Anomalous monism and mental causality : on the debate of Donald Davidson’s philosophy of the mental

The English version of the first chapter of Erwin Rogler and Gerhard Preyer: Materialismus, anomaler Monismus und mentale Kausalität. Zur gegenwärtigen Philosophie des Mentalen bei Donald Davidson und David Lewis (2001) "Anomaler Monismus und Mentale Kausalität. Ein Beitrag zur Debatte über Donald Davidsons Philosophie des Mentalen" is a contribution to the current debates on the philosophy of the mental and mental causality initiated from Donald Davidson's philosophy with his article "Mental Events" (1970). It is the intent of the English version to give a response to the controversy among American, British and Australian philosophers in the context of a global exchange of ideas on problems understanding the mental. Contents 1. Preliminary Remarks 2. The Critique of Property-Epiphenomenalism and Counterarguments (a) The Enlargement of Nomological Reasoning (b) The Counterfactual Analysis (c) Supervenient Causality 3. Are Mental Properties real or unreal (fictive)? Abstract Things and events are fundamental entities in Davidson's ontology. Less distinct is the ontological status of properties, especially of mental types. Despite of some eliminative allusions there are weighty reasons to understand Davidson's philosophy of mind as including intentional realism. With it, the question of mental causality arises. There are two striking solutions to this problem: the epiphenomenalism of mental properties and the downward causation of mental events. Davidson cannot accept either. He claims to justify the mental as supervenient causality in order to thus integrate it into physicalism (his version of monism). But his argument at best proves the explanatory, not the causal relevance of mental properties. For this and for other reasons, Davidson fails the aspired synthesis of a sufficiently strong physicalism and the autonomy of the mental; a project whose realization is anyhow hard to achieve

Die Macht des Sozialen : wie frei sind wir wirklich?

Rezension zu: Karl Otto Hondrich : Liebe in den Zeiten der Weltgesellschaft ; Suhrkamp Verlag, Edition Suhrkamp 2313, Frankfurt, 2004, ISBN 3-518-12313-0, 176 Seiten, 9 Euro

Concepts of Consciousness and Representation. Merits and Critiques of Higher and Same Order Monitoring Accounts in the Theories of the Mental

The concept of representation has been renewed in the philosophy of the mental since the 1990s epistemically. But there are no unified accounts and different concepts of representation and consciousness as well. Therefore, differentiated analysis is desirable to give some clarifications of “consciousness” and “representation”. In particular, the higher order monitoring and same order monitoring theories have their merits in the philosophy of the mental, but their basic concept of higher and same order mental states do not give an adequate account in the theory of the mental because the basic concept is not an intentional relationship of representation. Therefore, an outlook to an alternative turn is given as a tentative orientation.The concept of representation has been renewed in the philosophy of the mental since the 1990s epistemically. But there are no unified accounts and different concepts of representation and consciousness as well. Therefore, differentiated analysis is desirable to give some clarifications of “consciousness” and “representation”. In particular, the higher order monitoring and same order monitoring theories have their merits in the philosophy of the mental, but their basic concept of higher and same order mental states do not give an adequate account in the theory of the mental because the basic concept is not an intentional relationship of representation. Therefore, an outlook to an alternative turn is given as a tentative orientation

Cartesian Intuition. A Cleansed Cartesianism

For the contemporary philosophy of the mental, it is fruitful for us to return to Cartesian intuition and to attempt to present a “cleansed Cartesianism”, because the intuition takes effect in the fields of epistemology, semantic and linguistic internalism, externalism, and linguistics (Chomsky, Fodor). In this article, we present a series of six following sketches (1.-5.), leading towards a new correction of Cartesian internalism which we hope will cleanse and unleash a fresh outlook on Cartesianism because if we are to finally put aside pragmatism, we must realize that Cartesianism is in the offing when it comes to the lively scholarly discourse around the philosophy of the mind and related subjects: the feature of the subject’s point of view (1.); the dilemma of Cartesian knowledge (2.); a review of Cartesian reflection (3.); the ‘Kantian I’ (as well as Castañeda’s reinterpretation of it) (5.); the monadological foundation of subjectivity (7.); we conclude with a correction and outlook (7.). We find it of particular interest to connect what we call the ‘dilemma of Cartesian knowledge’ (2.) with “Fichte’s original insight” (4.), Reinhold’s “Elementary Philosophy”, and the “Early Romance ‘Constellation’ (6.) as rediscovered by Dieter Henrich and continued by Manfred Frank. The foundational subject here is the regress and circle as well as the problem of “philosophical deduction” in the philosophy of reflection, Elementary Philosophy, and German Idealism in general. Manfred Frank long connected this problem to contemporary philosophy of the mental (mind), as we describe in “The Early Romance Constellation” and “Fichte’s Original Insight” (6., 4.) The rebuilding of a Cartesian view hints that we might well promote the theme of pre-reflective consciousness—going back to Jean-Paul Sartre—within the new architecture of philosophy of the mental as a fundamental question.Neither in the rationalistic or the empiricist accounts of “modern philosophy” nor within the discourse around German Idealism has pre-reflective consciousness been recognized adequately. Looking back, the important matteris following: Within modern egology, the function of pre-reflective consciousness is covered by the I-axiom as the foundation of knowledge. We conclude with a correction of the Cartesian view, the limit of self-consciousness, and a brief treatment of current cooperations of the European and American philosophers exchange (7.)For the contemporary philosophy of the mental, it is fruitful for us to return to Cartesian intuition and to attempt to present a “cleansed Cartesianism”, because the intuition takes effect in the fields of epistemology, semantic and linguistic internalism, externalism, and linguistics (Chomsky, Fodor). In this article, we present a series of six following sketches (1.-5.), leading towards a new correction of Cartesian internalism which we hope will cleanse and unleash a fresh outlook on Cartesianism because if we are to finally put aside pragmatism, we must realize that Cartesianism is in the offing when it comes to the lively scholarly discourse around the philosophy of the mind and related subjects: the feature of the subject’s point of view (1.); the dilemma of Cartesian knowledge (2.); a review of Cartesian reflection (3.); the ‘Kantian I’ (as well as Castañeda’s reinterpretation of it) (5.); the monadological foundation of subjectivity (7.); we conclude with a correction and outlook (7.). We find it of particular interest to connect what we call the ‘dilemma of Cartesian knowledge’ (2.) with “Fichte’s original insight” (4.), Reinhold’s “Elementary Philosophy”, and the “Early Romance ‘Constellation’ (6.) as rediscovered by Dieter Henrich and continued by Manfred Frank. The foundational subject here is the regress and circle as well as the problem of “philosophical deduction” in the philosophy of reflection, Elementary Philosophy, and German Idealism in general. Manfred Frank long connected this problem to contemporary philosophy of the mental (mind), as we describe in “The Early Romance Constellation” and “Fichte’s Original Insight” (6., 4.) The rebuilding of a Cartesian view hints that we might well promote the theme of pre-reflective consciousness—going back to Jean-Paul Sartre—within the new architecture of philosophy of the mental as a fundamental question.Neither in the rationalistic or the empiricist accounts of “modern philosophy” nor within the discourse around German Idealism has pre-reflective consciousness been recognized adequately. Looking back, the important matteris following: Within modern egology, the function of pre-reflective consciousness is covered by the I-axiom as the foundation of knowledge. We conclude with a correction of the Cartesian view, the limit of self-consciousness, and a brief treatment of current cooperations of the European and American philosophers exchange (7.

Skandale und das Schattenreich der Inoffizialität : der Soziologe Karl Otto Hondrich zu Phänomenen der Gegenwartsgesellschaft

Rezensionen zu: Enthüllung und Entrüstung / Karl Otto Hondrich. - Frankfurt am Main : Suhrkamp Verl., 2002. - 166 S., ISBN 3-518-12270-3, 9 Euro. Der Neue Mensch / Karl Otto Hondrich. - Frankfurt am Main : Suhrkamp Verlag, 2001. - 222 S., ISBN 3-518-1227-8, 10 Euro. Wieder Krieg / Karl Otto Hondrich. - Frankfurt am Main : Suhrkamp Verlag, 2002. - 192 S., ISBN 3-518-12297-5, 9 Euro

Modern Music

Thesis (M.M.)--University of Kansas, Music, 1920. ; Includes bibliographical references

The perspective of multiple modernities on Shmuel N. Eisenstadt’s sociology

No abstractNo abstrac