Safe to Drive? Police Powers of Search and Seizure in the Vehicular Context

Since their creation, automobiles have become a central facet of the American culture and psyche. As status symbols and modes of transportation their importance cannot be overstated. Americans love their cars, and the average citizen believes that he or she has legitimate privacy interests in his or her vehicle. But is this the case? For decades, The Court has struggled to balance 4th Amendment privacy rights with effective police procedure, and has thus handed down dozens of rulings on the topic, many of which often seem disparate and contradictory. In the face of such confusion, the Court’s answer has almost always been to allow an increasing amount of discretion to police officers. This study seeks to find out how well college students on the University of Maine campus know both police powers of search and seizure as well as what their rights are in vehicular search and seizure situations. A questionnaire was distributed throughout Greek life on the University of Maine campus, the results of which were compiled and analyzed in an endeavor to gain insight into how well students understand their rights. Through this we can gain insight as to how much young people know about the rights and responsibilities that come with obtaining their license. This question is of more than passing importance in light of current Supreme Court rulings trending toward expansion of police power. Finally, I will assess the question of significance: How and to what extent should public education inform individuals of their rights

State v. Lovejoy: Should Pre-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence be Admissible During the State\u27s Case-in-Chief as Substantive Evidence of Guilt?

Article 1, section 6 of Maine Constitution reads in part that “[t]he accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself or herself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, property, or privileges . . . .” Further, the Law Court has held that “the State constitutional protection against self-incrimination is the equivalent of the Fifth Amendment. However, as with most provisions of the Constitution, the protection against self-incrimination is open to interpretation. While the Supreme Court has answered some questions surrounding the Fifth Amendment’s protections, it has left many decisions regarding its scope largely within the purview of the states. As a result, The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, like many courts across the United States, has struggled to qualify exactly how Maine’s codification of the Fifth Amendment applies outside of the courtroom. Specifically, the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence can be used during the prosecution’s case-in-chief as evidence of consciousness of guilt in a criminal trial. Further, the circuit courts that have addressed the issue are split. As a result, jurisdiction have been forced to fashion their own rules regarding the admissibility of the pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as evidence of consciousness of guilt. It was against backdrop that the Law Court decided State v. Lovejoy. The purpose of this case note is to analyze Lovejoy and how it fits into the existing body of case law regarding pre-arrest statements and their admissibility in court. Part II of this note briefly discusses the scope of the Fifth Amendment to held elucidate the rationale behind courts’ decisions to either admit or exclude pre-arrest, pre-Miranda testimony at trial. Part III of this note discusses Lovejoy in some detail, explaining the facts, procedural posture, and holding of the case, including a detailed analysis of the Court’s reasoning and the precedent upon which it relied. Part IV discusses how other courts have addressed the admissibility of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence. Finally, Part V argues that the Court’s ruling in Lovejoy is the correct interpretation of the Fifth Amendment and article 1, section 6 of the Maine Constitution as it applies to pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence, as any comment on a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda decision to remain silent implicates the Fifth Amendment, has minimal probative value, and should be precluded by a logical extension of the Griffin Penalty doctrine

State v. Lovejoy: Should Pre-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence be Admissible During the State\u27s Case-in-Chief as Substantive Evidence of Guilt?

Article 1, section 6 of Maine Constitution reads in part that “[t]he accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself or herself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, property, or privileges . . . .” Further, the Law Court has held that “the State constitutional protection against self-incrimination is the equivalent of the Fifth Amendment. However, as with most provisions of the Constitution, the protection against self-incrimination is open to interpretation. While the Supreme Court has answered some questions surrounding the Fifth Amendment’s protections, it has left many decisions regarding its scope largely within the purview of the states. As a result, The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, like many courts across the United States, has struggled to qualify exactly how Maine’s codification of the Fifth Amendment applies outside of the courtroom. Specifically, the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence can be used during the prosecution’s case-in-chief as evidence of consciousness of guilt in a criminal trial. Further, the circuit courts that have addressed the issue are split. As a result, jurisdiction have been forced to fashion their own rules regarding the admissibility of the pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as evidence of consciousness of guilt. It was against backdrop that the Law Court decided State v. Lovejoy. The purpose of this case note is to analyze Lovejoy and how it fits into the existing body of case law regarding pre-arrest statements and their admissibility in court. Part II of this note briefly discusses the scope of the Fifth Amendment to held elucidate the rationale behind courts’ decisions to either admit or exclude pre-arrest, pre-Miranda testimony at trial. Part III of this note discusses Lovejoy in some detail, explaining the facts, procedural posture, and holding of the case, including a detailed analysis of the Court’s reasoning and the precedent upon which it relied. Part IV discusses how other courts have addressed the admissibility of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence. Finally, Part V argues that the Court’s ruling in Lovejoy is the correct interpretation of the Fifth Amendment and article 1, section 6 of the Maine Constitution as it applies to pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence, as any comment on a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda decision to remain silent implicates the Fifth Amendment, has minimal probative value, and should be precluded by a logical extension of the Griffin Penalty doctrine

Understanding the relationship between poverty and inequality: overview report

An understanding that poverty and inequality are inextricably linked has given rise to a number of large international organisations setting joint inequality-poverty reduction targets on the basis that poverty cannot be seriously tackled without addressing inequality. However, the evidence base was relatively weak with only limited information available on the relationship between the two phenomena. The programme was designed to expand the evidence base on the links between inequality and poverty and to fill this knowledge gap. In the research summarised in this report we explored the relationship between inequality and poverty by: • Examining philosophical concerns for poverty and inequality and how they may overlap • Estimating the empirical relationship between income inequality and a variety of poverty measures • Reviewing the existing evidence base on potential mechanisms that may drive any relationshi

Double Trouble: A review of the relationship between UK poverty and economic inequality

The link between inequality and poverty has been highlighted by a number of international organisations, which have outlined a series of policy recommendations supporting the view that high levels of inequality need to be tackled even if the central objective is to reduce poverty.This report makes clear there is a positive correlation between income inequality and relative income poverty in the UK. The strength of this connection depends on which measure of inequality is used and this report makes no claim about causation - but the central conclusion is clear. We can no longer treat poverty and economic inequality as separate problems which can be tackled in isolation. They are instead closely linked and must be tackled together

Monitoring deformation at the Geysers geothermal field, California using C-band and X-band interferometric synthetic aperture radar

We resolve deformation at The Geysers Geothermal Field using two distinct sets of interferometric synthetic aperture radar (InSAR) data. The first set of observations utilize archived European Space Agency C-band synthetic aperture radar data from 1992 through 1999 to image the long-term and large-scale subsidence at The Geysers. The peak range velocity of approximately 50 mm/year agrees with previous estimates from leveling and global positioning system observations. Data from a second set of measurements, acquired by TerraSAR-X satellites, extend from May 2011 until April 2012 and overlap the C-band data spatially but not temporally. These X-band data, analyzed using a combined permanent and distributed scatterer algorithm, provide a higher density of scatterers (1122 per square kilometer) than do the C-band data (12 per square kilometer). The TerraSAR-X observations resolve 1 to 2 cm of deformation due to water injection into a Northwest Geysers enhanced geothermal system well, initiated on October 2011. The temporal variation of the deformation is compatible with estimates from coupled numerical modeling. © 2013 American Geophysical Union. All Rights Reserved