La guerra de Gaza: antecedentes y consecuencias

Cuando Israel lanzó la ofensiva militar contra Gaza el 27 de diciembre de 2008, no lo hizo en un momento cualquiera. No obstante, como ocurrió en la guerra de Líbano de 2006, los logros estratégicos de Israel en la “Operación Plomo Fundido” se diluyen día tras día. Hamás ha sufrido un duro revés como consecuencia de los 23 días de ofensiva militar en Gaza, pero es la población civil quien se ha llevado la peor parte. Mientras que Israel ha perdido 10 soldados y cuatro civiles, las bajas palestinas ascienden a 1.300 personas, la gran mayoría de las cuales eran no combatientes, incluidos aproximadamente 300 niños. No obstante, como ocurrió en la guerra de Líbano de 2006, los logros estratégicos de Israel en la “Operación Plomo Fundido” se diluyen día tras día. Si Israel hubiera lanzado una dura campaña de tres o cuatro días de duración contra Hamás y sus infraestructuras, el grupo islamista habría despertado menos simpatías en el mundo árabe y es posible que se hubiera podido reinstaurar un alto el fuego bajo las condiciones impuestas por Israel. Sin embargo, tras 23 días de combates, Israel ha quedado muy lejos de alcanzar una victoria estratégica clara. La historia nos dice que la paz en la región –si en efecto es ese el objetivo– no se alcanzará ni con bombas ni con misiles. La guerra de Gaza es una prueba palpable de ello

La estrategia estadounidense en Oriente Medio: luchando por evitar el fracaso

Al analizar la historia estadounidense resulta muy difícil encontrar decisiones presidenciales tan mal fundadas y contraproducentes como la de invadir y ocupar Irak en 2003. Ahora la cuestión es ver si EEUU agravará aún más su tremendo error estratégico decidiendo atacar a Irán. Se avecinan desafíos para EEUU con respecto a Irán, así como en Líbano y Palestina. La suerte del declarado pero vacío empeño de la Administración Bush de promover la reforma política y la democracia en Oriente Medio también pende de un hilo. En este documento se analizan el laberinto al que se enfrenta EEUU en Irak así como la evolución de la estrategia que está elaborando con respecto a Irán

THE SECOND ARAB AWAKENING

After years of false promises and thwarted hopes significant political reform is no longer a hypothetical possibility but a reality. In the annals of the Middle East, the year 2011 is likely to be remembered for quite some time to come. As the year began protests were accelerating in Tunisia, and on January 14 President Zine al-Abidine Ben ‘Ali fled into exile in Saudi Arabia. In neighboring Egypt the Tunisians’ accomplishment lent momentum to widespread demonstrations especially after January 25, 2011, designated (following Tunisia’s example) as the “Day of Rage” (yaum al-ghadab). Eighteen days later, after more than 800 demonstrators were killed by security forces and government-linked thugs, President Husni Mubarak, who had ruled Egypt for three decades, resigned from office, thereby launching a process of political and constitutional transition that is likely to continue for years. Across the Arab world, emulative protests spread in nearly every country, with varying success and sometimes with horrendous bloodshed. In Libya, a strongman met his demise; in Yemen, a dictator retreated from the presidency; in Bahrain, protesters demanding reform and equitable treatment, were suppressed within weeks by a Saudi-led force that was intended to stymie demands for reform; and, in Syria, chants of “irhal, irhal” (go/scram) were met by brutal government violence and a descent into a civil war that by late 2012 claimed at least 18,000 lives. (Case studies illustrating the widely variant outcomes of popular demands for reform in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria appear below)

'Divided they stand, divided they fail': opposition politics in Morocco

The literature on democratization emphasises how authoritarian constraints usually lead genuine opposition parties and movements to form alliances in order to make demands for reform to the authoritarian regime. There is significant empirical evidence to support this theoretical point. While this trend is partly visible in the Middle East and North Africa, such coalitions are usually short-lived and limited to a single issue, never reaching the stage of formal and organic alliances. This article, using the case of Morocco, seeks to explain this puzzle by focusing on ideological and strategic differences that exist between the Islamist and the secular/liberal sectors of civil society, where significant opposition politics occurs. In addition, this article also aims to explain how pro-democracy strategies of the European Union further widen this divide, functioning as a key obstacle to democratic reforms

Looking ahead: forecasting and planning for the longer-range future, April 1, 2, and 3, 2005

This repository item contains a single issue of the Pardee Conference Series, a publication series that began publishing in 2006 by the Boston University Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future. This was the Center's spring Conference that took place during April 1, 2, and 3, 2005.The conference allowed for many highly esteemed scholars and professionals from a broad range of fields to come together to discuss strategies designed for the 21st century and beyond. The speakers and discussants covered a broad range of subjects including: long-term policy analysis, forecasting for business and investment, the National Intelligence Council Global Trends 2020 report, Europe’s transition from the Marshal plan to the EU, forecasting global transitions, foreign policy planning, and forecasting for defense

Freedom of expression, accountability and development in the Arab region

Mechanisms for ensuring government transparency and accountability have yet to become established in the Arab region, where oil rents and security rents have traditionally enabled governments to provide jobs and services without having to rely heavily, if at all, on raising revenue through personal income tax on citizens. Yet various forms of resource mobilisation, which will be needed in future, are likely to require a greater degree of accountability from those responsible for such mobilisation. This paper considers whether a move in this direction is under way. It reviews government approaches to freedom of expression in the media and among non-governmental organisations. It notes changes that have taken place in this sphere since the start of the 1990s, not all of them positive, and concludes that many more steps remain to be taken if media organisations and NGOs are to exert pressure for accountability on behalf of citizens, and especially the disadvantaged