1995 reports /

General report: towards a security strategy for Europe and NATO / Jan PetersenInterim report of the sub-committee on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union: projecting stability in an undivided Europe: partnership for peace and a pact of stability in Europe / Maurice BlinInterim report of the sub-committee on the Southern region: co-operation and security in the Mediterranean / Rodrigo de RatoInterim report of the working group on transatlantic and European organizations: collective security revisited / Bruce GeorgeSpecial report of the working group on transatlantic and European organizations: civilian control of the armed forces of the republic of Poland / Longin PastusiakSpecial report of the working group on transatlantic and European organizations: understanding and ensuring mutual security: a challenging task for us all - an in-between perspective / Petre RomanSpecial report of the working group on transatlantic and European organizations: transatlantic security: beyond NATO / Vyacheslav NikonovSpecial report: blessings of liberty: a wider NATO and soon / Gerald B. SolomonInformation document: communication between the chairman and members concerning parliamentary support for NATO enlargement / Gerald B. Solomo

Economic Sanctions and the Politics of IMF Lending

What effect do economic sanctions have on the IMF lending decisions? Though countries under economic sanctions often face significant economic and financial difficulties, no comprehensive research to date has explored whether the IMF as a de facto lender of last resort intervenes in those countries in need. We posit that economic coercion is likely to hinder the target’s access to IMF credits as sanctioning (sender) countries are likely to use their political influence in the IMF to deny funds to the destabilized target economies. To assess the empirical merits of the hypothesis, we combine data on the IMF lending with the economic sanctions data for 120 emerging market economies from 1975 to 2005. Results indicate that target countries are less likely to receive IMF funds, especially when under sanctions by the United States and international institutions. Our findings contradict the conventional wisdom that the IMF is tasked with providing lifelines to member governments in need of help to ease their short-term balance of payment problems. Further, as much as IMF loans can be used as positive inducements to acquire a country’s strategic cooperation, we show that they might also be used by sender countries as a punishment tool against target countries to amplify the impact of sanctions regimes