Epistemic Peer Disagreement

We offer a critical survey of the most discussed accounts of epistemic peer disagreement that are found in the recent literature. We also sketch an alternative approach in line with a pluralist understanding of epistemic rationality

Jurisdictional and Interstate Commerce Problems in the Imposition of Excess on Sales

I denne rapport argumenterer forfatterne for, at der i beskæftigelsespolitikken er behov for at flytte det strategiske fokus fra 'flexicurity' til 'mobication' ('mobility through education'), som indebærer, at man sætter kompetenceudvikling i centrum. Det er forfatternes vurdering, at 'flexicurity' fortsat udgør et vigtigt fundament for fleksibiliteten og sikkerheden for først og fremmest de ledige på arbejdsmarkedet, men at der er behov for en langt mere offensiv satsning på livslang uddannelse af hele arbejdsstyrken, hvis man skal sikre arbejdskraftens konkurrencedygtighed fremover. 'Mobication' sigter netop mod at styrke arbejdskraftens muligheder for at tilpasse sig og bevæge sig i forhold til de skiftende behov på et arbejdsmarked i en stadigt mere konkurrencepræget verdensøkonomi

Kampen om klimaet

Intet resum

Entitlement in mathematics

This first half of this thesis investigates the epistemological foundations of mathematical theories, with special attention devoted to two questions: (1) how can we have a warrant for the satisfiability and consistency of mathematical theories, and (2) given we conceive of mathematical judgement as objective - as being concerned with a realm of abstract entities - can we have a warrant for thinking that such a realm of entities exists? In Chapter 2, two kinds of mathematical scepticism are developed. The regress sceptic argues that we can have a warrant for accepting neither the satisfiability nor the consistency of a mathematical theory. The I-II-III sceptic maintains that there can be no warrant for thinking that a realm of abstract entities exists if mathematical judgement is conceived as being objective. The notions of entitlement of cognitive project and entitlement of substance - recently introduced into the literature by Crispin Wright - are invoked to respond to the mathematical regress and I-II-III sceptic. This is done in Chapters 3 and 4. The distinctive feature of an entitlement is its non-evidential nature. What is relevant is not the presence of positive evidence, but rather the absence of sufficient countervailing evidence. The second half of the thesis explores and develops certain aspects of this proposal. Chapter 5 develops the notion of entitlement of cognitive project by investigating two of its three defining clauses. Chapter 6 draws a picture of a wider philosophical framework of which entitlement can be regarded an integrated part. In so doing entitlement is discussed in light of the internalism/externalism distinction and the distinction between monism and pluralism about epistemic value. Chapter 7 tables two fundamental challenges to the entitlement proposal - firstly, whether entitlement is an epistemic notion of warrant at all, and secondly, whether the notion of rationality associated with it is epistemic in nature or of some other kind

Dynamical quantum phase transitions in a noisy lattice gauge theory

Lattice gauge theories (LGTs) form an intriguing class of theories highly relevant to both high-energy particle physics and low-energy condensed matter physics with the rapid development of engineered quantum devices providing new tools to study e.g. dynamics of such theories. The massive Schwinger model is known to exhibit intricate properties of more complicated theories and has recently been shown to undergo dynamical quantum phase transitions out of equilibrium. With current technology, noise is inevitable and potentially fatal for a successful quantum simulation. This paper studies the dynamics subject to noise of a $(1+1)$D U$(1)$ quantum link model following a quench of the sign of the mass term. We find that not only is the system capable of handling noise at rates realistic in NISQ-era devices, promising the possiblity to study the target dynamics with current technology, but the effect of noise can be understood in terms of simple models. Specifically the gauge-breaking nature of bit-flip channels results in exponential dampening of state amplitudes, and thus observables, which does not affect the structures of interest. This is especially important as it demonstrates that the gauge theory can be successfully studied with devices that only exhibit approximate gauge invariance.Comment: 12 pages, 8 figures. Changes: added reference

On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance

Pluralistic ignorance is a socio-psychological phenomenon that involves a systematic discrepancy between people’s private beliefs and public behavior in certain social contexts. Recently, pluralistic ignorance has gained increased attention in formal and social epistemology. But to get clear on what precisely a formal and social epistemological account of pluralistic ignorance should look like, we need answers to at least the following two questions: What exactly is the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance? And can the phenomenon arise among perfectly rational agents? In this paper, we propose answers to both these questions. First, we characterize different versions of pluralistic ignorance and define the version that we claim most adequately captures the examples cited as paradigmatic cases of pluralistic ignorance in the literature. In doing so, we will stress certain key epistemic and social interactive aspects of the phenomenon. Second, given our characterization of pluralistic ignorance, we argue that the phenomenon can indeed arise in groups of perfectly rational agents. This, in turn, ensures that the tools of formal epistemology can be fully utilized to reason about pluralistic ignoranc