MONOPOL NAD ROBOM S PROSTORNIM ODRŽAVANJEM

This study addresses the effects of monopolistic firms\u27 location and guarantee time limit on pricing for goods requiring high maintenance expenditure, such as elevators, televisions and computers. A spatial maintenance model of two stages within a guaranteed time limit is outlined in this paper. Based on this model, location, maintenance commitment and pricing are all characterized under a monopoly situation. This paper outlines the optimal price and location for the monopolist. The effects of guarantee time limit on price are discussed.Ovaj rad se bavi efektima koje lokacija i vremensko ograničenje garancije u monopolističkim tvrtkama imaju na formiranje cijena robe koja zahtijeva visoke troškove održavanja, kao što su liftovi, televizori i kompjuteri. U ovom radu iznosimo model prostornog održavanja u dva stupnja unutar garantiranog vremenskog ograničenja. Na osnovu ovog modela, lokacija, obveza održavanja i formiranje cijena se sve određuju u situaciji monopola. Rad donosi optimalne cijene i lokacije za monopolistu. Raspravlja se i o učincima vremenskog ograničenja garancije na cijenu

INOVACIJA MONOPOLA S POTROŠNIM RESURSIMA I UTROŠKOM RADA

This paper focuses on the propensity to innovate for a monopolist with two inputs, an exhaustible resource and labor. When this exhaustible resource is used up, the monopolist quits this industry. This paper characterizes the relationship between the two types of elasticity of innovation. With this relationship, the equilibrium is captured. This study argues that the lower the marginal cost incurred by innovation, the longer it takes for the monopolist to quit the industry and the higher the profits.Ovaj rad je usredotočen na sklonost koju monopol s dva utroška, potrošnim resursom i radnom snagom, ima ka inovacijama. Kad se potrošni resursi istroše, monopolisti gase tu industriju. Ovaj rad analizira vezu između dva tipa elastičnosti inovacija. Ovom se vezom postiže ravnoteža. Članak postavlja tezu da što je manji marginalni trošak inovacije, monopolistu treba duže vremena da ugasi industriju a profit je isto tako veći

R&D subsidies under asymmetric Cournot competition

With a three-stage game model, this article theoretically assesses the effectiveness of different research and development subsidy strategies under asymmetric duopoly. The findings indicate that subsidising the small firm instead of the large is the optimum for the maximisation of social welfare in general. Meanwhile, if the initial marginal costs of the two firms are close to each other, providing subsidies to the small firm leads to more social R&D investment and higher aggregate production, but lower consumer surplus. Conversely, while the cost gap of the duopoly is large, subsidising the big firm becomes the preferable option for the authority to stimulate both R&D investment and total output of the industry, while sacrificing consumer surplus

Duopoly innovation under product externalities

This study argues that product substitutability and complementary have major effects on the relationship between innovation and competition and some interesting conclusions are derived. First, innovative investment is reduced with market power. The total quantity of products and social welfare are increased with market power while decreased with increasing of substitutability or deceasing of complementary. Second, the equilibrium products and innovative investment are lower than those under social optimality. Finally, by comparison with Cournot quantity competition, Bertrand price competition is keener. But the main conclusions are the same under both kinds of competitions

MONOPOL NAD ROBOM S PROSTORNIM ODRŽAVANJEM

This study addresses the effects of monopolistic firms\u27 location and guarantee time limit on pricing for goods requiring high maintenance expenditure, such as elevators, televisions and computers. A spatial maintenance model of two stages within a guaranteed time limit is outlined in this paper. Based on this model, location, maintenance commitment and pricing are all characterized under a monopoly situation. This paper outlines the optimal price and location for the monopolist. The effects of guarantee time limit on price are discussed.Ovaj rad se bavi efektima koje lokacija i vremensko ograničenje garancije u monopolističkim tvrtkama imaju na formiranje cijena robe koja zahtijeva visoke troškove održavanja, kao što su liftovi, televizori i kompjuteri. U ovom radu iznosimo model prostornog održavanja u dva stupnja unutar garantiranog vremenskog ograničenja. Na osnovu ovog modela, lokacija, obveza održavanja i formiranje cijena se sve određuju u situaciji monopola. Rad donosi optimalne cijene i lokacije za monopolistu. Raspravlja se i o učincima vremenskog ograničenja garancije na cijenu

Optimal trade policies under product differentiations

This article focuses on the optimal international trade policy considered product differentiations. A duopoly model with a home firm in a developing country and a foreign firm in a developed country is established. The findings indicate that, the optimal tariff relies on the product differentiations significantly. On one hand, higher marginal cost of home firms have opposite effects on optimal tariff compared to higher marginal cost of foreign firms. On the other hand, the optimal tariff is monotonically decreasing in the amount of consumers caring about brands and increasing in the scale of consumers not caring about brands. Moreover, an increase in the marginal cost and transportation cost of imported goods triggers price rising in domestic market as the market power of home firms is consolidated. In addition, a foreign firm may withdraw from domestic market if its competitive advantages vanishes under high tariffs

Effects of celebrity endorsement on firms’ competition: from industrial organisation perspective

Product endorsement is employed by many firms and most studies have proceeded based on management perspectives and ignored the strategic effects (or indirect effects). However, as a non-price competition, product endorsement behaviour’s strategic effects are valuable to be considered and convenient to be captured by industrial organisation perspective. So, this paper’s purpose is to reveal the strategic effects of product endorsement by industrial organisation perspective. First, the results of this paper show that celebrity endorsement decreases the rival’s benefits. Second, under a unique endorser, the lower efficiency (measured by marginal production cost) firm’s celebrity endorsement improves price difference and dispersion, which are direct effects of product endorsement. The higher efficiency firm’s endorsement promotes the producer surplus, consumer surplus and social welfare, which are called indirect effects. Finally, celebrity endorsement has trigger effects. If one firm launches celebrity endorsement, the rational reaction for its rivals is also to engage in a similar behaviour. This paper expands the celebrity endorsement issue from management to economics perspective

A line search filter approach for the system of nonlinear equations

AbstractSome constrained optimization approaches have been recently proposed for the system of nonlinear equations (SNE). Filter approach with line search technique is employed to attack the system of nonlinear equations in this paper. The system of nonlinear equations is transformed into a constrained nonlinear programming problem at each step, which is then solved by line search strategy. Furthermore, at each step, some equations are treated as constraints while the others act as objective functions, and filter strategy is then utilized. In essence, constrained optimization methods combined with filter technique are utilized to cope with the system of nonlinear equations

Asymmetric doupoly competition with innovation spillover and input constraints

This paper subjects to examine how technology spillover affects input competition and how input constraints impact firm innovation by a two-stage game model and theoretic analysis. The results show that with low spillover, the high cost firm can capture more input than the low cost firm through cost-reducing innovation. Adding input increases firms’ innovation, but it cannot improve the disadvantaged firm's state under input constraint. Compared with non-cooperative innovation, cooperative innovation reduces innovation difference and firm size difference. The research implications are that disadvantage firms could take innovation spillover and capacity constraints as a competition strategy to obtain competition advantage and regulators should stimulate cooperative innovation to higher social welfare. The major value of this paper is that it combines capacity constraints and innovation investment originality