Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence

This paper studies budget processes, both theoretically and experimentally. We compare the outcomes of bottom-up and top-down budget processes. It is often presumed that a top-down budget process leads to a smaller overall budget than a bottom-up budget process. Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987) showed theoretically that this need not be the case. We test experimentally the theoretical predictions of their work. The evidence from these experiments lends strong support to their theory, both at the aggregate and the individual subject level

Political institutions and debt crises

This paper shows that political institutions matter in explaining defaults on external and domestic debt obligations. We explore a large number of political and macroeconomic variables using a non-parametric technique to predict safety from default. The advantage of this technique is that it is able to identify patterns in the data that are not captured in standard probit analysis. We find that political factors matter, and do so in different ways for democratic and non-democratic regimes, and for domestic and external debt. In democracies, a parliamentary system or sufficient checks and balances almost guarantee the absence of default on external debt when economic fundamentals or liquidity are sufficiently strong. In dictatorships, high stability and tenure play a similar role for default on domestic debt

Country characteristics and the incidence of capital income taxation on wages: an empirical assessment

This paper examines the incidence of corporate income taxes on wages using data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics for 13 OECD countries. Within a wage-bargaining framework, our econometric analysis shows that a substantial share of the corporate tax burden is shifted from capital to labour. However, the magnitude of this shift is influenced importantly by country characteristics affecting the process of wage determination, such as the degree of capital mobility, a country's relative influence over the world price of output and trade unions’ strength

Non-Keynesian Effects of Fiscal Consolidations in Central Europe in the Years 2000-2013

Last two decades were a period of significant discussion concerning determinants of effectiveness of fiscal policy. After some cases of expansionary episodes of fiscal consolidations in eighties of XX century, an intensive international research on the possibility of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal contractions in highly developed countries has started. The aim of the article is to analyze the possibility of obtaining non-Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidations in post-transformation countries of Central Europe. An important aim of macroeconomic policy in the analyzed economies is to benefit the advantages of convergence process. Thus, the empirical analysis is made within conditional β-convergence framework. The verification of hypothesis of β-convergence enables to identify the long term tendency of output per capita, in the same time it enables to identify non-Keynesian effects of fiscal prudence and to assess their role in the process of reducing GDP gap between the analyzed economies. Then the potential transmission channels for non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy were analyzed. In the research the data from Eurostat and European Commission for the years 2000-2013 was used. The paper provides arguments in favor of the existence of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidations in Central Europe that support the process of conditional convergence

Partisan Views of the Economy

In this paper it is argued that political parties may have incentives to adopt a partisan view on the working of the economic system. Our approach is based on a dynamical spatial voting model in which political parties are policy oriented. This model revolves around two interrelated issues x and y. The policy maker sets x directly. There exist two views on the relationship between x and y. Model uncertainty confronts policy makers with the problem of the selection of a model to base their actions on. We show that if voters have imperfect information about the working of the economic system that model selection contains a strategic element. Policy makers are inclined to adopt a view on the working of the economic system which fits in with their preferences. There is no inherent logic that places monetarists to the right of New Economists. They have different models of economic mechanism, but they need not have different political values. A conservative can be a Keynesian and a liberal a monetarist. These combinations are in fact surprisingly rare. James Tobin, 1974,The New Economics One Decade Older, p. 62. I am greatly indebted to Peter Broer, Ben Heydra, Jos Jansen and Wilko Letterie for many helpful suggestions. Furthermore, I would like to thank an anonymous referee for his comments

The transition of people’s preferences for the intervention of the government in the economy of re-unified Germany

Covering the first fifteen years immediately after German re- unification, this paper analyzes the people’s support to the transition. The focus is on individuals’ preferences for the intervention of the government in the economy and on the opinion about competition per se. Eastern German data are compared with Western German data. Using suitable data that allow for interpersonal comparisons, the paper shows that Eastern Germans have always preferred an intervention of the public hand in the economy deeper than Western Germans; these different positions have hardly converged during the examined period of time. However there are no significant differences with respect to how Germans perceive competition per se: it is considered as a good by the people living in both parts of the country.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

It is Hobbes, not Rousseau:an experiment on voting and redistribution

We perform an experiment which provides a laboratory replica of some important features of the welfare state. In the experiment, all individuals in a group decide whether to make a costly effort, which produces a random (independent) outcome for each one of them. The group members then vote on whether to redistribute the resulting and commonly known total sum of earnings equally amongst themselves. This game has two equilibria, if played once. In one of them, all players make effort and there is little redistribution. In the other one, there is no effort and nothingWe thank Iris Bohnet, Tim Cason, David Cooper, John Duffy, Maia Guell, John Van Huyck and Robin Mason for helpful conversations and encouragement. The comments of the Editor and two referees helped improve the paper. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from Spain’s Ministry of Science and Innovation under grants CONSOLIDER INGENIO 2010 CSD2006-0016 (all authors), ECO2009-10531 (Cabrales), ECO2008-01768 (Nagel) and the Comunidad de Madrid under grant Excelecon (Cabrales), the Generalitat de Catalunya and the CREA program (Nagel), and project SEJ2007-64340 of Spain’s Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (Rodríguez Mora).Publicad