Constraining the PG 1553+113 binary hypothesis: interpreting a new, 22-year period

PG 1553+113 is a well-known blazar exhibiting evidence of a $\sim\! 2.2$-year quasi-periodic oscillation in radio, optical, X-ray, and $\gamma$-ray bands. We present evidence of a new, longer oscillation of $21.8 \pm 4.7$ years in its historical optical light curve covering 100 years of observation. On its own, this $\sim\! 22$-year period has a statistical significance of $1.9\sigma$ when accounting for the look-elsewhere effect. However, the probability of both the $2.2$- and $22$-year periods arising from noise is $\sim0.02\%$ ($3.5\sigma$). The next peak of the 22-year oscillation should occur around July 2025. We find that the $\sim\,$10:1 relation between these two periods can arise in a plausible supermassive black hole binary model. Our interpretation of PG 1553+113's two periods suggests that the binary engine has a mass ratio $\gtrsim 0.2$, an eccentricity $\lesssim 0.1$, and accretes from a disk with characteristic aspect ratio $\sim 0.03$. The putative supermassive black hole binary radiates nHz gravitational waves, but the amplitude is $\sim10-100$ times too low for detection by foreseeable pulsar timing arrays.Comment: 18 pages, 13 figures, 1 tabl

Simulation of attacks for security in wireless sensor network

The increasing complexity and low-power constraints of current Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) require efficient methodologies for network simulation and embedded software performance analysis of nodes. In addition, security is also a very important feature that has to be addressed in most WSNs, since they may work with sensitive data and operate in hostile unattended environments. In this paper, a methodology for security analysis of Wireless Sensor Networks is presented. The methodology allows designing attack-aware embedded software/firmware or attack countermeasures to provide security in WSNs. The proposed methodology includes attacker modeling and attack simulation with performance analysis (node?s software execution time and power consumption estimation). After an analysis of different WSN attack types, an attacker model is proposed. This model defines three different types of attackers that can emulate most WSN attacks. In addition, this paper presents a virtual platform that is able to model the node hardware, embedded software and basic wireless channel features. This virtual simulation analyzes the embedded software behavior and node power consumption while it takes into account the network deployment and topology. Additionally, this simulator integrates the previously mentioned attacker model. Thus, the impact of attacks on power consumption and software behavior/execution-time can be analyzed. This provides developers with essential information about the effects that one or multiple attacks could have on the network, helping them to develop more secure WSN systems. This WSN attack simulator is an essential element of the attack-aware embedded software development methodology that is also introduced in this work.This work has been funded by the Spanish MICINN under the TEC2011-28666-C04-02 and TEC2014-58036-C4-3-R project

CONTREX: Design of embedded mixed-criticality CONTRol systems under consideration of EXtra-functional properties

The increasing processing power of today’s HW/SW platforms leads to the integration of more and more functions in a single device. Additional design challenges arise when these functions share computing resources and belong to different criticality levels. The paper presents the CONTREX European project and its preliminary results. CONTREX complements current activities in the area of predictable computing platforms and segregation mechanisms with techniques to consider the extra-functional properties, i.e., timing constraints, power, and temperature. CONTREX enables energy efficient and cost aware design through analysis and optimization of these properties with regard to application demands at different criticality levels