354 research outputs found

    Modality, Potentiality and Contradiction in Quantum Mechanics

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    In [11], Newton da Costa together with the author of this paper argued in favor of the possibility to consider quantum superpositions in terms of a paraconsistent approach. We claimed that, even though most interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM) attempt to escape contradictions, there are many hints that indicate it could be worth while to engage in a research of this kind. Recently, Arenhart and Krause [1, 2, 3] have raised several arguments against this approach and claimed that, taking into account the square of opposition, quantum superpositions are better understood in terms of contrariety propositions rather than contradictory propositions. In [17] we defended the Paraconsistent Approach to Quantum Superpositions (PAQS) and provided arguments in favor of its development. In the present paper we attempt to analyze the meanings of modality, potentiality and contradiction in QM, and provide further arguments of why the PAQS is better suited, than the Contrariety Approach to Quantum Superpositions (CAQS) proposed by Arenhart and Krause, to face the interpretational questions that quantum technology is forcing us to consider.Comment: Published in: New Directions in Paraconsistent Logic, J-Y B\'eziau M. Chakraborty & S. Dutta (Eds.), Springer, in press. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1404.518

    The strong emergence of molecular structure

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    One of the most plausible and widely discussed examples of strong emergence is molecular structure. The only detailed account of it, which has been very influential, is due to Robin Hendry and is formulated in terms of downward causation. This paper explains Hendry’s account of the strong emergence of molecular structure and argues that it is coherent only if one assumes a diachronic reflexive notion of downward causation. However, in the context of this notion of downward causation, the strong emergence of molecular structure faces three challenges that have not been met and which have so far remained unnoticed. First, the putative empirical evidence presented for the strong emergence of molecular structure equally undermines supervenience, which is one of the main tenets of strong emergence. Secondly, it is ambiguous how the assumption of determinate nuclear positions is invoked for the support of strong emergence, as the role of this assumption in Hendry’s argument can be interpreted in more than one way. Lastly, there are understandings of causation which render the postulation of a downward causal relation between a molecule’s structure and its quantum mechanical entities, untenable

    G\"odel Incompleteness and the Black Hole Information Paradox

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    Semiclassical reasoning suggests that the process by which an object collapses into a black hole and then evaporates by emitting Hawking radiation may destroy information, a problem often referred to as the black hole information paradox. Further, there seems to be no unique prediction of where the information about the collapsing body is localized. We propose that the latter aspect of the paradox may be a manifestation of an inconsistent self-reference in the semiclassical theory of black hole evolution. This suggests the inadequacy of the semiclassical approach or, at worst, that standard quantum mechanics and general relavity are fundamentally incompatible. One option for the resolution for the paradox in the localization is to identify the G\"odel-like incompleteness that corresponds to an imposition of consistency, and introduce possibly new physics that supplies this incompleteness. Another option is to modify the theory in such a way as to prohibit self-reference. We discuss various possible scenarios to implement these options, including eternally collapsing objects, black hole remnants, black hole final states, and simple variants of semiclassical quantum gravity.Comment: 14 pages, 2 figures; revised according to journal requirement

    Functional kinds: a skeptical look

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    The functionalist approach to kinds has suffered recently due to its association with law-based approaches to induction and explanation. Philosophers of science increasingly view nomological approaches as inappropriate for the special sciences like psychology and biology, which has led to a surge of interest in approaches to natural kinds that are more obviously compatible with mechanistic and model-based methods, especially homeostatic property cluster theory. But can the functionalist approach to kinds be weaned off its dependency on laws? Dan Weiskopf has recently offered a reboot of the functionalist program by replacing its nomological commitments with a model-based approach more closely derived from practice in psychology. Roughly, Weiskopf holds that the natural kinds of psychology will be the functional properties that feature in many empirically successful cognitive models, and that those properties need not be localized to parts of an underlying mechanism. I here skeptically examine the three modeling practices that Weiskopf thinks introduce such non-localizable properties: fictionalization, reification, and functional abstraction. In each case, I argue that recognizing functional properties introduced by these practices as autonomous kinds comes at clear cost to those explanations’ counterfactual explanatory power. At each step, a tempting functionalist response is parochialism: to hold that the false or omitted counterfactuals fall outside the modeler’s explanatory aims, and so should not be counted against functional kinds. I conclude by noting the dangers this attitude poses to scientific disagreement, inviting functionalists to better articulate how the individuation conditions for functional kinds might outstrip the perspective of a single modeler

    Next-Generation Sequencing Reveals Significant Bacterial Diversity of Botrytized Wine

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    While wine fermentation has long been known to involve complex microbial communities, the composition and role of bacteria other than a select set of lactic acid bacteria (LAB) has often been assumed either negligible or detrimental. This study served as a pilot study for using barcoded amplicon next-generation sequencing to profile bacterial community structure in wines and grape musts, comparing the taxonomic depth achieved by sequencing two different domains of prokaryotic 16S rDNA (V4 and V5). This study was designed to serve two goals: 1) to empirically determine the most taxonomically informative 16S rDNA target region for barcoded amplicon sequencing of wine, comparing V4 and V5 domains of bacterial 16S rDNA to terminal restriction fragment length polymorphism (TRFLP) of LAB communities; and 2) to explore the bacterial communities of wine fermentation to better understand the biodiversity of wine at a depth previously unattainable using other techniques. Analysis of amplicons from the V4 and V5 provided similar views of the bacterial communities of botrytized wine fermentations, revealing a broad diversity of low-abundance taxa not traditionally associated with wine, as well as atypical LAB communities initially detected by TRFLP. The V4 domain was determined as the more suitable read for wine ecology studies, as it provided greater taxonomic depth for profiling LAB communities. In addition, targeted enrichment was used to isolate two species of Alphaproteobacteria from a finished fermentation. Significant differences in diversity between inoculated and uninoculated samples suggest that Saccharomyces inoculation exerts selective pressure on bacterial diversity in these fermentations, most notably suppressing abundance of acetic acid bacteria. These results determine the bacterial diversity of botrytized wines to be far higher than previously realized, providing further insight into the fermentation dynamics of these wines, and demonstrate the utility of next-generation sequencing for wine ecology studies

    Extending List’s levels

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    Christian List (Noûs, forthcoming, 2018, [24]) has recently proposed a category-theoretic model of a system of levels, applying it to various pertinent metaphysical questions. We modify and extend this framework to correct some minor defects and better adapt it to application in philosophy of science. This includes a richer use of category theoretic ideas and some illustrations using social choice theory

    Factive Scientific Understanding Without Accurate Representation

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    This paper analyzes two ways idealized biological models produce factive scientific understanding. I then argue that models can provide factive scientific understanding of a phenomenon without providing an accurate representation of the (difference-making) features of their real-world target system(s). My analysis of these cases also suggests that the debate over scientific realism needs to investigate the factive scientific understanding produced by scientists’ use of idealized models rather than the accuracy of scientific models themselves
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