BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND CYBER CRIME

This article deals with the problem of cybercrime. The main objective of this piece is to present a proposal of possible solutions to software piracy. To solve the problem, knowledge from the field of behavioral economics will be used, which will be presented in the second chapter of the article. The authors identify the causes of computer piracy and have subsequently concluded that in order to curb piracy, it is key that producers respect the social contract between them and the customers and that they act upon customer´s moral consciousness, instead of threatening punishment

BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND CYBER CRIME

This article deals with the problem of cybercrime. The main objective of this piece is to present a proposal of possible solutions to software piracy. To solve the problem, knowledge from the field of behavioral economics will be used, which will be presented in the second chapter of the article. The authors identify the causes of computer piracy and have subsequently concluded that in order to curb piracy, it is key that producers respect the social contract between them and the customers and that they act upon customer´s moral consciousness, instead of threatening punishment

Intensity and extensity of firm development and dynamic Dupont analysis

The paper introduces two types of indicators that can extend financial (ratio) analysis. The first ones are dynamic intensity and extensity parameter that show if a firm develop in intensively or extensively and count impact of intensive and extensive factors. The second type contains indicators extending DuPont analysis about counting how the change of Profit Margin, Total Assets Turnover and Leverage Factor affects change Return on Equity. Both types of indicators concentrate on firm development and they are able indicate whether a firm develop in the right direction. They can be easily count using basic firm data founding in balance sheet, profit and loss statement or cash flow statement.peer-reviewe

Economic paradigms and economic communications

The development of modern economic theory is influenced by various factors of the external and internal environment. The factors of the external environment include: changes in the practice of economic entities, global economy, in the institutional environment, technological changes. The factors of the internal environment include: changes in the field of scientific knowledge in general, as well as changes in the methodology of economic science itself. The main driving force behind the development of economic theory is the evolution of economic paradigms, which has an impact on the methodological choice of researchers, their scientific worldview. An important component of human economic activity are economic communications, the essence and content of which have not been yet sufficiently studied from a theoretical point of view. Since economic communications are closely related to the behavior of economic agents, which affects, in turn, the results of economic activity, their study is an urgent task. The subject of research in the article is the relationship of economic paradigms and ideas about the essence of economic communication. The purpose of the article is to study the influence of the evolution of economic paradigms on the development of scientific ideas about economic communication. The authors have applies following research methods in the scientific paper: the method of rational reconstruction of science, the method of comparative analysis, the method of scientific abstraction and others. The relationship between the evolution of economic paradigms, theories of behavior of economic agents and the understanding of the role of economic communications in economic activity have been revealed. The authors investigated economic communications in the context of the theory of full, limited, procedural rationality, organic irrationality, as well as in the context of the theory of productive consumption. The main scientific results consist in identifying features in the understanding of the essence of economic communications from the point of view of various theories. The results obtained are the basis for the study of the systemic and humanistic foundations of economic communications, as well as the development of recommendations for improving economic communications

Creation and Violation of Institutional Equilibrium in Redistribution Systems

Institutional economics is one of the most developing fields of economics. However, many its issues still need to be solved. For instance the theory does not give exact answer to why particular institutions (formal and informal norms) occur, change and cease to exist. The paper tries to solve the topic through the model of establishing and disrupting institutional equilibrium in redistribution systems. People live their whole lives in redistribution systems and they can be members of a winning coalition and receive some redistribution or they are out of coalition and the redistribution is made to their detriment. The members of a winning coalition are not, however, automatically guaranteed ongoing membership. So they have interest to establish a structure of institutions (institutional equilibrium) helping them to protect their position. The paper divides redistribution into two kinds: necessary and unnecessary redistribution. The process of creating a winning coalition in a redistribution system is described and it is shown how institutions help to facilitate the process. Then the paper defines the institutional equilibrium (IEQ) and its conditions. They are explained the connections between IEQ and redistribution systems, the conditions when is convenient for some players endeavour to create a equilibrium, the reasons why IEQ does not occur. The theory of institutional change is hereto used - if somebody endeavours to create a IEQ, (s)he also realizes a institutional change.redistribution systems, institutions, institutional equilibrium, institutional change, game theory, desirable and undesirable redistribution, coalition

Institutional equilibrium in redistribution systems

The topic of this thesis is institutional equilibrium, its formation and disruption in human systems. The thesis analyses what is common to the most human systems and concludes that it is some kind of redistribution. That is reason for the thesis title "Institutional equilibrium in redistribution systems". As the term institutional equilibrium comes from institutional economics, the thesis begins with characteristic institutional economy and its differences form mainstream economy, defines the term institution and methodological institutionalism and explains the reasons of institution evolution. Then, the problematic of redistribution is analyzed. The thesis brings a general model of a redistribution system and describes a coalition forming in it. The thesis concludes that such a process must be facilitated and regulated by institutions and that institutions define the negotiation strength of the players and stabilize their position. In a fourth chapter, the term of institutional equilibrium is defined and its preconditions and consequences are described. Factors preventing the redistribution system from reaching the equilibrium are shown. The analysis of institutional equilibrium formation follows; the open and closed systems are addressed separately, with the emphasis being put on open systems. In open systems, the creative destruction process in ever-present, disrupting the institutional equilibrium. Therefore, a question is posed: may there be such a structure of institutions which will stay unchanged despite the ongoing exogenous changes? Or, more precisely, the change of which will not be in the interest of the players? The thesis finds that the preconditions for institutions system facilitating the institutional equilibrium are investments into skills of the players and the open access into the system. The thesis also shows that such preconditions help to reduce undesirable redistribution. The fifth chapter analyses parallel redistribution games as one of the specific way of disturbing institutional equilibrium. The parallel redistribution games have secret character; their players do not want the other players to know about their game, because their game breaches the norms of the majority of players. The parallel redistribution games may be characterized as a form of opportunistic behavior. The thesis investigates the causes of these games, the reasons why they remain uncovered and the strategies of their players. Eventually, the conditions under which the parallel games may be reduced are formulated. The institutions must fulfill these conditions as well. In the end, the institutions structure capable of introducing the redistribution system into the institutional equilibrium state is defined

Developing Intercultural Efficiency: The Relationship between Cultural Intelligence and Self-Efficacy

Cultural intelligence measures an individual’s ability to succeed in a culturally unknown environment. Self-efficacy expresses self-confidence in one’s own ability to handle a situation. The two concepts are closely linked, as confirmed by a number of previous studies. Using the multivariate method PLS-SEM, the predictive effect of CQ on self-efficacy is investigated; compared to previous studies, the relationship causality is reversed. A sample of 190 university students was also tested for how this relationship is moderated by two categorical variables: work experience abroad and gender. The results showed that cultural intelligence is a predictor of intercultural self-efficacy in communication. Its impact on the endogenous variable (self-efficacy) is rather weak, but significantly strengthened by work experience abroad. Gender has no effect on this relationship