Refinement Types as Higher Order Dependency Pairs

Refinement types are a well-studied manner of performing in-depth analysis on functional programs. The dependency pair method is a very powerful method used to prove termination of rewrite systems; however its extension to higher order rewrite systems is still the object of active research. We observe that a variant of refinement types allow us to express a form of higher-order dependency pair criterion that only uses information at the type level, and we prove the correctness of this criterion

Banana and plantain (Musa) genomics: Missing opportunity?

Poster presented at 2009 Annual Research Meeting of the Generation Challenge Programme. Bamako (Mali), 20-23 Sep 200

On closed subgroups of the group of homeomorphisms of a manifold

Let $M$ be a triangulable compact manifold. We prove that, among closed subgroups of \homeo_{0}(M) (the identity component of the group of homeomorphisms of $M$), the subgroup consisting of volume preserving elements is maximal

Infinite subgame perfect equilibrium in the Hausdorff difference hierarchy

Subgame perfect equilibria are specific Nash equilibria in perfect information games in extensive form. They are important because they relate to the rationality of the players. They always exist in infinite games with continuous real-valued payoffs, but may fail to exist even in simple games with slightly discontinuous payoffs. This article considers only games whose outcome functions are measurable in the Hausdorff difference hierarchy of the open sets (\textit{i.e.} $\Delta^0_2$ when in the Baire space), and it characterizes the families of linear preferences such that every game using these preferences has a subgame perfect equilibrium: the preferences without infinite ascending chains (of course), and such that for all players $a$ and $b$ and outcomes $x,y,z$ we have $\neg(z <_a y <_a x \,\wedge\, x <_b z <_b y)$. Moreover at each node of the game, the equilibrium constructed for the proof is Pareto-optimal among all the outcomes occurring in the subgame. Additional results for non-linear preferences are presented.Comment: The alternative definition of the difference hierarchy has changed slightl