Quine, Ontology, and Physicalism

Quine's views on ontology and naturalism are well-known but rarely considered in tandem. According to my interpretation the connection between them is vital. I read Quine as a global epistemic structuralist. Quine thought we only ever know objects qua solutions to puzzles about significant intersections in observations. Objects are always accessed descriptively, via their roles in our best theory. Quine's Kant lectures contain an early version of epistemic structuralism with uncharacteristic remarks about the mental. Here Quine embraces mitigated anomalous monism, allowing introspection and the availability in principle of full physical descriptions of the perceptual states which get science off the ground. Later versions abandon these ideas. My epistemic-structural interpretation explains why. I argue first-personal introspective access to mental states is incompatible with global epistemic structuralism

Mental States Are Like Diseases

While Quine’s linguistic behaviorism is well-known, his Kant Lectures contain one of his most detailed discussions of behaviorism in psychology and the philosophy of mind. Quine clarifies the nature of his psychological commitments by arguing for a modest view that is against ‘excessively restrictive’ variants of behaviorism while maintaining ‘a good measure of behaviorist discipline…to keep [our mental] terms under control’. In this paper, I use Quine’s Kant Lectures to reconstruct his position. I distinguish three types of behaviorism in psychology and the philosophy of mind: ontological behaviorism, logical behaviorism, and epistemological behaviorism. I then consider Quine’s perspective on each of these views and argue that he does not fully accept any of them. By combining these perspectives we arrive at Quine’s surprisingly subtle view about behaviorism in psychology

Microwave measurement of the probability of collision of low energy electrons in nitrogen technical report no. 17

Collision probability for momentum transfer of low energy electrons in nitroge

Development and Validation of a Dissolution Test Method for Artemether and Lumefantrine in Tablets

Purpose: To develop and validate a dissolution test method for dissolution release of artemether and lumefantrine from tablets.Methods: A single dissolution method for evaluating the in vitro release of artemether and lumefantrine from tablets was developed and validated. The method comprised of a dissolution medium of 1000 ml of 2 %w/v of Myrj 52 in 0.005M HCl per vessel with the paddle rotating at 100 rpm for 120 min. The dissolution samples were analysed using a Waters HPLC system with Waters symmetry column (C-18 column of 250mm x 4.6mm i.d., 5 μ particle size). The mobile phase was a mixture of 20 volumes of 0.5 %v/v of triethylamine in water (adjusted to a pH of 3.0 with orthophosphoric acid) and 80 volumes of acetonitrile. The detection wavelength was set at 216 nm and 100 μl of each sample was injected. The HPLC method used for the determination of drug release was validated for the parameters of accuracy, precision, linearity, specificity, filter validation, solution stability and robustness.Results: The dissolution test provided sink conditions for artemether and lumefantrine and was able to discriminate between tablet formulations of different hardness and different composition. Application of Mann-Whitney U test for significant difference between samples at various time points during the dissolution test yielded z values > 1.96 (1.96 = critical z value at p = 0.05) for the various formulations tested, indicating the discriminatory power of the dissolution test.Conclusion: This validated dissolution test may be used as a single dissolution test for artemether and luminfantrine in tablet formulations.Keywords: Artemether, Lumefantrine, Tablet formulations, Single dissolution test, HPL

An exact solution method for 1D polynomial Schr\"odinger equations

Stationary 1D Schr\"odinger equations with polynomial potentials are reduced to explicit countable closed systems of exact quantization conditions, which are selfconsistent constraints upon the zeros of zeta-regularized spectral determinants, complementing the usual asymptotic (Bohr--Sommerfeld) constraints. (This reduction is currently completed under a certain vanishing condition.) In particular, the symmetric quartic oscillators are admissible systems, and the formalism is tested upon them. Enforcing the exact and asymptotic constraints by suitable iterative schemes, we numerically observe geometric convergence to the correct eigenvalues/functions in some test cases, suggesting that the output of the reduction should define a contractive fixed-point problem (at least in some vicinity of the pure $q^4$ case).Comment: flatex text.tex, 4 file

Machine Learning and Irresponsible Inference: Morally Assessing the Training Data for Image Recognition Systems

Just as humans can draw conclusions responsibly or irresponsibly, so too can computers. Machine learning systems that have been trained on data sets that include irresponsible judgments are likely to yield irresponsible predictions as outputs. In this paper I focus on a particular kind of inference a computer system might make: identification of the intentions with which a person acted on the basis of photographic evidence. Such inferences are liable to be morally objectionable, because of a way in which they are presumptuous. After elaborating this moral concern, I explore the possibility that carefully procuring the training data for image recognition systems could ensure that the systems avoid the problem. The lesson of this paper extends beyond just the particular case of image recognition systems and the challenge of responsibly identifying a person’s intentions. Reflection on this particular case demonstrates the importance (as well as the difficulty) of evaluating machine learning systems and their training data from the standpoint of moral considerations that are not encompassed by ordinary assessments of predictive accuracy

Niches for Species, a multi-species model to guide woodland management: An example based on Scotland's native woodlands

Designating and managing areas with the aim of protecting biodiversity requires information on species distributions and habitat associations, but a lack of reliable occurrence records for rare and threatened species precludes robust empirical modelling. Managers of Scotland’s native woodlands are obliged to consider 208 protected species, which each have their own, narrow niche requirements. To support decision-making, we developed Niches for Species (N4S), a model that uses expert knowledge to predict the potential occurrence of 179 woodland protected species representing a range of taxa: mammals, birds, invertebrates, fungi, bryophytes, lichens and vascular plants. Few existing knowledge-based models have attempted to include so many species. We collated knowledge to define each species’ suitable habitat according to a hierarchical habitat classification: woodland type, stand structure and microhabitat. Various spatial environmental datasets were used singly or in combination to classify and map Scotland’s native woodlands accordingly, thus allowing predictive mapping of each species’ potential niche. We illustrate how the outputs can inform individual species management, or can be summarised across species and regions to provide an indicator of woodland biodiversity potential for landscape scale decisions. We tested the model for ten species using available occurrence records. Although concordance between predicted and observed distributions was indicated for nine of these species, this relationship was statistically significant in only five cases. We discuss the difficulties in reliably testing predictions when the records available for rare species are typically low in number, patchy and biased, and suggest future model improvements. Finally, we demonstrate how using N4S to synthesise complex, multi-species information into an easily digestible format can help policy makers and practitioners consider large numbers of species and their conservation needs

Explaining Evidence Denial as Motivated Pragmatically Rational Epistemic Irrationality

This paper introduces a model for evidence denial that explains this behavior as a manifestation of rationality and it is based on the contention that social values (measurable as utilities) often underwrite these sorts of responses. Moreover, it is contended that the value associated with group membership in particular can override epistemic reason when the expected utility of a belief or belief system is great. However, it is also true that it appears to be the case that it is still possible for such unreasonable believers to reverse this sort of dogmatism and to change their beliefs in a way that is epistemically rational. The conjecture made here is that we should expect this to happen only when the expected utility of the beliefs in question dips below a threshold where the utility value of continued dogmatism and the associated group membership is no longer sufficient to motivate defusing the counter-evidence that tells against such epistemically irrational beliefs

The Prenective View of Propositional Content

Beliefs have what I will call ‘propositional content’. A belief is always a belief that so-and-so: a belief that grass is green, or a belief that snow is white, or whatever. Other things have propositional content too, such as sentences, judgments and assertions. The Standard View amongst philosophers is that what it is to have a propositional content is to stand in an appropriate relation to a proposition. Moreover, on this view, propositions are objects, i.e. the kind of thing you can refer to with singular terms. For example, on the Standard View, we should parse the sentence ‘Simon believes that Sharon is funny’ as: [Simon] believes [that Sharon is funny]; ‘Simon’ is a term referring to a thinking subject, ‘that Sharon is funny’ is a term referring to a proposition, and ‘x believes y’ is a dyadic predicate expressing the believing relation. In this paper, I argue against the Standard View. This is how I think we should parse ‘Simon believes that Sharon is funny’: [Simon] believes that [Sharon is funny]; here we have a singular term, ‘Simon’, a sentence ‘Sharon is funny’, and a ‘prenective’ joining them together, ‘x believes that p’. On this Prenective View, we do not get at the propositional content of someone’s belief by referring to a reified proposition with a singular term; we simply use the sentence ‘Sharon is funny’ to express that content for ourselves. I argue for the Prenective View in large part by showing that an initially attractive version of the Standard View is actually vulnerable to the same objection that Wittgenstein used against Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgment

The perimeter of large planar Voronoi cells: a double-stranded random walk

Let $p\_n$ be the probability for a planar Poisson-Voronoi cell to have exactly $n$ sides. We construct the asymptotic expansion of $\log p\_n$ up to terms that vanish as $n\to\infty$. We show that {\it two independent biased random walks} executed by the polar angle determine the trajectory of the cell perimeter. We find the limit distribution of (i) the angle between two successive vertex vectors, and (ii) the one between two successive perimeter segments. We obtain the probability law for the perimeter's long wavelength deviations from circularity. We prove Lewis' law and show that it has coefficient 1/4.Comment: Slightly extended version; journal reference adde