Implantación y utilización de la base de datos SABI para el análisis económico-financiero de empresas españolas

Memoria ID-0101. Ayudas de la Universidad de Salamanca para la innovación docente, curso 2014-2015

Do Family Firms Use Dividend Policy as a Governance Mechanism? Evidence from the Euro zone

[EN] Manuscript Type:EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue:This study investigates whether family firms use dividend policy as a corporate governancemechanism to overcome agency problems between the controlling family and minority investors. We further account fordeviations between ownership and control and consider the presence and identity of other large shareholders in familycompanies.Research Findings/Insights:Based on a sample of firms from nine Eurozone countries and using a panel data method, wefind that family firms distribute higher and more stable dividends to alleviate expropriation concerns of minority investors.However, the higher dividend payments are mainly explained by family firms with no separation between the largestowner’s voting and cash flow rights and those with non-family second blockholders.Theoretical/Academic Implications:We contribute to the literature by shedding light on how the family business modelaffects companies’ dividend preferences. Our research also highlights the importance of taking into account the identity oflarge shareholders, especially in a context in which concentrated ownership structures are commonplace. The reporteddifferences in dividend policies between family and non-family firms help to clarify the variant performances of familybusinesses found in previous studies.Practitioner/Policy Implications:Family firms should regard dividend policy as a governance tool that allows them toattract prospective investors and enlarge their shareholder base. Simultaneously, minority investors can benefit from familyfirms’ dividend decisions. Our evidence also suggests that European policy makers should lay the necessary foundations toprevent controlling families from adopting ownership structures that serve their own personal interests

Family control, expropriation, and investor protection: A panel data analysis of Western European corporations

[EN] We investigate whether the value impact of family control in Western European firms depends on country-level investor protection. To this aim, we account for ownership–value nonlinearities. Supporting that the risk of expropriation increases with high ownership concentration, we find an inverted U-shape relation between family control and firm value. Family firms incur a value discount when family equity holdings exceed approximately 50%. The nonlinear effect of family control is attributable to family firms from a strongly protective environment. When investor protection is weak, family control has a positive impact on firm value regardless of the ownership concentration leve

Does Family Control Shape Corporate Capital Structure? An Empirical Analysisof Eurozone Firms

[EN] This study investigates the relationship between family control and corporatecapital structure considering the dynamic nature of the debt policy and the ownership structureof family firms. Our results show that the sensitivity of debt to fluctuations in cash flow isless pronounced in family firms and highlight that family control increases the speed ofadjustment toward target debt. Four dimensions of the family business model explain theseresults: deviations of voting from cash flow rights, the presence of a second blockholder in thecompany, involvement of family members in management, and the generation in charge ofthe business. The weaker negative impact of cash flow on debt is driven by family firms with nocontrol-enhancing mechanisms, companies with active family participation in management andfamily businesses that are still controlled by the first generation. By contrast, the more severeagency conflicts between owners and creditors in family firms with a second blockholder leadto more pronounced pecking order behaviour. Furthermore, the higher flexibility in corporatedecision-making of family firms managed by the family and under the influence of the firstgeneration explains why family companies are able to rebalance their capital structure faste

Family control and investment–cash flow sensitivity: Empirical evidence from the Euro zone

[EN] This paper considers the ownership structure of family firms to determine whether family control alleviates or exacerbates investment–cash flow sensitivity in the Euro zone. We find that family-controlled corporations have lower investment–cash flow sensitivities. Further, our results show that this reduced sensitivity is mainly attributable to family firms with no deviations between cash flow and voting rights and to family firms in which family members hold managerial positions. We also find that second largest shareholders affect family firms' sensitivity and are associated with either monitoring (non-family second blockholders) or collusion (family second blockholders). Overall, family control seems to mitigate investment inefficiencies that derive from capital market imperfections

Concentración de propiedad y valor de mercado en la empresa familiar : un enfoque de gobierno corporativo

[ES] Dada la importancia de las empresas familiares en todo el mundo, nuestro principal objetivo en este trabajo es investigar la relación entre concentración de propiedad y valor de mercado en el caso particular de las compañías familiares. Además, estudiamos si las empresas familiares obtienen mejores resultados que las no familiares. Para lograr este objetivo, adoptamos un enfoque de gobierno corporativo. La estimación de nuestros modelos mediante el método generalizado de los momentos proporciona nueva evidencia empírica. Nuestros resultados revelan que la propiedad familiar influye positivamente en el valor empresarial. No obstante, cuando la concentración de propiedad en manos de la familia es demasiado elevada, el valor de la compañía disminuye; dando lugar a un relación no lineal entre concentración de propiedad familiar y valor de mercado. Finalmente, demostramos que las empresas familiares obtienen mejores resultados que las no familiares, incluso cuando se tiene en cuenta la mencionada no linealidad. En general, los resultados obtenidos indican que el control familiar de las empresas puede ser beneficioso para los accionistas minoritarios [EN] Given the importance of family firms all over the world, our main objective in this paper is to investigate the relation between ownership concentration and the market value of the company in the particular case of family firms. Additionally, we study whether family firms outperform nonfamily corporations. To this aim, we adopt a corporate governance approach. The estimation of our models by using the generalized method of moments provides new empirical evidence. Our results show that family ownership impacts positively on firm value. Nevertheless, when ownership concentration in the hands of the family is too high, firm value decreases; thus giving rise to a nonlinear relation between family ownership concentration and firm value. Finally, we find that family firms perform better than non-family ones, even when nonlinearities are taken into account. Overall, our findings suggest that family control of corporations may be beneficial to minority shareholders

Retos de gobernanza en las empresas familiares españolas

RESUMEN: Sobre la base de una encuesta telefónica realizada a finales de 2016 a 1005 CEO o responsables de empresas familiares, cuyos resultados fueron empleados en el informe elaborado conjuntamente por el Instituto de la Empresa Familiar y la Red de Cátedras de Empresa Familiar, y publicado en 2018 con el título: Factores de Competitividad y Análisis Financiero en la Empresa Familiar, complementada con datos financieros, en el presente artículo se reflexiona sobre algunas de las características y principales retos de gobernanza de las empresas familiares españolas

Hacia la internacionalización y la mejora en la empleabilidad de los estudiantes del Grado en Administración y Dirección de Empresas. Propuesta docente integradora para asignaturas en inglés

Memoria ID-044 Ayudas de la Universidad de Salamanca para la innovación docente, curso 2020-2021

Plan Estratégico de Promoción y Visibilidad de los Títulos y Servicios Empresariales ofertados por IME Business School para la mejora del Entorno Económico y Social

Memoria ID-0095. Ayudas de la Universidad de Salamanca para la innovación docente, curso 2017-2018

Apps y economía II. Memoria final

Memoria ID-0182. Ayudas de la Universidad de Salamanca para la innovación docente, curso 2015-2016