What is regulation? An interdisciplinary concept analysis

The concept of regulation is believed to suffer from a lack of shared understanding. Yet, the maturation of the field raises the question whether this conclusion is still valid. By taking a new methodological approach towards this question of conceptual consolidation, this study assesses how regulation is conceived in the most-cited articles in six social science disciplines. Four main conclusions are drawn. First, there is a remarkable absence of explicit definitions. Second, the scope of the concept is vast, which requires us to talk about regulation in rather abstract terms. Third, scholars largely agree that ‘prototype regulation’ is characterised by interventions which are intentional and direct – involving binding standard-setting, monitoring and sanctioning – and exercised by public-sector actors on the economic activities of private-sector actors. Fourth, while there is considerable variation in research concerns, this variation cannot be attributed to disciplinary differences. Instead, our findings support the portrayal of the field as interdisciplinary, including a shared conception of regulation

Technocracy, the Market and the Governance of England's National Health Service

England's National Health Service, the fifth largest employer in the world, has become heavily influenced by expert authority and the market economy, which has had implications for accountability and the receptiveness of health decisions to stakeholder needs. One response has been the introduction of a range of regulatory provisions designed to facilitate effective governance and stakeholder engagement. These provisions are scrutinized using three conceptual devices: core accountability, social reporting and social learning. These devices have significant implications, as they enable technical experts to form closed communities, communicate among themselves mainly about economic and financial matters, and make decisions that aid the market without meaningful recourse to citizens. While technical experts are necessary to help manage complex areas, current arrangements reinforce an existing gap between economic and democratic values through hardened technocratic approaches to health care governance

Regulatory Constructivism: Application of Q Methodology in Italy and China

Conventional view holds that beliefs play an important role in the development of regulations but there is little evidence to support this claim. We use Comparative Q Methodology to systematically map out and compare the beliefs of public officers in China and Italy, two countries with contrasting sets of institutions but have both adopted similar ideas about integrated water resource management. We find some similarities and differences in the beliefs of public officers in both countries. In particular, we find that in both countries beliefs on the regulation of water utilities are diverse and fragmented on issues such as ownership structure of water utilities, how water infrastructure development should be funded, and how tariffs should be regulated. Our findings have two implications for theory, methods and practice. First, the Q methodology is a useful tool for systematically mapping out the beliefs of regulators and managers. Second, systematically mapping out beliefs will help facilitate the development of an alternative regime of regulation such as negotiated rule making. This alternative regime can provide substantial benefits such as more efficient rule making, more cost effective enforcement and compliance, and more equitable in terms of balancing the interests of stakeholders

Regulation:Managing the Antinomies of Economic Vice and Virtue

In the quarter-century that SLS has been published, regulation has emerged as a new, and for many exciting, inter-disciplinary field. The concept itself requires a wider view of normativity than the narrow positivist one of law as command. It is certainly protean, ranging over many fundamental questions about the changing nature of the public sphere of politics and the state, and its interactions with the ‘private’ sphere of economic activity and social relations, as well as the mediation of these interactions, especially through law. This survey aims to outline and evaluate some of the main contours of the field as it has developed in this recent period, focusing on the regulation of economic activity. Regulation is seen as having emerged with the withdrawal by governments from direct provision of many economic and social services, to be replaced by corporatist bureaucracies and quasi-public agencies managing the complex public-private interactions of financialised capitalism. The arguments for ‘smart’ regulation have, in an era fixated on neo-liberalism, generally legitimised delegation of responsibility to big business. Its advocates, having been drawn into policy fields, have perhaps too often lost their critical edge, and allowed it to become instrumentalised, reflecting the technicist character of its practice

Toward a “constitution” for behavioral policy-making

Behavioral policy interventions aimed at redirecting individuals’ behavior toward optimal choices are characterized by an important issue which is often overlooked: the lack of an instrument to define what “optimal” means. If agents are subject to behavioral biases leading them to make “wrong” choices, the policy-maker can no longer rely on the revealed preferences approach (e.g., what people choose is what people prefer) for defining a welfare criterion. In this article, we reiterate the argument put forward by some scholars that choosing a suitable welfare criterion once the link between observed choices and individuals’ preferences is broken becomes a problematic task. We review the state of the art in the literature and the possible approaches proposed to overcome the problem, concluding that a solution has not yet been reached. Moreover, we argue that the lack of an established welfare criterion characterizing behavioral policy-making could pave the way to government wanting to restrict individual freedom. In the absence of any legislative constraint for the executive, stating that what individuals choose is not what they prefer in principle justifies any freedom-reducing government intervention, since choices can be arbitrarily labeled “sub-optimal” or “welfare-reducing.” To avoid this risk without turning down the potential of behavioral policy-making, we propose that an independent committee establishes ex ante procedural rules and domains where behavioral policy-making can be implemented. The article suggests some possible examples of normative provisions characterizing this constitution-type document, such as the selective identification of the only sectors where behavioral policies could be effectively applied, the periodic evaluation of policy effects, and the use of sunset clauses