Strategic Prudence in the Colombian Constitutional Court, 1992-2006

Under what conditions are justices able to make decisions that are contrary to the executive's preferences in strong Latin American presidentialisms? To answer this question, I formulate a theory of interbranch relations, particularly of the interplay between courts and justices, on the one hand, and executives and legislatures on the other. The model of strategic prudence involves a game between two players -a court and a government-as well as a stage in which this game takes place, including the institutional design and the political environment. It specifies how players' policy preferences and their assessments of the personal and institutional risks involved in their decision making interact with the institutional setting and the political context. Based on the empirical implications derived from the game, I hypothesize that when courts are institutionally insulated, justices are more likely to decide based on their own preferences, while an institutionally weak court makes them act strategically based on their perception of how the political environment enhances or hinders the government's ability to build a coalition to sanction the court. I test the empirical predictions of the game with the case of the Colombian Constitutional Court (CCC). I combine qualitative evidence, including press coverage and interviews with former justices and law clerks, with a systematic quantitative analysis of an original dataset of abstract review cases decided by the CCC between 1992 and 2006. Given its well-deserved reputation of autonomy and progressive activism, the CCC provides a "crucial case" test of the strategic prudence theory. The analysis of individual judicial decisions provides strong evidence supporting the hypotheses derived from the game's comparative statics analysis. Justices tend to be prudent when they face a strong administration and when the case under review is salient for the executive. In addition, they are more likely to annul legislation when they have stronger preferences against it and when they anticipate that the incumbent would have to pay a higher cost should it attempt sanctioning the court. This dissertation contributes to the subfield of judicial politics in Latin America and is the first comprehensive study of the Constitutional Court in Colombia

Personality and an internal enemy: understanding the popularity of Álvaro Uribe, 2002-2010

[EN] During two terms in office, Álvaro Uribe enjoyed very high approval ratings. This deviates from the typical approval patterns exhibited by most executives in the region and from prior Colombian presidents. In this paper we give elements to understand what explains Uribe’s eight-year honeymoon. Here we argue that Uribe’s popularity was the interplay of three factors: A ruling style that allowed him to build an affective link with citizens. Uribe’s ability to create a rally-around-the-flag atmosphere regarding the internal armed conflict. And a booming economy. Using regression models based on cross-national and survey data results indicate that: Uribe exhibited high approval ratings because he was part of a group of Latin American executives who developed a government style based on an emotional link with people, and that those citizens who saw the internal conflict as the main problem in Colombia and were more exposed to Uribe’s messages about the insurgent threat were more likely to support him

The renewal of traditional conservatism through new parties. The case of Centro Democrático in Colombia, 2014-2018

Desde inicios de la década de 1990, un porcentaje importante de partidos políticos tradicionales en América Latina ha decaído en su poder político y electoral (Wills-Otero, 2016). Los partidos conservadores de diferentes países sufrieron un proceso de desapego por parte de su electorado, tras reformas neoliberales que, en muchos casos, desmejoraron las condiciones de vida de los ciudadanos. Votantes y partidos se desconectaron. Colombia no fue ajena a ese problema. Los partidos tradicionales decayeron electoralmente desde la promulgación de la carta política aperturista de 1991. En años recientes, un nuevo partido de ideología de derecha, el Centro Democrático (CD), bajo la dirección del expresidente Álvaro Uribe, ha logrado conquistar a importantes sectores del electorado. ¿Cuáles han sido los factores determinantes de este éxito electoral reciente? Nuestro análisis de los datos a nivel municipal de las dos últimas elecciones nacionales sugiere que el CD ha sabido atraer de manera distintiva a los votantes de los municipios del país donde el tradicional Partido Conservador ejerció su dominio durante gran parte del siglo veinte.Since the early 1990s, a significant percentage of traditional political parties in Latin America have declined in political and electoral power (Wills-Otero, 2016). Conservative parties in different countries suffered a process of disaffection on the part of their electorate, following neoliberal reforms that, in many cases, worsened the living conditions of citizens. Voters and parties became disconnected. Colombia was no stranger to this problem. Traditional parties have declined electorally since the enactment of the 1991 constitution that opened the political arena. In recent years, a new right-wing party, the Centro Democrático (CD), under the leadership of former President Álvaro Uribe, has managed to win over important sectors of the electorate. What have been the determinants in this recent electoral success? Our analysis of municipal-level data from the last two national elections suggests that the CD has been able to appeal in a distinctive way to voters in the nation's municipalities where the traditional Conservative Party held sway for much of the twentieth century

¿Pavimentando con votos? Apropiación presupuestal para proyectos de infraestructura vial en colombia, 2002-2006

Este artículo se pregunta por los factores que explican los recursos destinados a los municipios para desarrollo vial durante el primer gobierno del presidente Uribe. En concreto, se contraponen criterios técnicos con criterios políticos. Las evidencias encontradas muestran que algunos criterios políticos importan y que los criterios técnicos no tienen incidencia alguna en la inversión en infraestructura vial. Para hacer el análisis se construyó una base de datos original, la cual permite concluir que la priorización del gasto en infraestructura vial parece no responder a la función de bienestar y al modelo de desarrollo que el país adoptó en su planeación estratégica. Aun más, se evidencia un divorcio efectivo entre los asesores técnicos del gobierno y la implementación de sus políticas. Los datos analizados muestran que existe una relación positiva entre la asignación del gasto en infraestructura vial y la realización de Consejos Comunales de Gobierno. Este hallazgo sugiere la presencia de un uso populista del gasto en infraestructura vial, ya que los municipios en los que se realizaron Consejos Comunales contaron con una asignación presupuestal de US$14,1 millones adicionales frente a los municipios en los que no se realizaron dichos consejos. A través de los Consejos Comunales se asumen compromisos que implican gastos, de manera que se aseguren los apoyos políticos necesarios para mantenerse en el poder. Adicionalmente, se concluye que el gobierno invierte más en municipios con alcaldes no uribistas, lo cual señalaría que el gobierno estaría usando el presupuesto para comprar apoyos en los municipios en los que salió derrotado en las elecciones locales. Estos municipios recibieron asignaciones presupuestales por US$2,6 millones más que los municipios regidos por alcaldes de su coalición.This article inquires about the factors that explain budgetary allocations for road infrastructure during the first Uribe administration. Concretely, the analysis contrasts the importance of technical and political criteria in budgetary decisions. The evidence suggests that some political criteria have predominance and that technical criteria have no incidence in the definition of investment on road infrastructure. For our analysis, we created an original data set which allows us to conclude that investment decisions on roads does not respond to the social welfare function and the development model that the administration defined in its own strategic planning. Furthermore, the evidence suggests an effective schism between the administration’s technical advisors and the implementation of its policies. The data shows a positive relationship between spending on roads and holding Consejos Comunales. This finding supports the hypothesis that spending on road infrastructure is a populist measure given that those municipalities in which Consejos Comunales met received an additional $14.1 million vis-à-vis municipalities without such meetings. In the Consejos Comunales the administration commits resources allowing it to secure political support needed to stay in power. Moreover, we conclude that the administration spends more in municipalities whose mayor does not belong to the government coalition, indicating that the use of budgetary priorization as a way to buy political support in those municipalities where it was defeated in the local elections. The municipalities where the coalition won received$2.6 million less in funding than those ruled by mayors of its coalition

The orosomucoid 1 protein (α1 acid glycoprotein) is overexpressed in odontogenic myxoma

Odontogenic myxoma (OM) is a benign, but locally invasive, neoplasm occurring in the jaws. However, the molecules implicated in its development are unknown. OM as well as Dental Follicle (DF), an odontogenic tissue surrounding the enamel organ, is derived from ectomesenchymal/mesencyhmal elements. To identify some protein that could participate in the development of this neoplasm, total proteins from OM were separated by two-dimensional electrophoresis and the profiles were compared with those obtained from DF, used as a control

Incidence of Changes in Electoral Competence Rules on the Nationalization of Party Systems: The Strategies of Political Actors in Antioquia, 1997-2011

RESUMEN: En este artículo se sostiene que la nacionalización vertical del sistema de partidos es afectada por la forma como los partidos y candidatos adoptanestrategias para seguir en competencia bajo un marco normativo dado, pues las reglas electorales ofrecen diferentes incentivos para que estos coordinen (o no) sus esfuerzos entre los diferentes niveles electorales. Para ello, a partir de la información de las elecciones de Concejo, Asamblea y Cámara en Antioquia entre 1997 y 2011 se encuentra que los cambios en las reglas electorales de 2003 y su efecto sobre la forma en que los políticos se organizan para la competencia son un factor que afecta la nacionalización vertical del sistema de partidos, haciendo que la competencia a nivel municipal se aparte de la regional y nacional.ABSTRACT: In this article it is argued that vertical nationalization of the party system is affected by the way in which parties and candidates adopt strategies to remain in competition under a given set of rules, since electoral rules offer different incentives for them to coordinate (or not) their efforts among the different electoral levels. For this purpose, based on information from the elections for Council, Assembly and Chamber in Antioquia between 1997 and 2011, it was found that the changes in electoral rules in 2003 and their effect on the way in which politicians organize themselves for elections are a factor that affects vertical nationalization of the party system, distancing the competition on the municipal level from that which takes place on the regional and national levels

Izquierdas y derechas en Colombia. Una mirada rápida a los rasgos sociodemográficos del espectro ideológico del país

A partir de un panorama comparativo entre las posiciones ideológicas de los ciudadanos de Colombia, Venezuela y Uruguay, el autor describe algunos de los rasgos característicos del actual espectro ideológico del país. En éste se observa cómo los colombianos están más a la derecha del espectro ideológico que la mayoría de las sociedades latinoamericanas, que han girado a la izquierda. La encuesta del Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina (LAPOP, por su sigla en inglés), realizada en 2006 a 19 países de la región, muestra que, en promedio, sólo los ciudadanos de República Dominicana y Honduras tienen posiciones más derechistas que los colombianos