License prices for financially constrained firms

It is often alleged that high auction prices inhibit service deployment. We investigate this claim under the extreme case of financially constrained bidders. If demand is just slightly elastic, auctions maximize consumer surplus if consumer surplus is a convex function of quantity (a common assumption), or if consumer surplus is concave and the proportion of expenditure spent on deployment is greater than one over the elasticity of demand. The latter condition appears to be true for most of the large telecom auctions in the US and Europe. Thus, even if high auction prices inhibit service deployment, auctions appear to be optimal from the consumers’ point of view

How do women at increased, but unexplained, familial risk of breast cancer perceive and manage their risk? A qualitative interview study

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The perception of breast cancer risk held by women who have not had breast cancer, and who are at increased, but unexplained, familial risk of breast cancer is poorly described. This study aims to describe risk perception and how it is related to screening behaviour for these women.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Participants were recruited from a population-based sample (the Australian Breast Cancer Family Study - ABCFS). The ABCFS includes women diagnosed with breast cancer and their relatives. For this study, women without breast cancer with at least one first- or second-degree relative diagnosed with breast cancer before age 50 were eligible unless a <it>BRCA1 </it>or <it>BRCA2 </it>mutation had been identified in their family. Data collection consisted of an audio recorded, semi-structured interview on the topic of breast cancer risk and screening decision-making. Data was analysed thematically.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>A total of 24 interviews were conducted, and saturation of the main themes was achieved. Women were classified into one of five groups: don't worry about cancer risk, but do screening; concerned about cancer risk, so do something; concerned about cancer risk, so why don't I do anything?; cancer inevitable; cancer unlikely.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>The language and framework women use to describe their risk of breast cancer must be the starting point in attempts to enhance women's understanding of risk and their prevention behaviour.</p

Collusion through Joint R&D: An Empirical Assessment

This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We consider an oligopolistic setting where firms enter in research joint ventures (RJVs) to lower production costs or coordinate on collusion in the product market. We show that a sufficient condition for identifying collusive behavior is a decline in the market share of RJV-participating firms, which is also necessary and sufficient for a decrease in consumer welfare. Using information from the US National Cooperation Research Act, we estimate a market share equation correcting for the endogeneity of RJV participation and R&D expenditures. We find robust evidence that large networks between direct competitors – created through firms being members in several RJVs at the same time – are conducive to collusive outcomes in the product market which reduce consumer welfare. By contrast, RJVs among non-competitors are efficiency enhancing

Access Charges, Vertical Separation, and Lobbying

We examine how vertical separation affects the lobbying activities for the access charge of essential facilities. First, when investigating a model where the number of new entrants is fixed, we find that vertical separation either increases or decreases the access charge, and that this depends on the relative efficiency between the incumbent and the new entrants, and the number of entrants. Second, when investigating a freeentry market, we find that vertical separation always reduces the access charge in such a market. The vertically integrated firm has a stronger incentive to lobby in this market because a higher access charge reduces the number of competitors

Market Competition, R&D and Firm Profits in Asymmetric Oligopoly

We investigate a Cournot model with strategic R&D investments wherein efficient low-cost firms compete against less efficient high-cost firms. We find that an increase in the number of high-cost firms can stimulate R&D by the low-cost firms, while it always reduces R&D by the high-cost firms. More importantly, this force can be strong enough to compensate for the loss that arises from more intense market competition: the low-cost firms' profits may indeed increase with the number of high-cost firms. An implication of this result is far-reaching, as it gives low-cost firms an incentive to help, rather than harm, high-cost competitors. We relate this implication to a practice known as open knowledge disclosure, especially Ford's strategy of disclosing its know-how publicly and extensively at the beginning of the 20th century

Exploring the usability of a connected autonomous vehicle human machine interface designed for older adults

Users of Level 4–5 connected autonomous vehicles (CAVs) should not need to intervene with the dynamic driving task or monitor the driving environment, as the system will handle all driving functions. CAV human-machine interface (HMI) dashboards for such CAVs should therefore offer features to support user situation awareness (SA) and provide additional functionality that would not be practical within non-autonomous vehicles. Though, the exact features and functions, as well as their usability, might differ depending on factors such as user needs and context of use. The current paper presents findings from a simulator trial conducted to test the usability of a prototype CAV HMI designed for older adults and/or individuals with sensory and/or physical impairments: populations that will benefit enormously from the mobility afforded by CAVs. The HMI was developed to suit needs and requirements of this demographic based upon an extensive review of HMI and HCI principles focused on accessibility, usability and functionality [1, 2], as well as studies with target users. Thirty-one 50-88-year-olds (M 67.52, three 50–59) participated in the study. They experienced four seven-minute simulated journeys, involving inner and outer urban settings with mixed speed-limits and were encouraged to explore the HMI during journeys and interact with features, including a real-time map display, vehicle status, emergency stop, and arrival time. Measures were taken pre-, during- and post- journeys. Key was the System Usability Scale [3] and measures of SA, task load, and trust in computers and automation. As predicted, SA decreased with journey experience and although cognitive load did not, there were consistent negative correlations. System usability was also related to trust in technology but not trust in automation or attitudes towards computers. Overall, the findings are important for those designing, developing and testing CAV HMIs for older adults and individuals with sensory and/or physical impairments

Tacit collusion, firm asymmetries and numbers:evidence from EC merger cases

The purpose of this paper is to identify empirically the implicit structural model, especially the roles of size asymmetries and concentration, used by the European Commission to identify mergers with coordinated effects (i.e. collective dominance). Apart from its obvious policy-relevance, the paper is designed to shed empirical light on the conditions under which tacit collusion is most likely. We construct a database relating to 62 candidate mergers and find that, in the eyes of the Commission, tacit collusion in this context virtually never involves more than two firms and requires close symmetry in the market shares of the two firms