Some meta-theorical questions about observation of legal phenomenon: a brief comparison between methodological legal positivism and neoconstitutionalism

El constitucionalismo que se ha difundido en Europa tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial, desde su comienzo, ha representado una explícita negación del anterior sistema jurídico , así como de su más consistente apoyo teórico, el positivismo jurídico, habiendo renovado, más o menos explícitamente, alguna de las más importantes dimensiones de un cierto iusnaturalismo, laico y racionalista. Ha venido a menos, principalmente, la idea por la cual el universo jurídico constituiría un ente cerrado y autorreferencial, en el que las normas se justifican y se legitiman de acuerdo con parámetros pertenecientes al mismo sistema jurídico. La teoría neoconstitucionalista, de modo particular en la interpretación que de ella ofrece Ronald Dworkin, se ha erigido en intérprete de estas exigencias, desarrollando un nuevo concepto de derecho capaz de dar cuenta también del componente moral incluido en los sistemas jurídicos constitucionalizados. En el presente artículo se ensaya una contraste entre dos diferentes modelos, limitando no obstante el análisis exclusivamente al ámbito del método, es decir a algunas cuestiones metateóricas relativas al punto de observación del fenómeno jurídico.Constitutionalism, that spreaded through out Europe after the Second World War, has meant, since its beginning, a explicit denial of the former legal System and its more sound theoretical basis, legal positivism, renewing –more or less explicitly– some of the most important dimensions of a certain kind of secular and rationalist iusnaturalism. The idea that legal universe is a closed and selfreferential entity where rules are justified and get their legitimacy in accordance with parameters belonging to the legal system itself. The neoconstitutionalist theory, specially the interpretation that Ronald Dworking offers of it, has turned into interpreter of these requirements, developing a new concept of law able to explain the moral component included in the constitutionalized legal systems. In this article, a contrast between these two different models is essayed, though limited to the methodological field, that is to say, to some meta-theorical questions about the point of observation of legal phenomenon

The principle of equality between resources, welfare and opportunities: theoretical projects and political demands

El presente escrito pretende ofrecer una definición de igualdad política. A tal fin, se intentará responder a tres preguntas fundamentales, distintas pero fuertemente interconectadas: la primera es la relativa a la diferencia entre igualdad política e igualdad matemática. Responder a dicha cuestión significa constatar el carácter flexible y cambiante del concepto de igualdad. La segunda se refiere a la relación entre igualdad y desigualdad, y por tanto implica la cuestión de la extensión del status de “iguales”. La tercera está referida, en fin, a la relación entre la igualdad y su objeto, es decir lo que “debe” ser considerado en concreto igual mediante la acción política. El objetivo del escrito es el de demostrar que las más importantes soluciones avanzadas por la elaboración filosófica contemporánea son a lo más parciales y reductivas; y que sólo modelo teóricos atentos a las exigencias prácticas, principalmente económicas, pueden pensar en influir sobre la actividad político-institucional.This paper aims to provide a definition of political equality. To this end, we will try to answer three fundamental questions, strongly interconnected: the first one is related to the difference between mathematical equality and political equality. The second concerns the relationship between equality and inequality, and therefore raises the question of the extension of the status of “equal”. The third refers, finally, to the relationship between equality and its object, ie. What “should” be made equal through the political action. The aim of the article is to show that the most important solutions proposed by contemporary political philosophy are at most partial and reductive; and that just a theoretical model, carefull to the practical demands, mainly economic, could influence the thinking and the action of political and institutional structure

La religione atea di Dworkin e la divinizzazione del valore

SOMMARIO: 1. Ateismo religioso e valori - 2. Ateismo moderato, neo-ateismo e ateismo religioso - 3. Alcune considerazioni su indipendenza e inevitabilità dei valori - 4. Conclusioni. Dworkin’s Atheistic Religion and the Divinization of Value ABSTRACT: This essay critically discusses some of the central ideas of Ronald Dworkin’s last book, Religion Without God. In particular, it will be argued that the idea of “religion without God” is not a form of atheism, as Dworkin claims, but a pure religious attitude in which the idea of “theistic entity” of traditional religion is replaced by a new and not less problematic entity, the idea of “value”

La definizione giuridica di genocidio e il problema dei punti di osservazione: alcune considerazioni in merito a una proposta di David Luban

Il contributo, non sottoposto a valutazione, riproduce, con l’aggiunta delle note, il testo della Relazione al Convegno di Studi, Ratio Juris Seminar, Genocide and Human Dignity. Hannah Arendt’s Moral Ontology (4 giugno 2014, Università degli Studi “Magna Graecia“ di Catanzaro, Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche, Storiche, Economiche e Sociali).SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa – 2. Breve analisi del problema dei punti di osservazione nell’attività conoscitiva 3. I punti di osservazione e l’“evento genocidio” – 4. Conclusione: il punto di osservazione giuridico.The Legal Definition of Genocide and the Problem of the Observation Points: Some Considerations about  David Luban’s PerspectiveABSTRACT: This brief paper concerns with the question of the legal definition ofgenocide, ie, and in more practical terms, with the problem about the opportunity of modifying “The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” adopted by United Nations General Assembly in 1951, which is still today the standard legal definition of genocide. What I propose here, is to join and support the conclusions expressed by Professor Luban the 2006 article Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name, but following a different line of argumentation.To this end, I intend to divide the paper in two parts:1) in the first one I will carry out some general considerations about the problem ofknowledge, as a matter of definition. And in particular I will try to offer some guidance on the complex issue of the “observation points”, such as central elements of the activity of knowing and defining a particular object of knowledge. 2) In the second part I will try toapply these results to the question of “genocide” as a possible object of knowledge anddefinition

Patric Devlin y el populismo penal contemporáneo

In 1954 the British Government, after centuries in which its criminal law had repressed a multitude of behaviors considered immoral and inappropriate in British society, primarily homosexuality, decided to initiate a public debate to evaluate its possible decriminalization. For this, a special commission was delegated, whose report was the antecedent of one of the most famous juridical-philosophical debates of the last century, the one between Patrick Devlin and Herbert Hart, which, based on the question of the decriminalization of the crime of homosexuality , was aimed at the role and function of criminal law in general and, in particular, the opportunity of criminal law to impose the dominant social morality. In other words, the two jurists questioned themselves about the rationale behind criminal criminalization, wondering, among other things, whether they should serve the moral authorities of the social majority or, on the contrary, in line with what sustained by nineteenth-century liberal thought, they were autonomous from them and entirely internal to a more strictly legal dimension.En 1954 el Gobierno británico, tras siglos en el que su derecho penal había reprimido multitud de comportamientos considerados inmorales e impropios de la sociedad británica, in primis la homosexualidad, decidió iniciar un debate público para evaluar su posible despenalización. Para ello se delegó en una comisión especial, cuyo informe fue el antecedente de uno de los debates jurídico-filosóficos más famosos del siglo pasado, el mantenido entre Patrick Devlin y Herbert Hart, que, partiendo de la cuestión de la despenalización del delito de homosexualidad, tuvo como objeto el papel y la función del derecho penal en general y, en particular, la oportunidad del derecho penal para imponer la moral social dominante. En otras palabras, los dos juristas se cuestionaron sobre las lógicas que estaban en la base de la criminalización penal, preguntándose, entre otras cosas, si debían servir a las instancias morales de la mayoría social o, si por el contrario, en línea con lo sostenido por el pensamiento liberal decimonónico, eran autónomas respecto a ellas y enteramente internas a una dimensión más estrictamente jurídica

Surgical and survival outcomes with perioperative or neoadjuvant immune-checkpoint inhibitors combined with platinum-based chemotherapy in resectable NSCLC: A systematic review and meta-analysis of randomised clinical trials

: The use of neoadjuvant or perioperative anti-PD(L)1 was recently tested in multiple clinical trials. We performed a systematic review and meta-analysis of randomised trials comparing neoadjuvant or perioperative chemoimmunotherapy to neoadjuvant chemotherapy in resectable NSCLC. Nine reports from 6 studies were included. Receipt of surgery was more frequent in the experimental arm (odds ratio, OR 1.39) as was pCR (OR 7.60). EFS was improved in the experimental arm (hazard ratio, HR 0.55) regardless of stage, histology, PD-L1 expression (PD-L1 negative, HR 0.74) and smoking exposure (never smokers, HR 0.67), as was OS (HR 0.67). Grade > = 3 treatment-related adverse events were more frequent in the experimental arm (OR 1.22). The experimental treatment improved surgical outcomes, pCR rates, EFS and OS in stage II-IIIB, EGFR/ALK negative resectable NSCLC; confirmatory evidence is warranted for stage IIIB tumours and with higher maturity of the OS endpoint

Patrick Devlin e il populismo penale contemporaneo

Resumen en inglésNell’articolo l’Autore s’interroga sulla complessa questione della funzione e del significato che il diritto penale deve assumere all’interno dei sistemi costituzionali, chiedendosi, innanzitutto, se sia compito delle sue norme imporre la morale dominante nel gruppo sociale oppure se esse debbano mantenere un netto distacco rispetto a quella morale e agli umori della maggioranza sociale. A tal fine vengono analizzati due importanti dibattiti filosofici, quello ottocentesco tra John Stuart Mill e James Fitzjames Stephens e quello della metà del Novecento tra Patrick Devlin e H.L.A. Hart. Ciò consentirà di mettere in evidenza un chiaro legame tra il moralismo giuridico sostenuto in epoche diverse dai conservatori Stephens e Devlin ed il populismo penale dei nostri giorni, tentando, al contempo, di mettere in evidenza alcune specifiche peculiarità di quest’ultimo rispetto ai populismi del passato

Transizione ecologica: tutela dell’ambiente o promozione del mercato? L’insostenibilità dell’economia sostenibile

The present paper is based on the idea that the only serious way to deal with the environmental crisis requires a paradigm shift, first of all ontological, through which human beings can restore in a healthy and intelligent way the relationships with the natural world, increasingly corrupt and “polluted” by sinister logics of exploitation and profit. Superimposing on the erroneous perception that human beings have of themselves and of natural dimension impromptu decisions aimed at ecological transition sounds more like a “greenwashing” operation than as a serious attempt to “ecologize” law and the economy in a profound way