261 research outputs found
ReCon: Revealing and Controlling PII Leaks in Mobile Network Traffic
It is well known that apps running on mobile devices extensively track and
leak users' personally identifiable information (PII); however, these users
have little visibility into PII leaked through the network traffic generated by
their devices, and have poor control over how, when and where that traffic is
sent and handled by third parties. In this paper, we present the design,
implementation, and evaluation of ReCon: a cross-platform system that reveals
PII leaks and gives users control over them without requiring any special
privileges or custom OSes. ReCon leverages machine learning to reveal potential
PII leaks by inspecting network traffic, and provides a visualization tool to
empower users with the ability to control these leaks via blocking or
substitution of PII. We evaluate ReCon's effectiveness with measurements from
controlled experiments using leaks from the 100 most popular iOS, Android, and
Windows Phone apps, and via an IRB-approved user study with 92 participants. We
show that ReCon is accurate, efficient, and identifies a wider range of PII
than previous approaches.Comment: Please use MobiSys version when referencing this work:
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2906392. 18 pages, recon.meddle.mob
ΠΡΡΡΡΠΎΠ΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΡΡΡΠ°Ρ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ° ΡΡΠ°Π±ΠΈΠ»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π½Π°ΠΏΡΡΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ
Π Π°ΡΡΠΌΠ°ΡΡΠΈΠ²Π°Π΅ΡΡΡ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ° ΡΡΠ°Π±ΠΈΠ»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π½Π°ΠΏΡΡΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π½Π° ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π΅ ΠΌΠ°Π³Π½ΠΈΡΠ½ΠΎ-ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠΏΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠ΅Π³ΡΠ»ΡΡΠΎΡΠ° Π±Π΅Π· ΠΏΠΎΠ΄ΠΌΠ°Π³Π½ΠΈΡΠΈΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠΎΡΠ½Π½ΡΠΌ ΡΠΎΠΊΠΎΠΌ ΠΈ Π±ΡΡΡΡΠΎΠ΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΡΡΡΠ΅ΠΉ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ²ΡΠ·ΠΈ. ΠΠΎ ΠΎΠΏΠΈΡΠ°Π½Π½ΠΎΠΌΡ ΠΏΡΠΈΠ½ΡΠΈΠΏΡ ΠΌΠΎΠ³ΡΡ Π±ΡΡΡ ΠΏΠΎΡΡΡΠΎΠ΅Π½Ρ Π±ΡΡΡΡΠΎΠ΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΡΡΡΠΈΠ΅ ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΠΎΡΠ°Π·Π½ΡΠ΅ ΠΈ ΡΡΠ΅Ρ
ΡΠ°Π·Π½ΡΠ΅ ΡΡΠ°Π±ΠΈΠ»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΎΡΡ Π½Π°ΠΏΡΡΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π½Π° Π²ΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΠ½ΠΎ-ΠΏΠ°ΡΠ°Π»Π»Π΅Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π»ΡΠ΅ΠΌΡΡ
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ΠΏΡΠΈ ΠΈΡ
Π΅ΡΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²Π΅Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΈΠ»ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΄ΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΌΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ
Short Enantioselective Total Synthesis of Tatanan A and 3-epi-Tatanan A Using Assembly-Line Synthesis
Short and highly stereoselective total syntheses of the sesquilignan natural product tatanan A and its C3 epimer are described. An assembly-line synthesis approach, using iterative lithiationβborylation reactions, was applied to install the three contiguous stereocenters with high enantio- and diastereoselectivity. One of the stereocenters was installed using a configurationally labile lithiated primary benzyl benzoate, resulting in high levels of substrate-controlled (undesired) diastereoselectivity. However, reversal of selectivity was achieved by using a novel diastereoselective Matteson homologation. Stereospecific alkynylation of a hindered secondary benzylic boronic ester enabled completion of the synthesis in a total of eight steps
RiPKI: The Tragic Story of RPKI Deployment in the Web Ecosystem
Previous arXiv version of this paper has been published under the title "When BGP Security Meets Content Deployment: Measuring and Analysing RPKI-Protection of Websites", Proc. of Fourteenth ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks (HotNets), New York:ACM, 2015Previous arXiv version of this paper has been published under the title "When BGP Security Meets Content Deployment: Measuring and Analysing RPKI-Protection of Websites", Proc. of Fourteenth ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks (HotNets), New York:ACM, 2015Web content delivery is one of the most important services on the Internet. Access to websites is typically secured via TLS. However, this security model does not account for prefix hijacking on the network layer, which may lead to traffic blackholing or transparent interception. Thus, to achieve comprehensive security and service availability, additional protective mechanisms are necessary such as the RPKI, a recently deployed Resource Public Key Infrastructure to prevent hijacking of traffic by networks. This paper argues two positions. First, that modern web hosting practices make route protection challenging due to the propensity to spread servers across many different networks, often with unpredictable client redirection strategies, and, second, that we need a better understanding why protection mechanisms are not deployed. To initiate this, we empirically explore the relationship between web hosting infrastructure and RPKI deployment. Perversely, we find that less popular websites are more likely to be secured than the prominent sites. Worryingly, we find many large-scale CDNs do not support RPKI, thus making their customers vulnerable. This leads us to explore business reasons why operators are hesitant to deploy RPKI, which may help to guide future research on improving Internet security
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