A Fluid Dynamics Calculation of Sputtering from a Cylindrical Thermal Spike

The sputtering yield, Y, from a cylindrical thermal spike is calculated using a two dimensional fluid dynamics model which includes the transport of energy, momentum and mass. The results show that the high pressure built-up within the spike causes the hot core to perform a rapid expansion both laterally and upwards. This expansion appears to play a significant role in the sputtering process. It is responsible for the ejection of mass from the surface and causes fast cooling of the cascade. The competition between these effects accounts for the nearly linear dependence of $Y$ with the deposited energy per unit depth that was observed in recent Molecular Dynamics simulations. Based on this we describe the conditions for attaining a linear yield at high excitation densities and give a simple model for this yield.Comment: 10 pages, 9 pages (including 9 figures), submitted to PR

Does strong heterogeneity promote cooperation by group interactions?

Previous research has highlighted the importance of strong heterogeneity for the successful evolution of cooperation in games governed by pairwise interactions. Here we determine to what extent this is true for games governed by group interactions. We therefore study the evolution of cooperation in the public goods game on the square lattice, the triangular lattice and the random regular graph, whereby the payoffs are distributed either uniformly or exponentially amongst the players by assigning to them individual scaling factors that determine the share of the public good they will receive. We find that uniformly distributed public goods are more successful in maintaining high levels of cooperation than exponentially distributed public goods. This is not in agreement with previous results on games governed by pairwise interactions, indicating that group interactions may be less susceptible to the promotion of cooperation by means of strong heterogeneity as originally assumed, and that the role of strongly heterogeneous states should be reexamined for other types of games.Comment: 12 pages, 4 figures; accepted for publication in New Journal of Physics [related work available at http://arxiv.org/abs/0708.1746 and http://www.matjazperc.com/

Renormalization Group Analysis of a Noisy Kuramoto-Sivashinsky Equation

We have analyzed the Kuramoto-Sivashinsky equation with a stochastic noise term through a dynamic renormalization group calculation. For a system in which the lattice spacing is smaller than the typical wavelength of the linear instability occurring in the system, the large-distance and long-time behavior of this equation is the same as for the Kardar-Parisi-Zhang equation in one and two spatial dimensions. For the $d=2$ case the agreement is only qualitative. On the other hand, when coarse-graining on larger scales the asymptotic flow depends on the initial values of the parameters.Comment: 8 pages, 5 figures, revte

Noisy Kuramoto-Sivashinsky equation for an erosion model

We derive the continuum equation for a discrete model for ion sputtering. We follow an approach based on the master equation, and discuss how it can be truncated to a Fokker-Planck equation and mapped to a discrete Langevin equation. By taking the continuum limit, we arrive at the Kuramoto-Sivashinsky equation with a stochastic noise term.Comment: latex (w/ multicol.sty), 4 pages; to appear in Physical Review E (Oct 1996

Facilitators on networks reveal optimal interplay between information exchange and reciprocity

Reciprocity is firmly established as an important mechanism that promotes cooperation. An efficient information exchange is likewise important, especially on structured populations, where interactions between players are limited. Motivated by these two facts, we explore the role of facilitators in social dilemmas on networks. Facilitators are here mirrors to their neighbors—they cooperate with cooperators and defect with defectors—but they do not participate in the exchange of strategies. As such, in addition to introducing direct reciprocity, they also obstruct information exchange. In well-mixed populations, facilitators favor the replacement and invasion of defection by cooperation as long as their number exceeds a critical value. In structured populations, on the other hand, there exists a delicate balance between the benefits of reciprocity and the deterioration of information exchange. Extensive Monte Carlo simulations of social dilemmas on various interaction networks reveal that there exists an optimal interplay between reciprocity and information exchange, which sets in only when a small number of facilitators occupy the main hubs of the scale-free network. The drawbacks of missing cooperative hubs are more than compensated for by reciprocity and, at the same time, the compromised information exchange is routed via the auxiliary hubs with only marginal losses in effectivity. These results indicate that it is not always optimal for the main hubs to become leaders of the masses, but rather to exploit their highly connected state to promote tit-for-tat-like behavior

Coulomb Explosion and Thermal Spikes

A fast ion penetrating a solid creates a track of excitations. This can produce displacements seen as an etched track, a process initially used to detect energetic particles but now used to alter materials. From the seminal papers by Fleischer et al. [Phys. Rev. 156, 353 (1967)] to the present [C. Trautmann, S. Klaumunzer and H. Trinkaus, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 3648 (2000)], `Coulomb explosion' and thermal spike models are treated as conflicting models for describing ion track effects. Here molecular dynamics simulations of electronic-sputtering, a surface manifestation of ion track formation, show that `Coulomb explosion' produces a `heat' spike so that these are early and late aspects of the same process. Therefore, differences in scaling are due to the use of incomplete spike models.Comment: Submitted to PRL. 4 pages, 3 figures. For related movies see: http://dirac.ms.virginia.edu/~emb3t/coulomb/coulomb.html PACS added in new versio

Security in the Age of Systemic Risk: Strategies, Tactics and Options for Dealing with Femtorisks and Beyond

The world today is increasingly confronted with systemic threats and challenges, in which femtorisks - small-scale dangers that are inherent to system structures and function and which pose asymmetrically catastrophic risks - can build in consequence, spreading uncontrollably like epidemics in both natural and social systems in such diverse areas as ecology, epidemiology, finance, the Internet, terrorism, and international relations. They have been successfully modeled in ecology in the context of complex adaptive systems: systems made up of individual agents, whose interactions have macroscopic consequences that feed back to influence individual behavior. While acknowledging challenges, this paper argues for the value of applying to societal systems the approaches that natural scientists have developed in quantifying and modeling biological interactions and ecosystems

Determinants of public cooperation in multiplex networks

Synergies between evolutionary game theory and statistical physics have significantly improved our understanding of public cooperation in structured populations. Multiplex networks, in particular, provide the theoretical framework within network science that allows us to mathematically describe the rich structure of interactions characterizing human societies. While research has shown that multiplex networks may enhance the resilience of cooperation, the interplay between the overlap in the structure of the layers and the control parameters of the corresponding games has not yet been investigated. With this aim, we consider here the public goods game on a multiplex network, and we unveil the role of the number of layers and the overlap of links, as well as the impact of different synergy factors in different layers, on the onset of cooperation. We show that enhanced public cooperation emerges only when a significant edge overlap is combined with at least one layer being able to sustain some cooperation by means of a sufficiently high synergy factor. In the absence of either of these conditions, the evolution of cooperation in multiplex networks is determined by the bounds of traditional network reciprocity with no enhanced resilience. These results caution against overly optimistic predictions that the presence of multiple social domains may in itself promote cooperation, and they help us better understand the complexity behind prosocial behavior in layered social systems.Comment: 12 pages, 3 figures; accepted for publication in New Journal of Physic

When agreement-accepting free-riders are a necessary evil for the evolution of cooperation

Agreements and commitments have provided a novel mechanism to promote cooperation in social dilemmas in both one-shot and repeated games. Individuals requesting others to commit to cooperate (proposers) incur a cost, while their co-players are not necessarily required to pay any, allowing them to free-ride on the proposal investment cost (acceptors). Although there is a clear complementarity in these behaviours, no dynamic evidence is currently available that proves that they coexist in different forms of commitment creation. Using a stochastic evolutionary model allowing for mixed population states, we identify non-trivial roles of acceptors as well as the importance of intention recognition in commitments. In the one-shot prisoner's dilemma, alliances between proposers and acceptors are necessary to isolate defectors when proposers do not know the acceptance intentions of the others. However, when the intentions are clear beforehand, the proposers can emerge by themselves. In repeated games with noise, the incapacity of proposers and acceptors to set up alliances makes the emergence of the first harder whenever the latter are present. As a result, acceptors will exploit proposers and take over the population when an apology-forgiveness mechanism with too low apology cost is introduced, and hence reduce the overall cooperation level.SCOPUS: ar.jinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishe

Resolution of the stochastic strategy spatial prisoner's dilemma by means of particle swarm optimization

We study the evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals in the stochastic strategy spatial prisoner's dilemma game. We equip players with the particle swarm optimization technique, and find that it may lead to highly cooperative states even if the temptations to defect are strong. The concept of particle swarm optimization was originally introduced within a simple model of social dynamics that can describe the formation of a swarm, i.e., analogous to a swarm of bees searching for a food source. Essentially, particle swarm optimization foresees changes in the velocity profile of each player, such that the best locations are targeted and eventually occupied. In our case, each player keeps track of the highest payoff attained within a local topological neighborhood and its individual highest payoff. Thus, players make use of their own memory that keeps score of the most profitable strategy in previous actions, as well as use of the knowledge gained by the swarm as a whole, to find the best available strategy for themselves and the society. Following extensive simulations of this setup, we find a significant increase in the level of cooperation for a wide range of parameters, and also a full resolution of the prisoner's dilemma. We also demonstrate extreme efficiency of the optimization algorithm when dealing with environments that strongly favor the proliferation of defection, which in turn suggests that swarming could be an important phenomenon by means of which cooperation can be sustained even under highly unfavorable conditions. We thus present an alternative way of understanding the evolution of cooperative behavior and its ubiquitous presence in nature, and we hope that this study will be inspirational for future efforts aimed in this direction.Comment: 12 pages, 4 figures; accepted for publication in PLoS ON