Una carta de Pompeu Fabra a Carles Pi i Sunyer /

Publicació d'una carta de Pompeu Fabra al conseller de Cultura del darrer govern de la Generalitat, Carles Pi i Sunyer, escrita a Bescanó el 25 de gener de 1939, la vigília de l'ocupació de Barcelona: el filòleg informa de les persones refugiades a Bescanó i Girona, a punt per creuar la frontera cap a França

A Retail Benchmarking Approach to Efficient Two-Way Access Pricing: Termination-Based Price Discrimination with Elastic Subscription Demand

We study how access pricing affects network competition when consumers' subscription demand is elastic and networks compete with non-linear prices and can use termination-based price discrimination. In the case of a fixed per minute termination charge, our model generalizes the results of Gans and King (2001), Dessein (2003) and Calzada and Valletti (2008). We show that a reduction of the termination charge below cost has two opposing effects: it softens competition and it helps to internalize network externalities. The former reduces consumer surplus while the latter increases it. Firms always prefer termination charge below cost, either to soften competition or to internalize the network effect. The regulator will favor termination below cost only when this boosts market penetration. Next, we consider the retail benchmarking approach (Jeon and Hurkens, 2008) that determines termination charges as a function of retail prices and show that this approach allows the regulator to increase subscription without distorting call volumes. Furthermore, we show that an informed regulator can even implement the first-best outcome by using this approach

A Retail Benchmarking Approach to Efficient Two-Way Access Pricing: Termination-Based Price Discrimination with Elastic Subscription Demand

We study how access pricing affects network competition when consumers' subscription demand is elastic and networks compete with non-linear prices and can use termination-based price discrimination. In the case of a fixed per minute termination charge, our model generalizes the results of Gans and King (2001), Dessein (2003) and Calzada and Valletti (2008). We show that a reduction of the termination charge below cost has two opposing effects: it softens competition and it helps to internalize network externalities. The former reduces consumer surplus while the latter increases it. Firms always prefer termination charge below cost, either to soften competition or to internalize the network effect. The regulator will favor termination below cost only when this boosts market penetration. Next, we consider the retail benchmarking approach (Jeon and Hurkens, 2008) that determines termination charges as a function of retail prices and show that this approach allows the regulator to increase subscription without distorting call volumes. Furthermore, we show that an informed regulator can even implement the first-best outcome by using this approach

Word of Mouth and Taste Matching: A Theory of the Long Tail

I present a model to assess the impact of demand-side factors on the concentration of sales within large product assortments. Consumers face a search problem within an assortment of horizontally differentiated products supplied by a monopolist. They may search for a product match by drawing products from the assortment or by seeking word of mouth recommendations from other consumers. Product evaluations prior to purchase and word of mouth are shown to arise endogenously, and increase the concentration of sales. I show that taste matching mechanisms such as recommender systems, which allow consumers to obtain product recommendations from others with similar preferences, reduce sales concentration by generating a long tail effect, an increase in the tail of the sales distribution. Insights are derived on the mechanisms driving concentration in artistic markets and their strategic implications for the firm. The model is suited for experience good markets such as music, cinema, literature and video game entertainment

An alternative analysis of variance

The one-way analysis of variance is a staple of elementary statistics courses. The hypothesis test of homogeneity of the means encourages the use of the selected-model based estimators which are usually assessed without any regard for the uncertainty about the outcome of the test. We expose the weaknesses of such estimators when the uncertainty is taken into account, as it should be, and propose synthetic estimators as an alternative

¡Mezquita no! : the origins of mosque opposition in Spain

This paper examines why mosque opposition has been more frequent in Catalonia than in other Spanish regions. A comparison is conducted between the metropolitan areas of Barcelona, where opposition has been most prevalent, and Madrid, where it has been strikingly absent. A relational approach is employed to highlight the factors in Barcelona that have complicated the reception of mosques and the populations they serve. These factors include pronounced socio-spatial divisions and a lack of confidence in the state's commitment to managing the challenges that accompany immigration. The prevalence of these factors in Barcelona has resulted in the integration of mosque debates into more general struggles over urban privilege and state recognition, explaining the high degree of opposition. These findings highlight the importance of studying conflicts related to religious and cultural diversification in context, as such conflicts are inextricably linked to the lived spaces and local structures in which they develop

Platform Competition, Compatibility, and Social Efficiency

In their seminal 1985 paper, Katz and Shapiro study systems compatibility in settings with one-sided platforms and direct network externalities. We consider systems compatibility when competing platforms are two-sided and there are indirect network externalities to develop an explanation why markets with two-sided platforms are often characterized by incompatibility with one dominant player who may subsidize access to one side of the market. Specifically, we model competitive interaction between two providers of horizontally differentiated platforms that act as intermediaries between developers of platform-based products (applications) and users of such products. We find that the unique equilibrium under platform compatibility leads to higher profits than the symmetric equilibrium under incompatibility. Notwithstanding, incompatibility naturally gives rise to asymmetric equilibria with a dominant platform that captures all users and earns more than under compatibility. Our model allows a detailed analysis of social efficiency. We find that entry by developers is socially excessive (insufficient) if competing platforms are compatible (incompatible) and that incompatibility generates larger total welfare than compatibility when horizontal differences between platforms are small

A Retail Benchmarking Approach to Efficient Two-way Access Pricing: Two-Part Tariffs

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering fixed access charges as in the existing literature, we study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to network j as a linear function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. In the case of competition in two-part tariffs, we consider a class of access pricing rules, similar to the optimal one under competition in linear prices, derived by Jeon (2005), but based on average retail prices. We show that firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost under the class of rules. Therefore, the regulator can choose one among the rules to pursue additional objectives such as consumer surplus, network coverage or investment: in particular, we show that the regulator can achieve static and dynamic e±ciency at the same time

Bundling and Competition for Slots

We study competition among upstream firms when each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products and the downstream has a limited number of slots (or shelf space). In this situation, we study how bundling a¤ects competition for slots. When the downstream has k number of slots, social e¢ ciency requires that it purchases the best k products among all upstream firms' products. We find that under bundling, the outcome is always socially efficient but under individual sale, the outcome is not necessarily efficient. Under individual sale, each upstream firm faces a trade-off between quantity and rent extraction due to the coexistence of the internal competition (i.e. competition among its own products) and the external competition (i.e. competition from other firms' products), which can create inefficiency. On the contrary, bundling removes the internal competition and the external competition among bundles makes it optimal for each upstream firm to sell only the products belonging to the best k. This unambiguous welfare-enhancing e¤ect of bundling is novel