John Higley's work an elite foundations of social theory and politics

"John Higley' s work traverses the boundaries of sociology, history and politics in the best tradition of classical social theory, and it has inspired countless scholars across Europe, North America, Australia and Asia. This inspiration has worked on three fronts: paradigmatic, theoretical and empirical. Higley and his colleagues revived the 'elite paradigm' focusing on top national power-holders, where elites are seen as the key social actors and agents of social and political change. An interest in elite theory was also stimulated by his work, especially with respect to the relationship between the key characteristics of national elites, such as their integration and consensus, and the nature (democratic or otherwise) of political regimes. This theoretical work inspired numerous critical analyses of elite transformations that precipitated the post-WWII 'halcyon years' of stability and growth in Europe and North America, the liberal-democratic transformations in post-communist Europe, as well as the recent turbulences: the financial crisis and a prolonged economic slowdown. The work of Higley and colleagues also continues to inspire a revival of macro-theoretical interests, especially in the European social theory, social-historical research, and theoretically informed political analysis." (author's abstract

The Weberian foundations of modern elite theory and democratic elitism

"Max Weber's portrayal of modern elftes shows clear proximity to 'classical elite theory,' modern 'elite perspective,' and 'democratic elitism.' This portrayal - stressing power concentration in the state apparata, legitimacy of rule, centrality of leadership groups, and the capacity of these groups to form cohesive power actors - anticipates many central themes in the work of contemporary elite theorists, such as John Higley, whose theoretical attention focuses on patterns of elite integration and ruling consensus as the key 'elite variables.' Higley's seminal studier, especially those linking such elite integration and ruling consensus with political outcomes and regime types, combine the classical elite-theoretical heritage with the Weberian 'supplements,' the latter stressing the variable internal structure of 'ruling minorities' that form in modern nation states. The Weberian elite perspective and theoretical model have been substantiated, elaborated and extended in research undertaken by John Higley and his collaborators." (author's abstract

Elite theory versus Marxism: the twentieth century's verdict (2000)

"Noting that Marxist and elite paradigms birthed competing theories on social and political change and that the differential development of these theories depends less on evidence than on ideological leanings, the epilogue to a collection of essays on postsocialist elites compares these paradigms in terms of their polarity in the 20th century. Although fading by the end of the 19th century, Marxism saw renewed vitality as it was embraced as a theoretical and ideological tool of radical and reforrnist leaders of the European Left. Elite theory's decline is attributed less to a lack of its plausibility than to a lack of Lies to organized political forces. However, Marxism's emergence as a major global intellectual and political movement had a concomitant destructive impact on its explanatory power. By the end of the 20th century, Marxist theory comprised many dissipating streams. The decline of elite theory is delineated, noting that its tenets remained intact despite its unpopularity among activists and intellectuals. The negative effect of fascism - i.e., the dubious notion that elite theory leads to fascism - is noted, along with the idea that a combination of socioeconomic and sociocultural factors further eclipsed elite theory's development and popularity. Latter-20th-century elite theory lacked urgency in discussions on Western democracies and non-Western developing countries. However, three trends led to the reinvigoration of elite theory: economic advances of Japan and the Asian tigers, state socialism in Eastern Europe, and the elite-driven Soviet collapse. Thus, political developments driving the revival of elite theory include the centrality of elite choices and actions guiding these changes; and the theoretical developments include the exhaustion of Marxist theory's credibility and the reformulation of elite-centered democratic theory. Five suppositions underlying the analyses of contributions are delineated." (author's abstract

Elite and leadership change in liberal democracies (2007)

"This article presents and assesses the thesis that a shift in the character of governing elites and leaders has been occurring in several important liberal democracies during recent years. Ascendant elites are more leonine and top leaders are more pugnacious. We attribute the shift to strong centripetal pressures that now impinge on elites and leaders, and we ask about the shift's consequences for the Operation of liberal democracies." (author's abstract

Elite power garnes and democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe (1999)

"Postcommunist elites play rational power games throughout East Central and Eastern Europe today. But their games differ according to the structure, behavioral codes, and informal orientations associated with the paths of elite change. Although democratic institutions and procedures are in place just about everywhere, the differing elite power games account for major differences in extra-electoral politics and, thus, for wide variations in the quality of postcommunist democracies. The extent of the particularisms - clientelism and patronage, blurred functional autonomies and boundaries, violations of horizontal accountabilities, manipulations of the media and judiciary, harassment of Opposition elites, personal vendettas, persecutions of minorities - define these power games, and they can be linked systematically to the patterns of elite unity, differentiation, and circulation. We view combinations of these patterns as constituting the critical elite conditions for different types of political regimes, including consolidated democracies." (author's abstract

Civic Identity in Australia

A typology of macro-social identities is suggested based on the strength of social attachments (strong vs. weak:) and the nature of the objects-referents of such attachments (society vs. nation). It yields three types of identity: civic, ethno-national, and denizen. This typology is then operationalized using national survey data (1995 ISSP). The analysis reveals two modal forms of identity in Australia (the denizen identity appears to be very rare). The largest proportion (38%) of Australians embrace civic identity, and this identity is most widespread among 'baby boomers', tertiary educated, and the secular. Ethno-nationalists form a sizable minority (30%), and they are predominantly older, less educated and religious people. The key issue dividing the adherents to civic and ethno-national identity is immigration and its socioeconomic consequences. The proportion of ethno-nationalists is likely to shrink in the process of generational replacement, educational revolution and progressive secularization

Pixel behaviour metrics for dynamic background modelling with the projected difference pattern method

US

Sexual citizenship in Belfast, Northern Ireland

In this article we examine the contours and construction of sexual citizenship in Belfast, Northern Ireland through in-depth interviews with 30 members of the GLBT community and a discursive analysis of discourses of religion and nationalism. In the first half of the article we outline how sexual citizenship was constructed in the Irish context from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, arguing that a moral conservatism developed as a result of religious reform and the interplay between Catholic and Protestant churches, and the redefining of masculinity and femininity with the rise of nationalism. In the second half of the article, we detail how the Peace Process has offered new opportunities to challenge and destabilise hegemonic discourses of sexual citizenship by transforming legislation and policing, and encouraging inward investment and gentrification

Class Is Not Dead! It Has Been Buried Alive

By means of a reanalysis of the most relevant data source—the International Social Mobility and Politics File—this article criticizes the newly grown consensus in political sociology that class voting has declined since World War II. An increase in crosscutting cultural voting, rooted in educational differences rather than a decline in class voting, proves responsible for the decline of traditional class-party alignments. Moreover, income differences have not become less but more consequential for voting behavior during this period. It is concluded that the new consensus has been built on quicksand. Class is not dead—it has been buried alive under the increasing weight of cultural voting, systematically misinterpreted as a decline in class voting because of the widespread application of the so-called Alford index

The CMS Phase-1 pixel detector upgrade

The CMS detector at the CERN LHC features a silicon pixel detector as its innermost subdetector. The original CMS pixel detector has been replaced with an upgraded pixel system (CMS Phase-1 pixel detector) in the extended year-end technical stop of the LHC in 2016/2017. The upgraded CMS pixel detector is designed to cope with the higher instantaneous luminosities that have been achieved by the LHC after the upgrades to the accelerator during the first long shutdown in 2013–2014. Compared to the original pixel detector, the upgraded detector has a better tracking performance and lower mass with four barrel layers and three endcap disks on each side to provide hit coverage up to an absolute value of pseudorapidity of 2.5. This paper describes the design and construction of the CMS Phase-1 pixel detector as well as its performance from commissioning to early operation in collision data-taking.Peer reviewe