Racjonalność filozofii Edyty Stein

Starting from Ernst Tugendhat’s discrimination of the ‘dogmatic’ and the‘critical’ motive of Husserl’s epistemology, the author argues that the former leads to anatomistic, analytic theory of ‘pure consciousness’, while the latter needs to be developedby holistic approach, in which the cognitive justification – as Ernest Sosa put it – derivesultimately not from direct obviousness or plausibility alone but from maximum coherencewith all relevant considerations, including all relevant intuitively plausible data. Inthe centre of Edith Stein’s philosophy lies an elaborate theory of sense showing a hierarchicalorder of beings. This seems to involve just the ‘critical’ attitude. Yet, if this is correct,Stein’s understanding of the ‘moments of essence’ as constituting the upper layer ofthe order of sense seems to be a relic of the Husserlian ‘dogmatic’, atomistic motiv

Roman Ingarden a metafizyka

Roman Ingarden and Metaphysics Roman Ingarden sees a human person  as a power which builds itself up, exists and becomes free by its effort to realize goodness, beauty and truth. In an essay delivered 25 years ago, its author expressed doubt concerning the applicability of Ingarden's ontology to the realization of such an enterprise. In the first place, this is a very dynamic idea of a human person, while Ingarden's ontology, based on the Husserlian analysis of perception, is utterly static. Moreover, Ingarden lays great stress on the existence and importance of values, but is not able to find a place for them in his ontology. His speaking of some 'higher powers' which we sometimes experience, is a rather enigmatic or even euphemistic way of expressing the problem of God by a thinker who in such a strong way accepts the main tenets of the Judeo-Greek understanding of humanity, the very basis of the European culture. To realize goodness one needs to know the truth about it, to accept the intelligibility of the world in which we live. But for the Modernity God's existence is not guaranteed by the intelligibility of being any more but, vice versa, only God could guarantee the intelligibility of being. In this way, Ingarden's idea of a human person presupposes a metaphysics of truth and goodness and a metaphysics of God. Only such a metaphysics can be a sort of a map of the world in which we live, a map indispensable to the enterprise of moving in it in order to realize truth and goodness − the necessary condition, according to Ingarden, of the existence and development of a human person. To make this clear, the author compares the attitude to the problem of God of Friedrich Nietzsche and of Richard Rorty and argues that not the vague hopes of the postmodern thought, but only an effort of building up a culture of love and charity as understood by John Paul II may make the life on this earth better.]]>Roman Ingarden and Metaphysics Roman Ingarden sees a human person  as a power which builds itself up, exists and becomes free by its effort to realize goodness, beauty and truth. In an essay delivered 25 years ago, its author expressed doubt concerning the applicability of Ingarden's ontology to the realization of such an enterprise. In the first place, this is a very dynamic idea of a human person, while Ingarden's ontology, based on the Husserlian analysis of perception, is utterly static. Moreover, Ingarden lays great stress on the existence and importance of values, but is not able to find a place for them in his ontology. His speaking of some 'higher powers' which we sometimes experience, is a rather enigmatic or even euphemistic way of expressing the problem of God by a thinker who in such a strong way accepts the main tenets of the Judeo-Greek understanding of humanity, the very basis of the European culture. To realize goodness one needs to know the truth about it, to accept the intelligibility of the world in which we live. But for the Modernity God's existence is not guaranteed by the intelligibility of being any more but, vice versa, only God could guarantee the intelligibility of being. In this way, Ingarden's idea of a human person presupposes a metaphysics of truth and goodness and a metaphysics of God. Only such a metaphysics can be a sort of a map of the world in which we live, a map indispensable to the enterprise of moving in it in order to realize truth and goodness − the necessary condition, according to Ingarden, of the existence and development of a human person. To make this clear, the author compares the attitude to the problem of God of Friedrich Nietzsche and of Richard Rorty and argues that not the vague hopes of the postmodern thought, but only an effort of building up a culture of love and charity as understood by John Paul II may make the life on this earth better.]]

The Rationality of Edith Stein’s Philosophy

Starting from Ernst Tugendhat’s discrimination of the ‘dogmatic’ and the‘critical’ motive of Husserl’s epistemology, the author argues that the former leads to anatomistic, analytic theory of ‘pure consciousness’, while the latter needs to be developedby holistic approach, in which the cognitive justification – as Ernest Sosa put it – derivesultimately not from direct obviousness or plausibility alone but from maximum coherencewith all relevant considerations, including all relevant intuitively plausible data. Inthe centre of Edith Stein’s philosophy lies an elaborate theory of sense showing a hierarchicalorder of beings. This seems to involve just the ‘critical’ attitude. Yet, if this is correct,Stein’s understanding of the ‘moments of essence’ as constituting the upper layer ofthe order of sense seems to be a relic of the Husserlian ‘dogmatic’, atomistic motiv

Senses and “sensual data”

One of the main goals of modern philosophy was to achieve an in-depth insight into the foundations of empirical knowledge. The problem was expected to be resolved by the analysis of experience. However, the road to a plausible account of experience was at the very beginning obstructed by turning the analysis into a search for clear and distinctive elements of experience and by sticking to purely intellectual intuition as means of this analysis. Moreover, clear and distinctive elements of experience were thought of as the basis of cognitive certainty. Both psychology and philosophy, at least until the nineteen-thirties, were deeply influenced by this essentially rationalistic conception of sensor experience. It is gestalt psychology and phenomenology that should be merited for overcoming that ill-conceived model. Only by taking into account the immediate sensor relation between the human subject and the environment, it is possible to show the kind of unity which is the prerequisite of human intellect

Was Roman Ingarden a phenomenologist?

Roman Ingarden used to say that he is not sure whether he was a phenomenologist. This does not seem to be just coquetry. Transcendental phenomenology in its official Husserlian version did not achieve adequacy of describing our primary experience in its fullness because it began as a sort of science, in the attitude of an 'uninvolved observer'. Yet phenomenology postulated a separate methodology, different from that of science, a methodology understood as building up a new conceptual apparatus based on a full analysis of primary experience – and the phenomenologists did achieve a great progress in this direction – the direction of transcending the limits of some sort of analytic philosophy of 'pure consciousness' based on traditional concepts which phenomenology could seem to be at the beginning. Husserl oscillated between the 'dogmatic' and 'critical' motive discerned in his thought by Ernst Tugendhat: between accepting consciousness as a sphere of absolute insights and seeing such insights as an asymptotic limit of investigation. A similar duality exists also in Ingarden's thought. This duality could have been a motive of Ingarden's doubts

Carta de Andrzej Półtawski a Alain Guy. Cracovia, 3 de Octubre de 1963

Carta de Andrzej Półtawski a Alain Guy en la que le comenta que no ha avanzado mucho en su trabajo pero que acaba de terminar una disertación del problema del mundo externo en la filosofía de G.E. Moore, y que le mande un sumario con sus predilecciones para la Revista Ruch Filozoficzny.- Observaciones: Se conserva el sobre. Andrzej Półtawski profesor de la Universidad Jagiellonian. G.E. Moore (1873-1958), filósofo británico relacionado con la filosofía occidental contemporánea.– Bibliografía que aparece en la carta: Ruch Filozoficzny. Torun: Universidad Nicolás Copérnico, Sociedad filosófica polaca, 1911

Husserl a Ingarden. Z Andrzejem Półtawskim rozmawia Marek Maciejczak

Husserl and IngardenIn the conversation professor Połtawski presents his opinions on the most important aspects of philosophical systems of Husserl and Ingarden.Husserl and IngardenIn the conversation professor Połtawski presents his opinions on the most important aspects of philosophical systems of Husserl and Ingarden