern Syria focusing on the current situation of Austrian foreign fighters and their families and supporters in the region

Evidence and experience for the management of metastatic renal cell carcinoma

Aims and scope The last 7 years have seen the treatment landscape for metastatic renal cell carcinoma (mRCC) dramatically change as the understanding of the molecular background of the disease has grown. With the increase in treatment options, however, comes the question of how best to maximise patient benefits based on the available medicines. This topic was the key focus of a Pfizer meeting held at the 8th European International Kidney Cancer Symposium (EIKCS) in Budapest, Hungary (3–4 May 2013), where leading oncology experts reviewed the latest clinical trial evidence and discussed the importance of real world experience in treating patients with mRCC. This report offers an overview of the discussion on how best to integrate clinical trial data, guideline recommendations and real world experience in order to make treatment decisions that will provide the maximum benefit for each individual patient

Home Monitoring for Implantable Devices: New Technology & New Service

The use and need for follow-up of cardiac electronic implantable devices, such as pacemakers and implantable defibrillators, is constantly increasing, and constitutes an ever-growing burden and cost in clinical practice and the health system in general. Telemedicine or remote, wireless home monitoring (HM) has recently come to aid in this situation and reliably retrieve information on the patient`s and device`s status and transmit it to the implanting center and physician. It thus offers considerable convenience and assurance to both patient and physician. To date this technology of remote monitoring allows continuous and episode related arrhythmia monitoring as well as continuous monitoring of the status of the implanted system (battery status, lead impedance). Preliminary data from ongoing large multicenter studies are promising and relate to the diagnostic power of telemetrically transmitted data, necessity for patient follow up, the influence of HM on the optimisation of device and medical therapy, and the impact of HM on cost- effectiveness in device therapy

Det skall inte löna sig att begå brott. En studie av den nationella och EU-rättsliga kriminalpolitiken

Den organiserade brottslighetens utveckling är en omstridd fråga. Statistikföringen lider av en definitionsproblematik, där den organiserade brottsligheten innefattar en mångfacetterad kategori av utövare. Den gemensamma nämnaren för den organiserade brottsligheten framstår däremot som mer tydlig; en strävan om ekonomisk vinning. Brottbekämpningen har därför riktat in sig på själva incitamentet till att begå brott, pengar och egendom. Lagstiftningsgärder har realiserats, vilket påvisas i bl.a. tillkomsten av utvidgat förverkandet, vilket är en särskild rättsverkan av brott. Myndigheternas strävan efter effektivitet i brottsbekämpningen har föranlett ett sänkt beviskrav där det förverkandeutlösande brottet utgör en nyckel åt egendom som kan förverkas utan att den behöver knytas till ett specifikt brott. Brottsbekämpningen i Sverige har, vid sidan om den traditionella brottsbekämpningen, valt att angripa den grova organiserade brottsligheten genom den tillgångsinriktade brottsbekämpningen. Brottsbekämpningen lanserades år 2008 i samband med Brottsförebyggande rådets (BRÅ) rapport, 2008:10. Den tillgångsinriktade brottsbekämpningen har påkallat ett nytt arbetssätt inom myndigheterna, där samverkan skall prioriteras och där brottsbekämpningen går ut på att lagföra egendom istället för lagföra personer. Målbilden av den tillgångsinriktade brottsbekämpningen uttrycks i tankar om effektivitet och allmänprevention. Men av de slutsatser jag kommit fram till har brottsbekämpningen inte fått det förväntade genomslaget. En av den tillgångsinriktade brottsbekämpningens viktigaste målbilder är penningtvätt. Undgår en egendom förverkande, skall det i största mån förhindras att det förs in och korrumperar den legala ekonomin. Den gränsöverskridande brottsligheten har påkallat gränsöverskridande åtgärder. Inom EU ser vi på en utökad lagstiftningskompetens, där straffrätten sedan Lissabonfördragets tillkomst inte längre utgör enbart en nationell angelägenhet. I syfte att skapa ett område med frihet, rättvisa och säkerhet har lagstiftningen tillnärmats för att uppnå en effektiv brottsbekämpning, som samtidigt bygger upp en förtroenderelation mellan stater sinsemellan samt mellan stat och medborgare. En stat eller union som påkallar en alltför offensiv kriminalpolitik riskerar att tumma på begrepp som rättssäkerhet. En effektiv lagstiftning i relation till den enskildes integritet innebär en svår ekvation. Målen får aldrig helga medlen, således är det en ständig balansgång mellan effektivitet och integritet. Vad som är påtagligt är att strafflagstiftning skall ske med restriktivitet i den mån det är möjligt.The development of organized criminal enforcement is a controversial matter. Partly explained by the compilation of statistics suffers from a definition problem, where organized crime involves a multifaceted category of practitioners. The same does not hold true for organized crime, where the common denominator seems more apparent, being the pursuit of financial gain. Hence, the fight against crime has been focused on the incentive to commit the crime; money and property, rather than the prosecution of individuals per se. In doing so, steps in lawmaking have been taken, which can be demonstrated, inter alia, in the advent of extended forfeiture, which in turn is a legal consequence of the crime. Also, the authorities' quest for efficiency in law enforcement has led to a lowered burden of proof towards organized crime, where the forfeiture triggering offense constitutes a key to the property that may be forfeited without having to be tied to a specific crime. Law enforcement in Sweden has, alongside traditional law enforcement, chosen to tackle serious organized crime through asset-oriented law enforcement measures. The law enforcement was launched in 2008 in conjunction with the Brottsförebyggande rådet’s (BRÅ) report, 2008: 10th. The asset-oriented law enforcement has called for a new approach within the authorities, where collaboration is a priority and where law enforcement is to prosecute property rather than prosecuting individuals. If forfeiture fails, measures to prevent financial means from organized criminal activities to subvert into the legal economy are taken. One such example is battling money laundering. The ambition of law enforcement is expressed in thoughts on efficiency and general prevention. However, as this thesis concludes, the development of the new law enforcement measures has not achieved the expected impact. Transnational crime has called for cross-border measures. In the EU, we observe an extended legislative competence, where criminal law from the creation of the Treaty of Lisbon no longer represents just a national concern. In order to create an area of freedom, security and justice, legislation has been harmonized to achieve an effective law enforcement, which also builds up a trust relationship between states and citizens. A State or a Union that calls for an overly aggressive criminal policy is risking to compromise on terms like legal security. Effective legislation in relation to the individual's integrity is a difficult equation. The goals must never be to justify the means; therefore, it is a constant balancing act between efficiency and integrity. What is evident is that criminal law shall be as restrictive as possible

Der Sudan zwischen autoritärer Militärdiktatur und Staatszerfall

'Der Sudan ist ein Beispiel für den drohenden Staatszerfall als Folge eines (langfristig gescheiterten) Versuchs der Errichtung einer autoritären bis totalitären zentralistischen Staatsform, die es weder verstand, regionale Interessen und Klasseninteressen auszugleichen, noch integrativ auf unterschiedliche Ideologien, 'ethnische Gruppen', tribale Einheiten und Religionsgemeinschaften zu wirken. Ziel des Beitrages ist es nicht nur, die Ursachen und Entwicklungen des jahrzehntelangen bewaffneten Konfliktes im Sudan zu untersuchen, sondern auch, parastaatliche Akteure als solche zu analysieren und in einen regionalen Kontext einzubinden. Dabei wird der Bürgerkrieg im Sudan, entgegen dem in Europa weit verbreiteten Mythos von einem Krieg zwischen islamischen NordsudanesInnen und christlichen SüdsudanesInnen, auch mit Blick auf seine ökonomischen und machtpolitischen Aspekte untersucht. Sowohl die verschiedenen Gruppen der südsudanesischen Guerilla SPLA, die im Darfur (Westsudan) aktiven SLA und JEM wie auch die Partei- und Stammesmilizen auf Regierungsseite sind dabei als parastaatliche Akteure zu behandeln.' (Autorenreferat)'The political history of the Sudan can be read as an example of a state being at high risk becoming a failing state. This situation has occurred on the background of repeated (and - in the long run - not 'successful') attempts to establish an authoritarian/ totalitarian centralised state, which failed to re-balance and ease regional and class interests as well as to have integrative effects regarding different ideologies and 'ethnic', tribal and religious groups. The aim of this article is not only to analyse the causes and the development of the armed conflict in Sudan, which has been persisting for several decades. It as well targets at examining the role of para-state organizations in a specific regional context. Doing this, the civil war in Sudan has to be analysed on the background of its economic context and respective power relations. Most important, the war in Sudan should not be understood as a religious conflict alone (as the - at least in Europe - wide spread myth of a war between Islamic Northern-Sudan and Christian Southern-Sudan suggests). Here, apart from others, the diverse groups of the South-Sudanese guerilla SPLA, the SLA and JEM in Dafur as well as tribal and partisan forces supporting the government are relevant para-state powers and organizations.' (author's abstract