322 research outputs found
Externalities and compensation: Primeval games and solutions
The classical literature [Pigou, A.C., 1920. The Economics of Welfare. Macmillan, London; Coase, R.H., 1960. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3, 1-44; Arrow, K., 1970. The organization of economic activity: issues pertinent to the choice of market versus non-market allocation. In: Haveman, R.H., Margolis, J. (Eds.), Public Expenditures and Policy Analysis. Markham, Chicago, pp. 59-73] and the relatively recent studies [cf. Varian, H.R., 1994. A solution to the problem of externalities when agents are well-informed. American Economic Review 84, 1278-1293] associate the externality problem with efficiency. This paper focuses explicitly on the compensation problem in the context of externalities. To capture the features of inter-individual externalities, this paper constructs a new game-theoretic framework: primeval games. These games are used to design normative compensation rules for the underlying compensation problems: the marginalistic rule, the concession rule, and the primeval rule. Characterizations of the marginalistic rule and the concession rule are provided and specific properties of the primeval rule are studied. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved
Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games
In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are considered. It turns out that the first domain restriction guarantees non-emptiness of the strong core and the second domain restriction ensures non-emptiness of the weak core of the corresponding hedonic games. Moreover, an element of the strong core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an element of the weak core under enemies aversion is NP-hard. We examine also the relationship between our domain restrictions and some sufficient conditions for non-emptiness of the core already known in the literature.coalition formation, core stability, hedonic games, priority
Convexity in stochastic cooperative situations
This paper introduces a new model concerning cooperative situations in which the payoffs are modeled by random variables. We analyze these situations by means of cooperative games with random payoffs. Special attention is paid to three types of convexity, namely coalitional-merge, individual-merge and marginal convexity. The relations between these types are studied and in particular, as opposed to their deterministic counterparts for TU games, we show that these three types of convexity are not equivalent. However, all types imply that the core of the game is nonempty. Sufficient conditions on the preferences are derived such that the Shapley value, defined as the average of the marginal vectors, is an element of the core of a convex game
Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games and Spillover Stability
This paper discusses minimum cost spanning tree games and argues that the standard approach of using a transferable utility game to come up with a fair allocation of the total costs has some flaws. A new model of spillover games is presented, in which each agent's decision whether or not to cooperate is properly taken into account.minimum cost spanning tree problems, transferable utility games, spillovers
Good and bad objects: the symmetric difference rule
We consider the problem of ranking sets of objects, the members of which are mutually compatible. Assuming that each object is either good or bad, we axiomatically characterize a cardinality-based rule which arises naturally in this dichotomous setting.
On the Unification of Centralized and Decentralized Clearing Mechanisms in Financial Networks
We analyze clearing mechanisms in financial networks in which agents may have both monetary individual assets and mutual liabilities. A clearing mechanism prescribes mutual payments between agents to settle their mutual liabilities. The corresponding payments, summarized in a payment matrix, are made in accordance with agent specific claims rules that stem from the vast literature on claims problems. We show that large classes of centralized and decentralized clearing mechanisms all prescribe the same payment matrix under the condition that the underlying claims rules satisfy composition; a property satisfied by the proportional rule that is often applied in insolvency proceedings. This payment matrix is the one that contains the minimal amount of payments required to clear the network. In fact, we show that composition guarantees unification of clearing mechanisms in which agents pay simultaneously and clearing mechanisms in which agents pay sequentially in any arbitrary order. Therefore, for a given financial network, each clearing mechanism gives rise to the same transfer allocation. Moreover, we provide an axiomatic characterization of the corresponding mutual claims rule on the basis of five axioms: scale invariance, equal treatment of equals, composition, path independence and consistency. This characterization extends the analogous characterization for claims rules as given by Moulin (2000)
Dynamic Stability of Cooperative Investment under Uncertainty
This article models the inherent cooperative and non-cooperative incentives of stakeholders in investment projects in a novel way by combining concepts from co operative game theory and real options theory. As stakeholders have outside options, in the sense that they may terminate negotiations with the current coalition and join another, we introduce and analyze a coalitional and dynamic stability concept. We show that investment projects, in which cooperation between stakeholders is necessary, are more prone to coalitional instability when there are insufficient synergies between the stakeholders. We characterize the proportional investment scheme as the investment scheme that maximizes the total project value and that results in the earliest investment timing. A failure to implement proportional investing leads to the formation of a smaller, less efficient, coalition. The vulnerability to fail is exacerbated in a market that is characterized by high profit growth and low profit uncertainty, or vice versa. Finally, we explicitly consider one-leader investment projects and characterize the prioritized investment scheme that maximizes the value of the leader. We show that the same market conditions govern the stability of the prioritized investment scheme, which contributes to the robustness of our results
Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games
In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are considered. It turns out that the first domain restriction guarantees non-emptiness of the strong core and the second domain restriction ensures non-emptiness of the weak core of the corresponding hedonic games. Moreover, an element of the strong core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an element of the weak core under enemies aversion is NP-hard. We examine also the relationship between our domain restrictions and some sufficient conditions for non-emptiness of the core already known in the literature.Additive separability, Coalition formation, Core stability, Hedonic games, NP-completeness, Priority
Egalitarianism in Nontransferable Utility Games
This paper studies egalitarianism in the context of nontransferable utility games by introducing and analyzing the egalitarian value. This new solution concept is based on an egalitarian negotiation procedure in which egalitarian opportunities of coalitions are explicitly taken into account. We formulate conditions under which it leads to a core element and discuss the egalitarian value for the well-known Roth-Shafer examples. Moreover, we characterize the new value on the class of bankruptcy games and bargaining games
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