Deficient mental own-body imagery in a neurological patient with out-of-body experiences due to cannabis use

In the present work, we report repeated out-of-body experiences (OBEs) in a patient with tetraplegia and severe somatosensory loss due to multiple sclerosis and predominant involvement of the cervical spinal cord. OBEs were experienced on a daily basis and induced by cannabis treatment that was started for severe spasticity with painful cramps and cloni. In order to investigate the link between OBEs and mental own-body imagery, the patient was asked to imagine himself in the position and visual perspective that is generally reported during OBEs, using front- and back-facing schematic human stimuli. Performance was measured before and after cannabis consumption. First, our data reveal that the patient was less accurate for back-facing than front-facing stimuli. This was found before and after cannabis consumption and is the opposite pattern to what is generally observed in healthy participants and in our control subjects (who did not use cannabis). We refer to this as lesion effect and argue that this relative facilitation for stimuli reflecting the position and visual perspective that is generally reported during OBEs might be due to recurrent and spontaneous own-body transformations during the patient's frequent OBEs. Secondly, we found a cannabis effect, namely a performance improvement in the back-facing condition while performance in the front-facing condition remained unchanged, after cannabis administration. We argue that cannabis administration may interfere with own-body imagery when reflecting the actual body position and only when associated with brain damage. Based on these data we propose an extended neurological model for own-body illusions including multisensory and sensorimotor mechanisms, cannabis consumption, and cortical and subcortical processing

Neural mechanisms of embodiment: asomatognosia due to premotor cortex damage

BACKGROUND: Patients with asomatognosia generally describe parts of their body as missing or disappeared from corporeal awareness. This disturbance is generally attributed to damage in the right posterior parietal cortex. However, recent neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies suggest that corporeal awareness and embodiment of body parts are instead linked to the premotor cortex of both hemispheres. PATIENT: We describe a patient with asomatognosia of her left arm due to damage in the right premotor and motor cortices. The patient's pathological embodiment for her left arm was associated with mild left somatosensory loss, mild frontal dysfunction, and a behavioral deficit in the mental imagery of human arms. CONCLUSION: Asomatognosia may also be associated with damage to the right premotor cortex

Your space or mine? : Mapping self in time

Peer reviewedPublisher PD

Fake hands in action: embodiment and control of supernumerary limbs

Demonstrations that the brain can incorporate a fake limb into our bodily representations when stroked in synchrony with our unseen real hand [(the rubber hand illusion (RHI)] are now commonplace. Such demonstrations highlight the dynamic flexibility of the perceptual body image, but evidence for comparable RHI-sensitive changes in the body schema used for action is less common. Recent evidence from the RHI supports a distinction between bodily representations for perception (body image) and for action (body schema) (Kammers et al. in Neuropsychologia 44:2430–2436, 2006). The current study challenges and extends these findings by demonstrating that active synchronous stroking of a brush not only elicits perceptual embodiment of a fake limb (body image) but also affects subsequent reaching error (body schema). Participants were presented with two moving fake left hands. When only one was synchronous during active touch, ownership was claimed for the synchronous hand only and the accuracy of reaching was consistent with control of the synchronous hand. When both fake hands were synchronous, ownership was claimed over both, but only one was controlled. Thus, it would appear that fake limbs can be incorporated into the body schema as well as the body image, but while multiple limbs can be incorporated into the body image, the body schema can accommodate only one

Disturbances in Body Ownership in Schizophrenia: Evidence from the Rubber Hand Illusion and Case Study of a Spontaneous Out-of-Body Experience

A weakened sense of self may contribute to psychotic experiences. Body ownership, one component of self-awareness, can be studied with the rubber hand illusion (RHI). Watching a rubber hand being stroked while one's unseen hand is stroked synchronously can lead to a sense of ownership over the rubber hand, a shift in perceived position of the real hand, and a limb-specific drop in stimulated hand temperature. We aimed to assess the RHI in schizophrenia using quantifiable measures: proprioceptive drift and stimulation-dependent changes in hand temperature.The RHI was elicited in 24 schizophrenia patients and 21 matched controls by placing their unseen hand adjacent to a visible rubber hand and brushing real and rubber hands synchronously or asynchronously. Perceived finger location was measured before and after stimulation. Hand temperature was taken before and during stimulation. Subjective strength of the illusion was assessed by a questionnaire.Across groups, the RHI was stronger during synchronous stimulation, indicated by self-report and proprioceptive drift. Patients reported a stronger RHI than controls. Self-reported strength of RHI was associated with schizotypy in controls Proprioceptive drift was larger in patients, but only following synchronous stimulation. Further, we observed stimulation-dependent changes in skin temperature. During right hand stimulation, temperature dropped in the stimulated hand and rose in the unstimulated hand. Interestingly, induction of RHI led to an out-of-body experience in one patient, linking body disownership and psychotic experiences.The RHI is quantitatively and qualitatively stronger in schizophrenia. These findings suggest that patients have a more flexible body representation and weakened sense of self, and potentially indicate abnormalities in temporo-parietal networks implicated in body ownership. Further, results suggest that these body ownership disturbances might be at the heart of a subset of the pathognomonic delusions of passivity

Distinct contributions of extrastriate body area and temporoparietal junction in perceiving one's own and others' body.

The right temporoparietal cortex plays a critical role in body representation. Here, we applied repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) over right extrastriate body area (EBA) and temporoparietal junction (TPJ) to investigate their causative roles in perceptual representations of one's own and others' body. Healthy women adjusted size-distorted pictures of their own body or of the body of another person according to how they perceived the body (subjective task) or how others perceived it (intersubjective task). In keeping with previous reports, at baseline, we found an overall underestimation of body size. Crucially, EBA-rTMS increased the underestimation bias when participants adjusted the images according to how others perceived their own or the other woman's body, suggesting a specific role of EBA in allocentric body representations. Conversely, TPJ-rTMS increased the underestimation bias when participants adjusted the body of another person, either a familiar other or a close friend, in both subjective and intersubjective tasks, suggesting an involvement of TPJ in representing others' bodies. These effects were body-specific, since no TMS-induced modulation was observed when participants judged a familiar object. The results suggest that right EBA and TPJ play active and complementary roles in the complex interaction between the perceptions of one's own and other people's body

Embodying the mind and representing the body

Does the existence of body representations undermine the explanatory role of the body? Or do certain types of representation depend so closely upon the body that their involvement in a cognitive task implicates the body itself? In the introduction of this special issue we explore lines of tension and complement that might hold between the notions of embodiment and body representations, which remain too often neglected or obscure. To do so, we distinguish two conceptions of embodiment that either put weight on the explanatory role of the body itself or body representations. We further analyse how and to what extent body representations can be said to be embodied. Finally, we give an overview of the full volume articulated around foundational issues (How should we define the notion of embodiment? To what extent and in what sense is embodiment compatible with representationalism? To what extent and in what sense are sensorimotor approaches similar to behaviourism?) and their applications in several cognitive domains (perception, concepts, selfhood, social cognition)

Embodied perspective-taking indicated by selective disruption from aberrant self motion

Spatial perspective-taking that involves imagined changes in one’s spatial orientation is facilitated by vestibular stimulation inducing a congruent sensation of self-motion. We examined further the role of vestibular resources in perspective-taking by evaluating whether aberrant and conflicting vestibular stimulation impaired perspective-taking performance. Participants (N = 39) undertook either an “own body transformation” (OBT)task, requiring speeded spatial judgments made from the perspective of a schematic figure, or a control task requiring reconfiguration of spatial mappings from one’s own visuo-spatial perspective. These tasks were performed both without and with vestibular stimulation by whole-body Coriolis motion, according to a repeated measures design, balanced for order. Vestibular stimulation was found to impair performance during the first minute post stimulus relative to the stationary condition. This disruption was task-specific, affecting only the OBT task and not the control task, and dissipated by the second minute post-stimulus. Our experiment thus demonstrates selective temporary impairment of perspective-taking from aberrant vestibular stimulation, implying that uncompromised vestibular resources are necessary for efficient perspective-taking. This finding provides evidence for an embodied mechanism for perspective-taking whereby vestibular input contributes to multisensory processing underlying bodily and social cognition. Ultimately, this knowledge may contribute to the design of interventions that help patients suffering sudden vertigo adapt to the cognitive difficulties caused by aberrant vestibular stimulation

Embodiment and body awareness in meditators

[EN] Mindfulness practice consists of focusing attention in an intentional way on the experience of the present moment, including bodily sensations, thoughts or feelings, and the environment, with an attitude of acceptance and without judging. The body and, especially, body awareness are key elements in mindfulness. Embodiment or the feeling of being located within one's physical body is a related concept, and it is composed of the sense of ownership, location, and agency of the body. The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is an experimental paradigm that has been used to understand the mechanisms of embodiment, and evidence shows that body awareness modulates this illusion. To our knowledge, no studies have analyzed embodiment processes in meditators. The aim of this study is to use the RHI to analyze the mechanisms of embodiment and its relationship with body awareness and mindfulness in meditators and non-meditators. The sample was composed of long-term meditators (n = 15) and non-meditators (n = 15). Objective and self-report measures for embodiment with the RHI and self-report questionnaires of body awareness and mindfulness were administered. One-way ANOVA revealed significant differences between groups in sense of agency in the rubber hand. Meditators experienced less sense of agency in the rubber hand than non-meditators. Pearson's correlations showed that this lower sense of agency in the rubber hand was associated with higher body awareness and mindfulness. Results highlight the role of body awareness and mindfulness in embodiment mechanisms. 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