The impact of relative position and returns on sacrifice and reciprocity: an experimental study using individual decisions

We present a comprehensive experimental design that makes it possible to characterize other-regarding preferences and their relationship to the decision maker’s relative position. Participants are faced with a large number of decisions involving variations in the trade-offs between own and other’s payoffs, as well as in other potentially important factors like the decision maker’s relative position. We find that: (1) choices are responsive to the cost of helping and hurting others; (2) The weight a decision maker places on others’ monetary payoffs depends on whether the decision maker is in an advantageous or disadvantageous relative position; and (3) We find no evidence of reciprocity of the type linked to menu-dependence. The results of a mixture-model estimation show considerable heterogeneity in subjects’ motivations and confirm the absence of reciprocal motives. Pure selfish behavior is the most frequently observed behavior. Among the subjects exhibiting social preferences, social-welfare maximization is the most frequent, followed by inequality-aversion and by competitiveness

Accidental Outcomes Guide Punishment in a “Trembling Hand” Game

How do people respond to others' accidental behaviors? Reward and punishment for an accident might depend on the actor's intentions, or instead on the unintended outcomes she brings about. Yet, existing paradigms in experimental economics do not include the possibility of accidental monetary allocations. We explore the balance of outcomes and intentions in a two-player economic game where monetary allocations are made with a “trembling hand”: that is, intentions and outcomes are sometimes mismatched. Player 1 allocates $10 between herself and Player 2 by rolling one of three dice. One die has a high probability of a selfish outcome, another has a high probability of a fair outcome, and the third has a high probability of a generous outcome. Based on Player 1's choice of die, Player 2 can infer her intentions. However, any of the three die can yield any of the three possible outcomes. Player 2 is given the opportunity to respond to Player 1's allocation by adding to or subtracting from Player 1's payoff. We find that Player 2's responses are influenced substantially by the accidental outcome of Player 1's roll of the die. Comparison to control conditions suggests that in contexts where the allocation is at least partially under the control of Player 1, Player 2 will punish Player 1 accountable for unintentional negative outcomes. In addition, Player 2's responses are influenced by Player 1's intention. However, Player 2 tends to modulate his responses substantially more for selfish intentions than for generous intentions. This novel economic game provides new insight into the psychological mechanisms underlying social preferences for fairness and retribution

Nonrenewable Resources, Strategic Behavior and the Hotelling Rule: An Experiment

This study uses the methods of experimental economics to investigate possible causes for the failure of the Hotelling rule for nonrenewable resources. We argue that as long as resource stocks are large enough, producers may choose to (partially) ignore the dynamic component of their production decision, shifting production to the present and focusing more on strategic behavior. We experimentally vary stock size in a nonrenewable resource duopoly setting and find that producers with large stocks indeed pay significantly less attention to variables related to dynamic optimization,leading to a failure of the Hotelling rule

Absent cervical spine pedicle and associated congenital spinal abnormalities - a diagnostic trap in a setting of acute trauma: case report

BACKGROUND: Congenital spinal abnormalities can easily be misdiagnosed on plain radiographs. Additional imaging is warranted in doubtful cases, especially in a setting of acute trauma. Case Presentation This patient presented at the emergency unit of our university hospital after a motor vehicle accident and was sent to our radiology department for imaging of the cervical spine. Initial clinical examination and plain radiographs of the cervical spine were performed but not conclusive. Additional CT of the neck helped establish the right diagnosis. CONCLUSION: CT as a three-dimensional imaging modality with the possibility of multiplanar reconstructions allows for the exact diagnosis and exclusion of acute traumatic lesions of the cervical spine, especially in cases of doubtful plain radiographs and when congenital spinal abnormalities like absent cervical spine pedicle with associated spina bifida may insinuate severe trauma

Trust, Salience and Deterrence: Evidence from an Antitrust Experiment

We present results from a laboratory experiment identifying the main channels through which different law enforcement strategies deter organized economic crime. The absolute level of a fine has a strong deterrence effect, even when the exogenous probability of apprehension is zero. This effect appears to be driven by distrust or fear of betrayal, as it increases significantly when the incentives to betray partners are strengthened by policies offering amnesty to “turncoat whistleblowers”. We also document a strong deterrence effect of the sum of fines paid in the past, which suggests a significant role for salience or availability heuristic in law enforcement

Height and timing of growth spurt during puberty in young people living with vertically acquired HIV in Europe and Thailand.

OBJECTIVE: The aim of this study was to describe growth during puberty in young people with vertically acquired HIV. DESIGN: Pooled data from 12 paediatric HIV cohorts in Europe and Thailand. METHODS: One thousand and ninety-four children initiating a nonnucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor or boosted protease inhibitor based regimen aged 1-10 years were included. Super Imposition by Translation And Rotation (SITAR) models described growth from age 8 years using three parameters (average height, timing and shape of the growth spurt), dependent on age and height-for-age z-score (HAZ) (WHO references) at antiretroviral therapy (ART) initiation. Multivariate regression explored characteristics associated with these three parameters. RESULTS: At ART initiation, median age and HAZ was 6.4 [interquartile range (IQR): 2.8, 9.0] years and -1.2 (IQR: -2.3 to -0.2), respectively. Median follow-up was 9.1 (IQR: 6.9, 11.4) years. In girls, older age and lower HAZ at ART initiation were independently associated with a growth spurt which occurred 0.41 (95% confidence interval 0.20-0.62) years later in children starting ART age 6 to 10 years compared with 1 to 2 years and 1.50 (1.21-1.78) years later in those starting with HAZ less than -3 compared with HAZ at least -1. Later growth spurts in girls resulted in continued height growth into later adolescence. In boys starting ART with HAZ less than -1, growth spurts were later in children starting ART in the oldest age group, but for HAZ at least -1, there was no association with age. Girls and boys who initiated ART with HAZ at least -1 maintained a similar height to the WHO reference mean. CONCLUSION: Stunting at ART initiation was associated with later growth spurts in girls. Children with HAZ at least -1 at ART initiation grew in height at the level expected in HIV negative children of a comparable age

Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment

Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the process of belief formation and evolution in a signaling game in which a common prior is not induced. Both prior and posterior beliefs of Receivers about Senders' types are elicited, as well as beliefs of Senders about Receivers' strategies. In the experiment, subjects often start with diffuse uniform beliefs and update them in view of observations. However, the speed of updating is influenced by the strength of initial beliefs. An interesting result is that beliefs about the prior distribution of types are updated slower than posterior beliefs, which incorporate Senders' strategies. In the medium run, for some specifications of game parameters, this leads to outcomes being significantly different from the outcomes of the game in which a common prior is induced. It is also shown that elicitation of beliefs does not considerably change the pattern of play in this game