On the role of deduction in reasoning from uncertain premises

The probabilistic approach to reasoning hypothesizes that most reasoning, both in everyday life and in science, takes place in contexts of uncertainty. The central deductive concepts of classical logic, consistency and validity, can be generalised to cover uncertain degrees of belief. Binary consistency can be generalised to coherence, where the probability judgments for two statements are coherent if and only if they respect the axioms of probability theory. Binary validity can be generalised to probabilistic validity (p-validity), where an inference is p-valid if and only if the uncertainty of its conclusion cannot be coherently greater than the sum of the uncertainties of its premises. But the fact that this generalisation is possible in formal logic does not imply that people will use deduction in a probabilistic way. The role of deduction in reasoning from uncertain premises was investigated across ten experiments and 23 inferences of differing complexity. The results provide evidence that coherence and p-validity are not just abstract formalisms, but that people follow the normative constraints set by them in their reasoning. It made no qualitative difference whether the premises were certain or uncertain, but certainty could be interpreted as the endpoint of a common scale for degrees of belief. The findings are evidence for the descriptive adequacy of coherence and p-validity as computational level principles for reasoning. They have implications for the interpretation of past findings on the roles of deduction and degrees of belief. And they offer a perspective for generating new research hypotheses in the interface between deductive and inductive reasoning. Keywords: Reasoning; deduction; probabilistic approach; coherence; p-validit

Paradigms, possibilities and probabilities: Comment on Hinterecker et al. (2016)

Hinterecker et al. (2016) compared the adequacy of the probabilistic new paradigm in reasoning with the recent revision of mental models theory (MMT) for explaining a novel class of inferences containing the modal term “possibly”. For example, the door is closed or the window is open or both, therefore, possibly the door is closed and the window is open (A or B or both, therefore, possibly(A & B)). They concluded that their results support MMT. In this comment, it is argued that Hinterecker et al. (2016) have not adequately characterised the theory of probabilistic validity (p-validity) on which the new paradigm depends. It is unclear how p-validity can be applied to these inferences, which are anyway peripheral to the theory. It is also argued that the revision of MMT is not well motivated and its adoption leads to many logical absurdities. Moreover, the comparison is not appropriate because these theories are defined at different levels of computational explanation. In particular, revised MMT lacks a provably consistent computational level theory that could justify treating these inferences as valid. It is further argued that the data could result from the non-colloquial locutions used to express the premises. Finally, an alternative pragmatic account is proposed based on the idea that a conclusion is possible if what someone knows cannot rule it out. This account could be applied to the unrevised mental model theory rendering the revision redundant

On the role of deduction in reasoning from uncertain premises

The probabilistic approach to reasoning hypothesizes that most reasoning, both in everyday life and in science, takes place in contexts of uncertainty. The central deductive concepts of classical logic, consistency and validity, can be generalised to cover uncertain degrees of belief. Binary consistency can be generalised to coherence, where the probability judgments for two statements are coherent if and only if they respect the axioms of probability theory. Binary validity can be generalised to probabilistic validity (p-validity), where an inference is p-valid if and only if the uncertainty of its conclusion cannot be coherently greater than the sum of the uncertainties of its premises. But the fact that this generalisation is possible in formal logic does not imply that people will use deduction in a probabilistic way. The role of deduction in reasoning from uncertain premises was investigated across ten experiments and 23 inferences of differing complexity. The results provide evidence that coherence and p-validity are not just abstract formalisms, but that people follow the normative constraints set by them in their reasoning. It made no qualitative difference whether the premises were certain or uncertain, but certainty could be interpreted as the endpoint of a common scale for degrees of belief. The findings are evidence for the descriptive adequacy of coherence and p-validity as computational level principles for reasoning. They have implications for the interpretation of past findings on the roles of deduction and degrees of belief. And they offer a perspective for generating new research hypotheses in the interface between deductive and inductive reasoning. Keywords: Reasoning; deduction; probabilistic approach; coherence; p-validit

Possible Detection of Low Energy Solar Neutrons Using Boron Based Materials

Solar neutrons have been detected aboard the International Space Station (ISS), using lithium tetraborate and boron carbide detector elements. We find that evidence of a solar neutron flux, as detected in a neutron calorimeter following subtraction of the proton background, with an energy of about 2 to 4 MeV. This solar neutron flux is likely no more than 250 to 375 neutrons cm−2sec−1, with a lower bound of 50–75 neutrons cm−2sec−1 at one au

Omecamtiv mecarbil in chronic heart failure with reduced ejection fraction, GALACTIC‐HF: baseline characteristics and comparison with contemporary clinical trials

Aims: The safety and efficacy of the novel selective cardiac myosin activator, omecamtiv mecarbil, in patients with heart failure with reduced ejection fraction (HFrEF) is tested in the Global Approach to Lowering Adverse Cardiac outcomes Through Improving Contractility in Heart Failure (GALACTIC‐HF) trial. Here we describe the baseline characteristics of participants in GALACTIC‐HF and how these compare with other contemporary trials. Methods and Results: Adults with established HFrEF, New York Heart Association functional class (NYHA) ≥ II, EF ≤35%, elevated natriuretic peptides and either current hospitalization for HF or history of hospitalization/ emergency department visit for HF within a year were randomized to either placebo or omecamtiv mecarbil (pharmacokinetic‐guided dosing: 25, 37.5 or 50 mg bid). 8256 patients [male (79%), non‐white (22%), mean age 65 years] were enrolled with a mean EF 27%, ischemic etiology in 54%, NYHA II 53% and III/IV 47%, and median NT‐proBNP 1971 pg/mL. HF therapies at baseline were among the most effectively employed in contemporary HF trials. GALACTIC‐HF randomized patients representative of recent HF registries and trials with substantial numbers of patients also having characteristics understudied in previous trials including more from North America (n = 1386), enrolled as inpatients (n = 2084), systolic blood pressure < 100 mmHg (n = 1127), estimated glomerular filtration rate < 30 mL/min/1.73 m2 (n = 528), and treated with sacubitril‐valsartan at baseline (n = 1594). Conclusions: GALACTIC‐HF enrolled a well‐treated, high‐risk population from both inpatient and outpatient settings, which will provide a definitive evaluation of the efficacy and safety of this novel therapy, as well as informing its potential future implementation

Identifying barriers and facilitators affecting the valorization of olive oil by-products

The climate crisis, inflicting extreme weather conditions and crop-killing high temperatures, caused agricultural producers to examine their methods to see how they can become more sustainable to combat negative effects. One way to increase sustainability, adopting a circular economic model of production, involves designing out or valorizing waste into economically valuable by-products that can be sold and used as a resource for other products. The production of olive oil, an economically important product for countries like Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece, creates waste like wastewater, solid olive waste, and solid-liquid bagasse that has a negative impact on the environment if left untreated. The objective of this thesis is to identify which barriers are preventing olive oil producers from adopting a circular production model, and which factors are facilitating producers into successfully applying this model. To investigate, we conducted interviews with a random sample of three olive oil producers located in Portugal. The results indicated that the barriers were high transportation costs from rural areas, having a low-risk approach to sustainability, and the lack of vital financial and technological resources. The facilitators that were helping producers become more sustainable included access to funding from the EU, having a high-involvement sustainability approach, and the commitment to make investments in innovation and technology. The implications of these findings emphasize the need for governmental organizations to create financial and technological resources for olive oil producers to innovate their production systems with sustainability integrated into the new design.A crise climática, infligindo condições climatéricas extremas e temperaturas elevadas, levou os produtores agrícolas a examinar os seus métodos para verificar como poderiam combater os consequentes efeitos negativos e tornarem-se mais sustentáveis. Uma forma de aumentar a sustentabilidade, adotando um modelo económico circular de produção, envolve valorizar resíduos em subprodutos economicamente valiosos que podem ser vendidos e utilizados como recurso para outros produtos. A produção de azeite, um produto economicamente importante para países como Espanha, Portugal, Itália, e Grécia, cria resíduos como águas residuais, resíduos sólidos de azeitonas e o bagaço de azeitona sólido-líquido, que tem um impacto negativo no ambiente caso não tratado. O objetivo desta tese é identificar quais as barreiras que impedem os produtores de azeite de adotar um modelo de produção circular, e quais os fatores que facilitam aos produtores a aplicação bem sucedida deste modelo. Para investigar, realizámos entrevistas a uma amostra de três produtores de azeite situados em Portugal. Os resultados indicaram que as maiores barreiras eram os custos de transporte nas zonas rurais, ter uma abordagem de baixo risco para a sustentabilidade, e a falta de recursos financeiros e tecnológicos. Os facilitadores que ajudariam os produtores a tornarem-se mais sustentáveis incluíam o acesso ao financiamento, ter uma estratégico abordagem de sustentabilidade e o compromisso de efetuar investimentos em inovação e tecnologia. As implicações destas descobertas sublinham a necessidade das organizações de criar recursos financeiros e tecnológicos para que os produtores de azeite inovem os seus sistemas de produção com sustentabilidade integrada na conceção

Sur le rôle de la déduction dans le raisonnement à partir de prémisses incertaines

The probabilistic approach to reasoning hypothesizes that most reasoning, both in everyday life and in science, takes place in contexts of uncertainty. The central deductive concepts of classical logic, consistency and validity, can be generalised to cover uncertain degrees of belief. Binary consistency can be generalised to coherence, where the probability judgments for two statements are coherent if and only if they respect the axioms of probability theory. Binary validity can be generalised to probabilistic validity (p-validity), where an inference is p-valid if and only if the uncertainty of its conclusion cannot be coherently greater than the sum of the uncertainties of its premises. But the fact that this generalisation is possible in formal logic does not imply that people will use deduction in a probabilistic way. The role of deduction in reasoning from uncertain premises was investigated across ten experiments and 23 inferences of differing complexity. The results provide evidence that coherence and p-validity are not just abstract formalisms, but that people follow the normative constraints set by them in their reasoning. It made no qualitative difference whether the premises were certain or uncertain, but certainty could be interpreted as the endpoint of a common scale for degrees of belief. The findings are evidence for the descriptive adequacy of coherence and p-validity as computational level principles for reasoning. They have implications for the interpretation of past findings on the roles of deduction and degrees of belief. And they offer a perspective for generating new research hypotheses in the interface between deductive and inductive reasoning.L’approche probabiliste du raisonnement émet l’hypothèse que la plupart des raisonnements, aussi bien dans la vie quotidienne qu’en science, se réalisent dans des contextes d’incertitude. Les concepts déductifs centraux de la logique classique, consistance et validité, peuvent être généralisés afin d’englober des degrés de croyance incertains. La consistance binaire peut être généralisée à travers la dénomination de cohérence, lorsque les jugements de probabilité à deux affirmations sont cohérents seulement s’ils respectent les axiomes de la théorie de la probabilité. La validité binaire peut se généraliser comme validité probabiliste (validité-p), lorsqu’une interférence est valide-p seulement si l’incertitude de sa conclusion ne peut être de façon cohérente plus grande que la somme des incertitudes de ses prémisses. Cependant le fait que cette généralisation soit possible dans une logique formelle n’implique pas le fait que les gens utilisent la déduction de manière probabiliste. Le rôle de la déduction dans le raisonnement à partir de prémisses incertaines a été étudié à travers dix expériences et 23 inférences de complexités différentes. Les résultats mettent en évidence le fait que la cohérence et la validité-p ne sont pas juste des formalismes abstraits, mais que les gens vont suivre les contraintes normatives établies par eux dans leur raisonnement. Que les prémisses soient certaines ou incertaines n’a pas créé de différence qualitative, mais la certitude pourrait être interprétée comme l’aboutissement d’une échelle commune de degrés de croyance. Les observations sont la preuve de la pertinence descriptive de la cohérence et de la validité-p comme principes de niveau de calcul pour le raisonnement. Ils ont des implications pour l’interprétation d’observations antérieures sur les rôles de la déduction et des degrés de croyance. Enfin, ils offrent une perspective pour générer de nouvelles hypothèses de recherche quant à l’interface entre raisonnement déductif et inductif

Sur le rôle de la déduction dans le raisonnement à partir de prémisses incertaines

The probabilistic approach to reasoning hypothesizes that most reasoning, both in everyday life and in science, takes place in contexts of uncertainty. The central deductive concepts of classical logic, consistency and validity, can be generalised to cover uncertain degrees of belief. Binary consistency can be generalised to coherence, where the probability judgments for two statements are coherent if and only if they respect the axioms of probability theory. Binary validity can be generalised to probabilistic validity (p-validity), where an inference is p-valid if and only if the uncertainty of its conclusion cannot be coherently greater than the sum of the uncertainties of its premises. But the fact that this generalisation is possible in formal logic does not imply that people will use deduction in a probabilistic way. The role of deduction in reasoning from uncertain premises was investigated across ten experiments and 23 inferences of differing complexity. The results provide evidence that coherence and p-validity are not just abstract formalisms, but that people follow the normative constraints set by them in their reasoning. It made no qualitative difference whether the premises were certain or uncertain, but certainty could be interpreted as the endpoint of a common scale for degrees of belief. The findings are evidence for the descriptive adequacy of coherence and p-validity as computational level principles for reasoning. They have implications for the interpretation of past findings on the roles of deduction and degrees of belief. And they offer a perspective for generating new research hypotheses in the interface between deductive and inductive reasoning.L’approche probabiliste du raisonnement émet l’hypothèse que la plupart des raisonnements, aussi bien dans la vie quotidienne qu’en science, se réalisent dans des contextes d’incertitude. Les concepts déductifs centraux de la logique classique, consistance et validité, peuvent être généralisés afin d’englober des degrés de croyance incertains. La consistance binaire peut être généralisée à travers la dénomination de cohérence, lorsque les jugements de probabilité à deux affirmations sont cohérents seulement s’ils respectent les axiomes de la théorie de la probabilité. La validité binaire peut se généraliser comme validité probabiliste (validité-p), lorsqu’une interférence est valide-p seulement si l’incertitude de sa conclusion ne peut être de façon cohérente plus grande que la somme des incertitudes de ses prémisses. Cependant le fait que cette généralisation soit possible dans une logique formelle n’implique pas le fait que les gens utilisent la déduction de manière probabiliste. Le rôle de la déduction dans le raisonnement à partir de prémisses incertaines a été étudié à travers dix expériences et 23 inférences de complexités différentes. Les résultats mettent en évidence le fait que la cohérence et la validité-p ne sont pas juste des formalismes abstraits, mais que les gens vont suivre les contraintes normatives établies par eux dans leur raisonnement. Que les prémisses soient certaines ou incertaines n’a pas créé de différence qualitative, mais la certitude pourrait être interprétée comme l’aboutissement d’une échelle commune de degrés de croyance. Les observations sont la preuve de la pertinence descriptive de la cohérence et de la validité-p comme principes de niveau de calcul pour le raisonnement. Ils ont des implications pour l’interprétation d’observations antérieures sur les rôles de la déduction et des degrés de croyance. Enfin, ils offrent une perspective pour générer de nouvelles hypothèses de recherche quant à l’interface entre raisonnement déductif et inductif

On the role of deduction in reasoning from uncertain premises

L’approche probabiliste du raisonnement émet l’hypothèse que la plupart des raisonnements, aussi bien dans la vie quotidienne qu’en science, se réalisent dans des contextes d’incertitude. Les concepts déductifs centraux de la logique classique, consistance et validité, peuvent être généralisés afin d’englober des degrés de croyance incertains. La consistance binaire peut être généralisée à travers la dénomination de cohérence, lorsque les jugements de probabilité à deux affirmations sont cohérents seulement s’ils respectent les axiomes de la théorie de la probabilité. La validité binaire peut se généraliser comme validité probabiliste (validité-p), lorsqu’une interférence est valide-p seulement si l’incertitude de sa conclusion ne peut être de façon cohérente plus grande que la somme des incertitudes de ses prémisses. Cependant le fait que cette généralisation soit possible dans une logique formelle n’implique pas le fait que les gens utilisent la déduction de manière probabiliste. Le rôle de la déduction dans le raisonnement à partir de prémisses incertaines a été étudié à travers dix expériences et 23 inférences de complexités différentes. Les résultats mettent en évidence le fait que la cohérence et la validité-p ne sont pas juste des formalismes abstraits, mais que les gens vont suivre les contraintes normatives établies par eux dans leur raisonnement. Que les prémisses soient certaines ou incertaines n’a pas créé de différence qualitative, mais la certitude pourrait être interprétée comme l’aboutissement d’une échelle commune de degrés de croyance. Les observations sont la preuve de la pertinence descriptive de la cohérence et de la validité-p comme principes de niveau de calcul pour le raisonnement. Ils ont des implications pour l’interprétation d’observations antérieures sur les rôles de la déduction et des degrés de croyance. Enfin, ils offrent une perspective pour générer de nouvelles hypothèses de recherche quant à l’interface entre raisonnement déductif et inductif.The probabilistic approach to reasoning hypothesizes that most reasoning, both in everyday life and in science, takes place in contexts of uncertainty. The central deductive concepts of classical logic, consistency and validity, can be generalised to cover uncertain degrees of belief. Binary consistency can be generalised to coherence, where the probability judgments for two statements are coherent if and only if they respect the axioms of probability theory. Binary validity can be generalised to probabilistic validity (p-validity), where an inference is p-valid if and only if the uncertainty of its conclusion cannot be coherently greater than the sum of the uncertainties of its premises. But the fact that this generalisation is possible in formal logic does not imply that people will use deduction in a probabilistic way. The role of deduction in reasoning from uncertain premises was investigated across ten experiments and 23 inferences of differing complexity. The results provide evidence that coherence and p-validity are not just abstract formalisms, but that people follow the normative constraints set by them in their reasoning. It made no qualitative difference whether the premises were certain or uncertain, but certainty could be interpreted as the endpoint of a common scale for degrees of belief. The findings are evidence for the descriptive adequacy of coherence and p-validity as computational level principles for reasoning. They have implications for the interpretation of past findings on the roles of deduction and degrees of belief. And they offer a perspective for generating new research hypotheses in the interface between deductive and inductive reasoning