Regulator Vulnerabilities to Political Pressure and Political Tie Intensity: The Moderating Effects of Regulatory and Political Distance

This study applies the institution-based view and neo-institutional theory in addressing how managerial perceptions of regulator vulnerabilities to political pressure, and institutional distance, influence intensification of political ties. Our analysis of 181 wholly owned foreign subsidiary (WOFSs) operating in the Philippines suggests that managerial perceptions of regulator vulnerability to political pressures positively enhance the intensification of political ties. Our results also reveal that regulatory distance and, more importantly, the simultaneous presence of political and regulatory distance diminish the positive relationship between managerial perceptions of regulator vulnerability to political pressures and a WOFS’s propensity to enhance the intensification of political ties. Managerial implications and future research directions are discusse

Antecedents and Outcomes of Political Tie Intensity: Institutional and Strategic Fit Perspectives

Although international nonmarket strategy research has highlighted the importance of political ties, it is still unclear why some foreign subsidiaries are more politically active than others and what conditions may render political practices beneficial in a host country. We argue that foreign subsidiary political tie intensity—the extent to which senior managers provide time and resources in informally dealing with government officials for nonmarket purposes—will be influenced by political institutions in their parent's home country, especially when the MNE parent attempts to protect foreign subsidiary resources. Additionally, we assert that fit between a parent's home country political institutions and foreign subsidiary political tie intensity will positively affect subsidiary performance. We employ primary data collected from 181 foreign subsidiaries in the Philippines and find support for our hypotheses. This study advances international nonmarket strategy research by highlighting how an MNE's home country political institutions shape subsidiary political networking and strategic performance outcomes in host country environments

MNE Home Country Cultural Norms and Conflict Strategy Fit in Transnational Business Contract Disputes

The increasing frequency and complexity of transnational business relationships has been commensurate with an increase in contractual disputes. In such situations, home country cultural norms will often influence how MNEs resolve contractual disputes in foreign markets. This begs the question: does fit between an MNE’s choice of conflict strategy and its home country cultural norms affect monetary payouts (costs) in transnational business contract disputes? We apply organizational imprinting theory and the fit paradigm to a model employing data from U.S. court cases involving 316 MNEs from 47 countries. We find that choosing a conflict strategy that fits home country cultural norms will result in higher monetary payouts for MNEs. Additionally, cultural distance, but not legal distance, enhances the positive relationship between MNE conflict strategy fit and monetary payouts. Implications and future research directions are discussed

Corporate governance and elites

Using a qualitative methodology (interviews), we examine the relationship between the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms and elitist interventions. In doing this, we identify three elitist groups – political, cultural and religious, and investigate how they shape the legitimacy and effectiveness (or otherwise) of the institutional drivers of corporate governance in Nigeria. We caution the widely-held notion in the literature which suggests that institutions act as a check on the behaviour of elites and influence how elites compete and emerge. Alternatively, we argue that elites, in the presence of institutional voids, can invent, circumvent and corrupt institutions