Leolani: a reference machine with a theory of mind for social communication

Our state of mind is based on experiences and what other people tell us. This may result in conflicting information, uncertainty, and alternative facts. We present a robot that models relativity of knowledge and perception within social interaction following principles of the theory of mind. We utilized vision and speech capabilities on a Pepper robot to build an interaction model that stores the interpretations of perceptions and conversations in combination with provenance on its sources. The robot learns directly from what people tell it, possibly in relation to its perception. We demonstrate how the robot's communication is driven by hunger to acquire more knowledge from and on people and objects, to resolve uncertainties and conflicts, and to share awareness of the per- ceived environment. Likewise, the robot can make reference to the world and its knowledge about the world and the encounters with people that yielded this knowledge.Comment: Invited keynote at 21st International Conference on Text, Speech and Dialogue, https://www.tsdconference.org/tsd2018

Game theory of mind

This paper introduces a model of ‘theory of mind’, namely, how we represent the intentions and goals of others to optimise our mutual interactions. We draw on ideas from optimum control and game theory to provide a ‘game theory of mind’. First, we consider the representations of goals in terms of value functions that are prescribed by utility or rewards. Critically, the joint value functions and ensuing behaviour are optimised recursively, under the assumption that I represent your value function, your representation of mine, your representation of my representation of yours, and so on ad infinitum. However, if we assume that the degree of recursion is bounded, then players need to estimate the opponent's degree of recursion (i.e., sophistication) to respond optimally. This induces a problem of inferring the opponent's sophistication, given behavioural exchanges. We show it is possible to deduce whether players make inferences about each other and quantify their sophistication on the basis of choices in sequential games. This rests on comparing generative models of choices with, and without, inference. Model comparison is demonstrated using simulated and real data from a ‘stag-hunt’. Finally, we note that exactly the same sophisticated behaviour can be achieved by optimising the utility function itself (through prosocial utility), producing unsophisticated but apparently altruistic agents. This may be relevant ethologically in hierarchal game theory and coevolution

Research Chimpanzees May Get a Break

A recent report by the Institute of Medicine leaves few urgent reasons standing for the continued use of chimpanzees in biomedical research. It is high time to think about their retirement, Frans de Waal argues, without neglecting prospects for non-invasive research on behavior, cognition, and genetics

Theory of mind in animals : current and future directions

C.K. was supported by European Commission Marie Skłodowska‐Curie fellowship MENTALIZINGORIGINS and J.C. by European Research Council Synergy grant 609819 SOMICS.Theory of mind (ToM; a.k.a., mind-reading, mentalizing, mental-state attribution, and perspective-taking) is the ability to ascribe mental states, such as desires and beliefs, to others, and it is central to the unique forms of communication, cooperation, and culture that define our species. As a result, for 40 years, researchers have endeavored to determine whether ToM is itself unique to humans. Investigations in other species (e.g., apes, monkeys, corvids) are essential to understand the mechanistic underpinnings and evolutionary origins of this capacity across taxa, including humans. We review the literature on ToM in nonhuman animals, suggesting that some species share foundational social cognitive mechanisms with humans. We focus principally on innovations of the last decade and pressing directions for future work. Underexplored types of social cognition have been targeted, including ascription of mental states, such as desires and beliefs, that require simultaneously representing one's own and another's conflicting motives or views of the world. Ongoing efforts probe the motivational facets of ToM, how flexibly animals can recruit social cognitive skills across cooperative and competitive settings, and appropriate motivational contexts for comparative inquiry. Finally, novel methodological and empirical approaches have brought new species (e.g., lemurs, dogs) into the lab, implemented critical controls to elucidate underlying mechanisms, and contributed powerful new techniques (e.g., looking-time, eye-tracking) that open the door to unexplored approaches for studying animal minds. These innovations in cognition, motivation, and method promise fruitful progress in the years to come, in understanding the nature and origin of ToM in humans and other species.PostprintPeer reviewe

Do adults with high functioning autism or Asperger Syndrome differ in empathy and emotion recognition?

The present study examined whether adults with high functioning autism (HFA) showed greater difficulties in (i) their self-reported ability to empathise with others and/or (ii) their ability to read mental states in others’ eyes than adults with Asperger syndrome (AS). The Empathy Quotient (EQ) and ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ Test (Eyes Test) were compared in 43 adults with AS and 43 adults with HFA. No significant difference was observed on EQ score between groups, while adults with AS performed significantly better on the Eyes Test than those with HFA. This suggests that adults with HFA may need more support, particularly in mentalizing and complex emotion recognition, and raises questions about the existence of subgroups within autism spectrum conditions

On deflationary accounts of human action understanding

A common deflationary tendency has emerged recently in both philosophical accounts and comparative animal studies concerned with how subjects understand the actions of others. The suggestion emerging from both arenas is that the default mechanism for understanding action involves only a sensitivity to the observable, behavioural (non-mental) features of a situation. This kind of ‘smart behaviour reading’ thus suggests that, typically, predicting or explaining the behaviour of conspecifics does not require seeing the other through the lens of mental state attribution. This paper aims to explore and assess this deflationary move. In §1 I clarify what might be involved in a smart behaviour reading account via looking at some concrete examples. Then in §2 I critically assess the deflationary move, arguing that, at least in the human case, it would in fact be a mistake to assume that our default method of action understanding proceeds without appeal to mental state attribution. Finally in §3 I consider briefly how the positive view proposed here relates to discussions about standard two-system models of cognition

Chemokine receptor CCR2 is expressed by human multiple myeloma cells and mediates migration to bone marrow stromal cell-produced monocyte chemotactic proteins MCP-1, -2 and -3

The restricted bone marrow (BM) localisation of multiple myeloma (MM) cells most likely results from a specific homing influenced by chemotactic factors, combined with the proper signals for growth and survival provided by the BM microenvironment. In analogy to the migration and homing of normal lymphocytes, one can hypothesise that the BM homing of MM cells is mediated by a multistep process, involving the concerted action of adhesion molecules and chemokines. In this study, we report that primary MM cells and myeloma derived cell lines (Karpas, LP-1 and MM5.1) express the chemokine receptor CCR2. In addition, we found that the monocyte chemotactic proteins (MCPs) MCP-1, -2 and -3, three chemokines acting as prominent ligands for CCR2, are produced by stromal cells, cultured from normal and MM BM samples. Conditioned medium (CM) from BM stromal cells, as well as MCP-1, -2 and -3, act as chemoattractants for human MM cells. Moreover, a blocking antibody against CCR2, as well as a combination of neutralizing antibodies against MCP-1, -2 and -3, significantly reduced the migration of human MM cells to BM stromal cell CM. The results obtained in this study indicate the involvement of CCR2 and the MCPs in the BM homing of human MM cells. (C) 2003 Cancer Research UK

Forty years on: Uta Frith's contribution to research on autism and dyslexia, 1966–2006

Uta Frith has made a major contribution to our understanding of developmental disorders, especially autism and dyslexia. She has studied the cognitive and neurobiological bases of both disorders and demonstrated distinctive impairments in social cognition and central coherence in autism, and in phonological processing in dyslexia. In this enterprise she has encouraged psychologists to work in a theoretical framework that distinguishes between observed behaviour and the underlying cognitive and neurobiological processes that mediate that behaviour

Working Together May Be Better: Activation of Reward Centers during a Cooperative Maze Task

Humans use theory of mind when predicting the thoughts and feelings and actions of others. There is accumulating evidence that cooperation with a computerized game correlates with a unique pattern of brain activation. To investigate the neural correlates of cooperation in real-time we conducted an fMRI hyperscanning study. We hypothesized that real-time cooperation to complete a maze task, using a blind-driving paradigm, would activate substrates implicated in theory of mind. We also hypothesized that cooperation would activate neural reward centers more than when participants completed the maze themselves. Of interest and in support of our hypothesis we found left caudate and putamen activation when participants worked together to complete the maze. This suggests that cooperation during task completion is inherently rewarding. This finding represents one of the first discoveries of a proximate neural mechanism for group based interactions in real-time, which indirectly supports the social brain hypothesis