The Least-core and Nucleolus of Path Cooperative Games

Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity flows through a network. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it enables a path from the source to the sink in the network, and lose otherwise. Based on dual theory of linear programming and the relationship with flow games, we provide the characterizations on the CS-core, least-core and nucleolus of path cooperative games. Furthermore, we show that the least-core and nucleolus are polynomially solvable for path cooperative games defined on both directed and undirected network

Ambiguity and public good provision in large societies

ArticleIn this paper, we consider the effect of ambiguity on the private provision of public goods. Equilibrium is shown to exist and be unique. We examine how provision of the public good changes as the size of the population increases. We show that when there is uncertainty, there may be less free-riding in large societies

On the Price of Anarchy of Highly Congested Nonatomic Network Games

We consider nonatomic network games with one source and one destination. We examine the asymptotic behavior of the price of anarchy as the inflow increases. In accordance with some empirical observations, we show that, under suitable conditions, the price of anarchy is asymptotic to one. We show with some counterexamples that this is not always the case. The counterexamples occur in very simple parallel graphs.Comment: 26 pages, 6 figure

Investment under ambiguity with the best and worst in mind

Recent literature on optimal investment has stressed the difference between the impact of risk and the impact of ambiguity - also called Knightian uncertainty - on investors' decisions. In this paper, we show that a decision maker's attitude towards ambiguity is similarly crucial for investment decisions. We capture the investor's individual ambiguity attitude by applying alpha-MEU preferences to a standard investment problem. We show that the presence of ambiguity often leads to an increase in the subjective project value, and entrepreneurs are more eager to invest. Thereby, our investment model helps to explain differences in investment behavior in situations which are objectively identical

Dietary composition modulates brain mass and solubilizable Aβ levels in a mouse model of aggressive Alzheimer's amyloid pathology

RIGHTS : This article is licensed under the BioMed Central licence at http://www.biomedcentral.com/about/license which is similar to the 'Creative Commons Attribution Licence'. In brief you may : copy, distribute, and display the work; make derivative works; or make commercial use of the work - under the following conditions: the original author must be given credit; for any reuse or distribution, it must be made clear to others what the license terms of this work are.Abstract Objective Alzheimer's disease (AD) is a progressive neurodegenerative disease of the central nervous system (CNS). Recently, an increased interest in the role diet plays in the pathology of AD has resulted in a focus on the detrimental effects of diets high in cholesterol and fat and the beneficial effects of caloric restriction. The current study examines how dietary composition modulates cerebral amyloidosis and neuronal integrity in the TgCRND8 mouse model of AD. Methods From 4 wks until 18 wks of age, male and female TgCRND8 mice were maintained on one of four diets: (1) reference (regular) commercial chow; (2) high fat/low carbohydrate custom chow (60 kcal% fat/30 kcal% protein/10 kcal% carbohydrate); (3) high protein/low carbohydrate custom chow (60 kcal% protein/30 kcal% fat/10 kcal% carbohydrate); or (4) high carbohydrate/low fat custom chow (60 kcal% carbohydrate/30 kcal% protein/10 kcal% fat). At age 18 wks, mice were sacrificed, and brains studied for (a) wet weight; (b) solubilizable Aβ content by ELISA; (c) amyloid plaque burden; (d) stereologic analysis of selected hippocampal subregions. Results Animals receiving a high fat diet showed increased brain levels of solubilizable Aβ, although we detected no effect on plaque burden. Unexpectedly, brains of mice fed a high protein/low carbohydrate diet were 5% lower in weight than brains from all other mice. In an effort to identify regions that might link loss of brain mass to cognitive function, we studied neuronal density and volume in hippocampal subregions. Neuronal density and volume in the hippocampal CA3 region of TgCRND8 mice tended to be lower in TgCRND8 mice receiving the high protein/low carbohydrate diet than in those receiving the regular chow. Neuronal density and volume were preserved in CA1 and in the dentate gyrus. Interpretation Dissociation of Aβ changes from brain mass changes raises the possibility that diet plays a role not only in modulating amyloidosis but also in modulating neuronal vulnerability. However, in the absence of a study of the effects of a high protein/low carbohydrate diet on nontransgenic mice, one cannot be certain how much, if any, of the loss of brain mass exhibited by high protein/low carbohydrate diet-fed TgCRND8 mice was due to an interaction between cerebral amyloidosis and diet. Given the recent evidence that certain factors favor the maintenance of cognitive function in the face of substantial structural neuropathology, we propose that there might also exist factors that sensitize brain neurons to some forms of neurotoxicity, including, perhaps, amyloid neurotoxicity. Identification of these factors could help reconcile the poor clinicopathological correlation between cognitive status and structural neuropathology, including amyloid pathology.Published versio

A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Arin and Feltkamp (J Math Econ 43:855-870, 2007), which is based on Dagan et al. (Games Econ Behav 18:55-72, 1997). A distinguished player makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and conflict is solved bilaterally between the rejector and the proposer. We allow the proposer to make sequential proposals over several periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (Eur J Oper Res 216:208-213, 2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are fully rational, the serial rule still arises as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if the order of moves is such that stronger players respond to the proposal after weaker ones