The Role of <i>Roles</i> in Risk Management Change:The Case of an Italian Bank

This paper explores the role of roles (i.e. groups of actors characterised by the same functional tasks within an organisation), and of their interactions, within processes of change in risk management (RM). By combining insights from the literature on RM and from institutional studies, this paper suggests that change in RM can be interpreted as a process that involves both enabling and precipitating dynamics [Greenwood, R., &amp; Hinings, C. R. (1996). Understanding radical organizational change: Bringing together the old and the new institutionalism. The Academy of Management Review, 21, 1022\ue2\u80\u931054. doi:10.5465/AMR.1996.9704071862] between different roles. Aiming to address these dynamics empirically, we rely on a longitudinal case study of an Italian bank. The study shows that the interactions between roles were dependent on their respective specific interests, the different institutional templates they supported, and the shifts in power for control over relevant information. These dynamics both affected and were affected by the change in the template-in-use within the bank and allowed a sort of RM ideal (i.e. the search for more RM) to persist over evolving templates

Beyond gender diversity: How specific attributes of female directors affect earnings management

We apply the system GMM regression estimation approach to a matched sample of French firms listed on Euronext Paris during the period 2001–2010 in order to investigate the relationship between female directors and earnings management by considering their specific (statutory and demographic) attributes. We first find that the presence of female directors deters managers from managing earnings. However, this finding does not hold when the statutory and demographic attributes of female directors are taken into account, thus showing that the detection and the correction of earnings management require particular competencies and skills. Interestingly, we find that business expertise and audit committee membership are key attributes of female directors that promote the effective monitoring of earnings management. An important implication of our findings is that the decision to appoint women on corporate boards should be based more on their statutory and demographic attributes than on blind implementation of gender quotas. Finally, our supplementary analysis reveals that female CEOs and CFOs are strongly inclined to reduce earnings management