Bidding with outside options

We introduce and experimentally test an auction model that allows for outside options of bidders as substitutes for the auctioned object under the private values assumption. Theoretically and in the experiments, bidders respond to their individual outside options and to variations of common knowledge about competitors outside options. Interestingly, private outside options induce concave equilibrium bidding functions with uniformly distributed valuations. The bidding data does support this property. As theoretically predicted, lower-valued outside options lead individuals to bid more aggressively in the experiments

Outside options: another reason to choose the first-price auction

Pre-print draft dated October 2005. Final version published by Elsevier; available online at http://www.sciencedirect.com/In this paper we study equilibrium and experimental bidding behaviour in first-price and second-price auctions with outside options. We find that bidders do respond to outside options and to variations of common knowledge about competitors’ outside options. However, overbidding in first-price auctions is significantly higher with outside options than without. First-price auctions yield more revenue than second-price auctions. This revenue-premium is significantly higher with outside options. In second-price auctions the introduction of outside options has only a small effect

The Tobit model with feedback and random effects: A Monte-Carlo study

We study a random effects censored regression model in the context of repeated games. Introducing a feedback variable into the model leads to violation of the strict exogeneity assumption, thus rendering the random effects estimator inconsistent. Using the example of contributions to a public good, we investigate the size of this bias in a Monte-Carlo study. We find that the magnitude of the bias is around one per cent when initial values and individual effects are correlated. The rate of censoring, as well as the size of the groups in which subjects interact, both have an effect on the magnitude of the bias. The coefficients of strictly exogenous, continuous regressors remain unaffected by the endogeneity bias. The size of the endogeneity bias in our model is very small compared to the size of the heterogeneity bias, which occurs when individual heterogeneity is not accounted for in estimation of nonlinear models.Monte-Carlo, Simulation, Random Effects, Censored Regression Model, Public Goods, Heterogeneity, Endogeneity

Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction

In this paper we derive equilibrium bidding functions for first-price and second-price auctions with private values when bidders have outside options. We then study bidding behaviour with the help of experiments. We find that bidders respond to outside options and to variations of common knowledge about competitors\u27 outside options, though bidders in first-price auctions show more overbidding with outside options than without. In second-price auctions overbidding is not affected by outside options. As expected first-price auctions yield more revenue than second-price auctions. This revenue-premium is higher in the presence of outside options

Bidding with Outside Options

We introduce and experimentally test an auction model that allows for outside options of bidders as substitutes for the auctioned object under the private values assumption. Theoretically and in the experiments, bidders respond to their individual outside options and to variations of common knowledge about competitors\u27 outside options. Interestingly, private outside options induce concave equilibrium bidding functions with uniformly distributed valuations. The bidding data does support this property. As theoretically predicted, lower-valued outside options lead individuals to bid more aggressively in the experiments