Hestenes' Tetrad and Spin Connections

Defining a spin connection is necessary for formulating Dirac's bispinor equation in a curved space-time. Hestenes has shown that a bispinor field is equivalent to an orthonormal tetrad of vector fields together with a complex scalar field. In this paper, we show that using Hestenes' tetrad for the spin connection in a Riemannian space-time leads to a Yang-Mills formulation of the Dirac Lagrangian in which the bispinor field is mapped to a set of Yang-Mills gauge potentials and a complex scalar field. This result was previously proved for a Minkowski space-time using Fierz identities. As an application we derive several different non-Riemannian spin connections found in the literature directly from an arbitrary linear connection acting on Hestenes' tetrad and scalar fields. We also derive spin connections for which Dirac's bispinor equation is form invariant. Previous work has not considered form invariance of the Dirac equation as a criterion for defining a general spin connection

Nonlinear modes of the tensor Dirac equation and CPT violation

Recently, it has been shown that Dirac's bispinor equation can be expressed, in an equivalent tensor form, as a constrained Yang-Mills equation in the limit of an infinitely large coupling constant. It was also shown that the free tensor Dirac equation is a completely integrable Hamiltonian system with Lie algebra type Poisson brackets, from which Fermi quantization can be derived directly without using bispinors. The Yang-Mills equation for a finite coupling constant is investigated. It is shown that the nonlinear Yang-Mills equation has exact plane wave solutions in one-to-one correspondence with the plane wave solutions of Dirac's bispinor equation. The theory of nonlinear dispersive waves is applied to establish the existence of wave packets. The CPT violation of these nonlinear wave packets, which could lead to new observable effects consistent with current experimental bounds, is investigated

Does correcting myths about the flu vaccine work? An experimental evaluation of the effects of corrective information

Seasonal influenza is responsible for thousands of deaths and billions of dollars of medical costs per year in the United States, but influenza vaccination coverage remains substantially below public health targets. One possible obstacle to greater immunization rates is the false belief that it is possible to contract the flu from the flu vaccine. A nationally representative survey experiment was conducted to assess the extent of this flu vaccine misperception. We find that a substantial portion of the public (43%) believes that the flu vaccine can give you the flu. We also evaluate how an intervention designed to address this concern affects belief in the myth, concerns about flu vaccine safety, and future intent to vaccinate. Corrective information adapted from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) website significantly reduced belief in the myth that the flu vaccine can give you the flu as well as concerns about its safety. However, the correction also significantly reduced intent to vaccinate among respondents with high levels of concern about vaccine side effects--a response that was not observed among those with low levels of concern. This result, which is consistent with previous research on misperceptions about the MMR vaccine, suggests that correcting myths about vaccines may not be an effective approach to promoting immunization

Displacing misinformation about events: An experimental test of causal corrections

PublishedMisinformation can be very difficult to correct and may have lasting effects even after it is discredited. One reason for this persistence is the manner in which people make causal inferences based on available information about a given event or outcome. As a result, false information may continue to influence beliefs and attitudes even after being debunked if it is not replaced by an alternate causal explanation. We test this hypothesis using an experimental paradigm adapted from the psychology literature on the continued influence effect and find that a causal explanation for an unexplained event is significantly more effective than a denial even when the denial is backed by unusually strong evidence. This result has significant implications for how to most effectively counter misinformation about controversial political events and outcomes.We are grateful to Democracy Fund and the New America Foundation for funding support and to Rune Slothuus and Dannagal Young for helpful comments

The structure of foreign policy attitudes in transatlantic perspective: comparing the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany

This is the final version of the article. Available from Wiley via the DOI in this record.While public opinion about foreign policy has been studied extensively in the United States, there is less systematic research of foreign policy opinions in other countries. Given that public opinion about international affairs affects who gets elected in democracies and then constrains the foreign policies available to leaders once elected, both comparative politics and international relations scholarship benefit from more systematic investigation of foreign policy attitudes outside the US. Using new data, we find a common set of core constructs structuring both American and European attitudes about foreign policy. Surveys conducted in four countries (the US, the UK, France, and Germany) provide an expanded set of foreign policy-related survey items that are analyzed using exploratory structural equation modeling (ESEM). We specifically test for measurement equivalence and find a common four-factor structure that fits the data in all four countries. Consequently, we make valid, direct comparisons of the foreign policy preferences of four world powers. In the process, our four-factor model confirms and expands previous work on the structure of foreign policy attitudes. We also demonstrate the capability of ESEM in testing the dimensionality and cross-national equivalence of social science concepts.Data collection was funded by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council of the United Kingdom (RES-061-25-0405). All data supporting this research are available from the UK Data Archive (Study Number 851142): https://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-851142/

The Consequences of Authoritarian Populism in Britain

Authoritarian Populist was a label often hung on the Thatcher governments of the 1980s. Although the UK political landscape has changed enormously since 1990, the popular sentiments that underpinned Margaret Thatcher?s repeated electoral successes remain remarkably strong among British voters today. The paper uses extensive survey evidence to characterise what Authoritarian Populism means for voters in Britain today. The analysis shows that there is a coherent set of beliefs, held by a surprisingly large proportion of the UK electorate, which can reasonably be described as Authoritarian Pop ulist. These beliefs focus on the strong role that Britain should play in the world, cynicism about the operation of EU institutions, a virulent opposition to human rights, negative views towards immigration, and preferences for lower taxes and a smaller state. The analysis also shows that (controlling for a wide range of other relevant factors) these views have important consequences for patterns of party support, for likely voting in the forthcoming referendum on the EU, for (dis)satisfaction with Briti sh democracy, and for attitudes towards courts

High-status lobbyists are most likely to overrate their success

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Nature Research via the DOI in this record Overconfidence helps individuals reach higher status within social groups by making them seem more competent regardless of objective ability, so this bias may be especially prevalent among status-oriented members of elite communities. Based on this premise, we explore whether lobbyists in the USA misperceive their success. Using models that (1) control for legislative outcome when predicting self-assessed policy success and (2) compare self-assessed policy success on specific proposals against the average success reported by all lobbyists working on the same side of an issue, we identify systematic tendencies to overrate achievements. Lobbyists with higher incomes, who reside in Washington, DC, USA, have congressional experience and who engage in a broader range of activities are more likely to overrate their success. Public interest group lobbyists tend to underestimate success. We conclude that political elites are subject to the same biases as others when evaluating their performance, and these biases may be largely status-driven.European Research Counci

The consequential Nationalist–Globalist policy divide in contemporary Britain: some initial analyses

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Taylor & Francis via the DOI in this record.The verdict delivered by voters in the 2015 and 2017 British General Elections and the European Union Referendum surprised pollsters, pundits, the media, and even the victors. Political choices representative of globalist outlooks saw defeat at the polls. Liberal Democratic support was below 10% and voting to remain in the EU underperformed predictions. Empirical analyses demonstrate that there is a nationalist-globalist policy divide, partially rooted in demographics and authoritarian predispositions, which go beyond traditional valence factors in explaining the recent choices of the British electorate. Moreover, this outlook influences how satisfied citizens are with the way democracy works in Britain. Nationalist viewpoints, when juxtaposed against globalist outlooks, are salient in a way they were not during the height of Thatcherism, encompass left-right economic concerns and may portend a new era in British political culture.Data collection was funded by ESRC Grants RES-061-25-0405 and ES/L011867/

Understanding Innovations in Journalistic Practice: A Field Experiment Examining Motivations for Fact-Checking

© 2016 International Communication Association. Why has fact-checking spread so quickly within U.S. political journalism? In the first field experiment conducted among reporters, we varied journalist exposure to messages that highlight either audience demand for fact-checking or the prestige it enjoys within the profession. Our results indicate that messages promoting the high status and journalistic values of fact-checking increased the prevalence of fact-checking coverage, while messages about audience demand were somewhat less successful. These findings suggest that political fact-checking is driven primarily by professional motives within journalism, a finding that helps us understand the process by which the practice spreads within the press as well as the factors that influence the behavior of journalists

Getting tough with the dragon? The comparative correlates of foreign policy attitudes toward China in the United States and UK

A large body of research suggests mass publics are capable of thinking coherently about international relations. We extend this body of research to show that domain relevant postures – in our case, more abstract beliefs about foreign policy – are related to how tough of a line representative samples of US and UK respondents want their governments to take toward China. More specifically, we utilize a unique comparative survey of American and British foreign policy attitudes to show broad support for toughness toward China. Beliefs about the use of the military and attitudes regarding globalization help explain preferences for tough economic and military policies toward China. In the two countries, the relationship between general foreign policy outlooks and the positions citizens take is robust to the addition of a general mediator that controls for the general affect those surveyed have toward China. Finally, the strength of the relationship between these abstract postures and specific preferences for a China policy are different across the countries