Preserving entanglement under decoherence and sandwiching all separable states

Every entangled state can be perturbed, for instance by decoherence, and stay entangled. For a large class of pure entangled states, we show how large the perturbation can be. Our class includes all pure bipartite and all maximally entangled states. For an entangled state, E, the constucted neighborhood of entangled states is the region outside two parallel hyperplanes, which sandwich the set of all separable states. The states for which these neighborhoods are largest are the maximally entangled ones. As the number of particles, or the dimensions of the Hilbert spaces for two of the particles increases, the distance between two of the hyperplanes which sandwich the separable states goes to zero. It is easy to decide if a state Q is in the neighborhood of entangled states we construct for an entangled state E. One merely has to check if the trace of EQ is greater than a constant which depends upon E and which we determine.Comment: Corrected first author's e-mail address. All the rest remains unchange

How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy

This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. The firm may induce legislators to support the policy by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district where voters or their representative support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, so each legislator who seeks the firm’s investment votes for the policy, though all legislators would be better off if they all voted against the policy. And when votes reveal information about the district, the firm’s implicit promise or threat can be credible. Unlike influence mechanisms based on contributions or bribes, the behavior considered is time consistent and in line with the low campaign contributions by special interests

Serving the Public Interest in Several Ways: Theory and Empirics

We develop a model where people differ in their altruistic preferences and can serve the public interest in two ways: by making donations to charity and by taking a public service job and exerting effort on the job. Our theory predicts that people who are more altruistic are more likely to take a public service job and, for a given job, make higher donations to charity. Comparing equally altruistic workers, those with a regular job make higher donations to charity than those with a public service job by a simple substitution argument. We subsequently test these predictions using cross-sectional data from Germany on self-reported altruism, sector of employment, and donations to charity. In addition, we use panel data from the Netherlands on volunteering and sector of employment. We find support for most of our predictions.Hervorming Sociale Regelgevin